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Abstract 
 
Since the fall of the communist regime in the beginning of 
the 1990s, Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia) have been 
striving to build democratic governments, market 
economies and pluralist societies. Although certain 
progress has been made, more than two decades later the 
Western Balkan states are still ‘stuck’ in an extended form 
of democratic transition, and as such are labeled as ‘hybrid’ 
or ‘semi-consolidated’ regimes. In contrast, most of the 
other post-communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) have displayed greater success in 
institutionalizing democratic pluralism, and have hence 
consolidated their democracies at a much faster pace. 
Taking the actor-based approach as a point of departure in 
explaining democratic consolidation, the aim of this 
dissertation is to empirically examine what are the effects 
of citizens’ participation and elite contestation on the 
advancement of the fragile Western Balkans democracies. 
By employing a time-series cross-section statistical model, I 
statistically assess the effects of citizens’ political 
participation and party competition on the democracy 
levels in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western 
Balkans. However, the focus of my research interest is 
primarily on the Western Balkan states, while the CEE EU 
member states serve just as a term of comparison. 
XVII 
 
Weak participation in politics by ordinary citizens in the 
new European democracies is considered to be one of the 
main causes of the peculiar practices of illiberal democracy 
in these countries. However, I argue that while low levels 
of citizens’ participation leads to hollow or stagnant 
democracy in most democratic systems, higher levels of 
civic engagement is not necessarily an indication for better 
democracy in post-communist Europe. The statistical test 
confirms that indeed there is a strong negative and 
statistically significant correlation between all four types of 
political participation examined in this study (voter 
turnout, party membership, signing petitions and attending 
demonstrations) and the levels of democracy when 
controlled for the Western Balkan region. I contend that 
clientelist practices that are widely spread in the Western 
Balkans account for this relationship. 
The relationship between political competition and the 
levels of democracy in the Western Balkans occupies the 
second part of my thesis. The empirical data reveals that 
CEE EU member states score higher in almost all 
dimensions of political competition compared to the 
Western Balkans. At the same time their party systems 
seem to be less institutionalized, more volatile, less 
distinguishable along ideological stances, as well as 
fragmented and ethnically polarized. Taking this into 
consideration, I argue that enhancing political competition 
would provide an impetus to the democratic development 
in the post-communist countries in Europe, including the 
XVIII 
 
Western Balkans. The large-N statistical test basically 
confirms this hypothesis. I consider three factors as most 
accountable for having the Western Balkan states 
unsuccessful in developing more robust political 
competition compared to their post-communist neighbors. 
These are: absence of an organized opposition to the former 
political order in the first years of their democratic 
transition, strong ethnic cleavage and party corruption. 
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Introduction 
 
‚Whether democracy becomes ‘the only game in 
town’ depends on the quality of democratic interactions 
and processes the consequences of which affect the 
legitimacy of democracy in the eyes of citizens and 
political elites alike‛ (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 1) 
 
More than 20 years after the overthrow of the 
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)1, 
most of the countries in this region are considered 
consolidated democracies. The transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule has opened many new 
opportunities for growth of a peaceful civil society and 
political activism, as well as possibility for competition 
among the political actors. 
Nevertheless, some of the CEE countries which 
underwent democratic regime transformation within the 
last two decades have seemingly stalled. A clear-cut 
example of such unconsolidated democracies that are still 
                                                 
1 Central and Eastern Europe, (abbreviated CEE) is a political definition 
for a region which encompasses the following former communist 
countries in Europe: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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facing the challenges of pursuing market liberalization, 
democratization and rule of law are the countries in the 
Western Balkans (WB)2. They ‚are engaged in an extended 
form of democratic transition with open prospects for 
eventual consolidation< Indeed, Freedom House (2013) 
does not identify any states in the region as ‘consolidated 
democracies’. Instead, the study groups Croatia, Serbia, 
FYR Macedonia, and Montenegro in the category of ‘semi-
consolidated democracies’. The same report then classifies 
Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina as ‘transitional 
governments’ or ‘hybrid regimes’, and labels Kosovo a 
‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’‛ (Balfour and 
Stratulat, 2011, p. 4). The transition fatigue and the 
skepticism regarding the responsiveness of their 
governments have just further raised the frustration and 
disappointment towards the political elites. Thus, finding a 
solution to this growing elite legitimacy problem should be 
of an utmost importance. Besides the effective 
implementation of the rule of law, it is the vibrant civil 
society and other non-institutionalized forms of citizens’ 
involvement that are fundamental for monitoring and 
censoring the government activities, i.e. for providing the 
system with legitimacy. As Balfour and Stratulat (2011, p. 
51) would note: ‚The mobilization of civil society can breed 
civic values that motivate people to act in the name of 
                                                 
2 Western Balkans, (abbreviated WB) is a political definition for a region 
of South-Eastern Europe which encompasses the following countries: 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Kosovo and Albania. 
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substantive democratic demands, putting pressure on their 
elites to supply adequate levels of effective democracy.‛ 
Most of the literature on democratic transition and 
consolidation is dominated by two types of approaches: 
structure- and actor-based approach. The structure-based 
approach developed by the modernization theorists in the 
1950s and 1960s (see Lipset, 1959), emphasizes the 
importance of structural properties of the society (like 
socio-economic development, educational opportunities, 
social or ethnic divisions etc.) as the most favorable factors 
to democratization. On the other hand, actor- or process-
oriented approach pioneered by Dankwart Rustow (1970) 
emphasizes the decisions of the political actors as the most 
important factors for democratization. Linz and Stepan 
(1978) further recognized the importance of political 
processes and elite choices arguing that cultural and 
socioeconomic factors should be seen as conditioning 
variables. Taking the actor-based approach as a point of 
departure in explaining the democratic consolidation in the 
Western Balkan countries, this dissertation focuses on the 
role of the strategic choices of political leaders regarding 
basic institutional arrangements, as well as on the mass 
public commitment to the democratization process.  
It can be said that there are two very broad 
conceptions of democracy (Riker, 1982). One is the so-called 
liberal democracy, while the other is populist or 
participatory democracy. Liberal democracy is considered 
to be elitist because it values the role of elites as legitimate 
representatives of the people. Participatory democracy on 
22 
the other hand emphasizes popular participation, i.e. the 
active engagement in public life. Dahl (1971) argues that 
democracy, or what he calls polyarchy, is present when 
both, contestation and participation in the political process, 
exist in a society. Following this line of reasoning, the aim 
of this dissertation is to empirically examine what are the 
effects of citizens’ participation and elite contestation on the 
advancement of the Western Balkans democracies. By 
focusing on the institutional change, this study raises doubt 
on the assumption that a strong and unified opposition, 
accompanied by high popular mobilization would promote 
democratization in the region. This is mainly because the 
traditional clientelistic relations that are still very much 
present in the countries of the Western Balkans continue to 
erode their democratization and to negatively impact their 
prospects for democratic consolidation. By investigating 
this aspect, I hope to clarify a number of empirical and 
analytical issues critical for comprehending the complexity 
of the Western Balkan’s democratic transformation. As 
‘democratization’ is rather loose term to describe the 
process in-between the collapse of the communist regime 
and establishment of liberal democracy, for the purpose of 
this thesis I use the explanation given by Pridham and 
Vanhanen (1994, p. 2). According to them, 
‘democratization’ is ‚the overall process of regime change 
from beginning to end, including both stages of what are 
generally called in the comparative literature ‘transition’ to 
a liberal democracy and its subsequent ‘consolidation.’‛ 
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In order to confront the theory on actor-centered 
democratic consolidation with empirical evidence, I 
compare two separate regions in post-communist Europe. 
The 10 new CEE EU member states3 which have had 
remarkably successful transitions to democracy represent 
the first block of analysis in this thesis and serve just as a 
term of comparison. Western Balkan countries that have 
faced many difficulties in consolidating their democracies 
will be in the focus of my cross-national investigation. With 
the aim of conducting the empirical inquiry into causal 
relationship, I rely on the large-N quantitative analysis. 
So far several good studies have examined the 
dynamics of political activism of the masses4 and strategic 
choices of the political elites in post-communist societies5. 
Just a few studies deal with the relationship between the 
                                                 
3 ‚CEE EU member states‛ here and further in the text refers to the 10 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. These are: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Although Croatia is also an EU member, it is not 
included in this group, as it was still an EU candidate country at the 
time that most part of this thesis was written. 
4 Among the studies that have analyzed the citizens’ political behavior 
and participation in post-communist Europe are the following: 
Bernhagen and Marsh (2007); Howard (2003); Karp and Banducci 
(2007); Kitschelt et al. (1999); Kostadinova (2003); Kostadinova and 
Power (2007); Kostelka (2010); Letki (2003); Mierina (2011); Pierobon 
(2010); Pollack et al. (2003); Vachudova (2005a, 2011). 
5 Among the studies that have analyzed strategic choices of the political 
elites in post-communist Europe are the following: Hanley et al. (1998); 
Innes (2002); Karp and Banducci (2007); Kitschelt et al. (1999); 
Lagerspetz (2009); Mierina (2011); Vachudova (2005a, 2011). 
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political culture and the state of democracy in post-
communist Europe6. At the same time, there are practically 
no empirical investigations dealing with this important 
aspect of democratization in the Western Balkans. 
Consequently, this PhD thesis attempts to fill this gap in 
the literature and to give a better understanding of the 
specifics of the political culture in the Western Balkans. 
This is particularly important because addressing this issue 
could encourage people to overcome the main challenges 
which confront the civil sector in the Balkans, and at the 
same time the international community to take proactive 
approach in strengthening and promoting substantive 
democracy in the region. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is the following: 
Democratization in the Western Balkan countries seems 
to be mainly elite-driven, as they still haven’t developed sufficient 
levels of genuinely democratic mass participation capable to 
induce political institutions to be responsive and accountable to 
societal interests. What is even more, clientelist-inspired political 
participation, rather than deepening and advancing the principles 
of representative democracy, only undermines further the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
The first chapter deals with the theoretical 
framework and is organized in three main sections. The 
first section provides an overview of the democratic 
                                                 
6 Some of the studies dealing with the relationship between the political 
culture and the state of democracy in post-communist Europe are: 
Klingemann et al. (2006); Pollack et al. (2003); Vachudova (2011). 
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consolidation theories. The second section contains a 
detailed analysis of the process-centered approach in 
explaining democratization. More specifically, this chapter 
gives an overview and analyzes the processes of mass 
mobilization and elite interaction as two competing 
concepts in explaining democratization. The third section 
gives and overview to the literature on the dynamics and 
determinants of democratization in the Western Balkans. 
The second chapter of this thesis provides an insight into 
the peculiarities of the Western Balkans transition. The 
main focus here is the development of the civil society 
sector and the state of the respective political systems. 
However, it also gives a brief overview of the political and 
economic challenges that these countries faced in their 
process of democratic regime-building. The empirical part 
is embedded in the next two chapters (chapters Three and 
Four), which actually represent the main body of the thesis. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the relationship between 
political participation and democracy in the Western 
Balkans. After giving an overview of the theoretical 
framework and development of the hypotheses, I describe 
in more details the data this chapter is based on, as well as 
the methodology that is used. The emphasis is on the 
analysis of the results of the empirical investigation. 
Chapter Four is concerned with the relationship between 
political competition and democracy in the Western 
Balkans and it basically follows the same format as the 
previous one. The thesis ends with a conclusion, where I 
summarize the main results, outline the practical and 
26 
scientific importance of the findings and present concepts 
and ideas for future research. 
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1. Theoretical framework 
 
1.1. Democratic consolidation: theories 
and concepts 
 
Guillermo O'Donnell (1988) rightly asserted that the overall 
change from authoritarianism to democracy contains not 
one but two transitions: the first leads to the ‘installation of 
a democratic government’, and the second to the 
‘consolidation of democracy’. As the new democracies in 
Europe have overthrown the authoritarian rule during the 
seventies and the eighties of the last century, the focus of 
the political scientists has shifted from the analysis of 
democratic transition to problems of democratic 
consolidation. Most of the previous studies were focused 
on the transition pathways starting from the dismantling of 
the authoritarian system to the inauguration and early 
operation of the new democracy, as well as on the 
determinants of political system change. Nevertheless, as 
the overall emphasis of this thesis is on the process of 
democratic consolidation of the Western Balkan countries, 
the theoretical framework is rather focused on this concept. 
Having said that, it is important to initially provide a 
working definition of democratic consolidation. Based on 
the postulates of Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 5), democratic 
regime is consolidated when 1) there are no significant 
actors engaging in secession or regime change; 2) the 
majority of the population holds the belief that democracy 
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is the best form of government and 3) when the 
governmental and nongovernmental actors of the state 
become subjects and act according to the democratic 
institutions. More specifically, as Morlino (2011, p. 110) 
emphasizes, there are three phenomena that should be 
observed more closely when analyzing whether 
consolidation is actually taking place. These are: 
stabilization of electoral behavior, emergence of recurring 
patterns of party competition and stabilization of the 
leadership. It is because ‚they give an immediate picture of 
the stabilization of the relationship between parties and 
civil society, i.e. some of the basic elements in the whole 
process of consolidation<‛ 
There are two main questions to address here: why some 
countries experience faster democratic consolidation than 
others and which are the destabilizing elements that 
prevent democracy to advance and eventually consolidate? 
To answer these questions we should take into account the 
influence of the domestic political, economic and social 
changes, as well as external transnational influences. Two 
of the most important factors for democratic consolidation 
are: the commitment of the government in power to pro-
democratic changes of the political order and the mass 
public commitment to the democratization process. In 
addition to this, political institutions should create rules 
which will support that political order. Morlino (2011, p. 
113) refers this as a process of democratic anchoring, that is, 
the existence of ‚intermediary institutions< able to 
provide alternative choices and, on some occasions, 
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solutions to actual problems people have.‛ More 
specifically, anchoring refers to those intermediate entities 
capable to politically bind citizens and associations, as very 
often there is an asymmetrical relationship between elites at 
the center of those anchors and the citizens. This is 
consistent with the Huntington’s view that ‚organization is 
the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of 
political stability‛ (Huntington, 1968). According to 
Morlino (2011), besides the parties with their organization 
which are the most important anchors in a society, there are 
several other aspects that shape other anchors and 
anchoring effects. These are related to: organized 
associations which have the gate-keeping function, non-
organized, but active elites bound in a patronage or 
clientelist relationship and organized interest bound in 
certain form of neo-corporatist arrangement. As it seems a 
counterintuitive that a clientelist relationship can create a 
specific process of anchoring, I will elaborate this a bit 
further. Namely, (Morlino, 1998, p. 253) argues that ‚in the 
absence of an inclusive legitimation of the new regime, 
party organization, party control of organized groups, and 
forms of party patronage may be necessary if the system is 
to become sufficiently consolidated. Under these 
circumstances, party structures< constrain the behavior of 
individuals and groups in civil society, channeling that 
behavior into democratic institutionalized arenas with the 
capacity to contain conflict.‛ However, this holds true as 
long as the governing parties ‚provide incentives to groups 
to work within the [democratic] system and deny rewards 
to those who overtly challenge its legitimacy.‛ Yet, very 
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often these parties become so dominant and are themselves 
tempted to misuse their position and to start ruling in a 
relatively non-competitive manner.  Although in such 
political systems, other political parties are tolerated, the 
incumbents abuse the state power to intentionally 
undermine the ability for an effective opposition to 
flourish. With the aim of keeping the opposition from 
power, they are using different methods such as placing 
media under their control, restricting the free speech, 
lawsuits against the opposition etc. These conditions are no 
longer considered a source of stability supportive to the 
consolidation of democracy, but rather a possibility of 
reverting to more authoritarian forms of rule. 
Apart from anchoring, the second sub-process that 
characterizes democratic consolidation is legitimation of 
the democratic institutions, i.e. citizens’ belief that ‚in spite 
of shortcomings and failures, existing political institutions 
are better than possible alternative ones‛ (Morlino, 2011, p. 
112). Mainwaring (1989, p. 13) also observes that legitimacy 
may not be present in the initial stages of democracy, but if 
a commitment to democracy fails to emerge over time, 
democracy is in trouble. In the context of this analysis, the 
two sub-processes that characterize crisis within democracy 
are de-anchoring and de-legitimation. 
Bandelj and Radu (2006) add that one of the institutions 
that shape the democratic process is the electoral system. 
The discussion here is which system is more democratic: 
majoritarian or proportional. Most analysts (Linz, 1990; 
Lipset, 1979; Riggs, 1993) hold the belief that majoritarian 
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systems are more stable and efficient. However, Lijphart 
(1999) challenged this idea and argued that proportional 
systems are more democratic because they offer fair 
representation of the minorities. 
Svolik (2013) tries to explain the divergent post-transition 
trajectories in the new democracies by developing a new 
theoretical model of electoral accountability. He 
presupposes that after the transition to democracy, some 
candidates enter politics for personal gain which raises 
doubts among the people about the value of democracy as 
a political system. Therefore, democracy consolidates when 
candidates that run for office only to exploit it conclude 
that their chances of gaining power are too small compared 
to their competitors, and consequently withdraw from 
politics. However, ‚this only occurs when sufficiently 
attractive, non-political careers are available. In poor 
democracies, where politics may be ‘the most profitable 
game in town,’ even increasingly competitive elections may 
not discourage such bad candidates from running for 
office‛ (Svolik, 2013, p. 7). This argument offers a new 
explanation for the positive correlation between the 
survival of democracy and economic development – most 
prominent empirical finding initially outlined by Lipset 
(1959). 
The proposition that ‚democracy is related to the state of 
economic development‛ made by Lipset (1959, p. 75) has 
generated probably the largest body of research in the field 
of political science and has been the subject of extensive 
qualitative and quantitative empirical research up to date 
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(see Bollen, 1979; Dahl, 1989; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; 
Huntington, 1991; Jackman, 1973; Przeworski et al., 2000; 
Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). More specifically, Lipset 
argued that ‚the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy‛ (1959, p. 75). 
Przeworski et al. (2000) further developed this concept, 
offering ‚endogenous‛ and ‚exogenous‛ explanations.7 
They strongly contend that democracies are more likely to 
be found in the highly developed countries. Still, however 
democracies emerge ‚... they are more likely to survive in 
countries that are already developed‛ (Przeworski et al., 
2000, p. 106). 
Social factors such as ethnic and religious fractionalization 
are often considered to influence the democratic 
development, particularly in post-communist countries 
which were historically fragmented along cultural and 
ethnic lines. The classical view on this issue supported by 
Robert A. Dahl (1971) is that the high level of ethno-
linguistic and religious fragmentation is a major 
impediment to democratization, especially in countries 
where nationalistic policies are being used with the aim of 
dominance of the largest ethnic group over the others. 
However, a slightly different explanation on the issue has 
been presented by Beissinger (2007) who examines the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and democratization 
                                                 
7 According to Przeworski et al. (2000), a distinction should be made 
between the democracies which result from economic development 
under authoritarianism (endogenous effect) and democracies which are 
more like to survive in developed countries (exogenous effect). 
33 
in the countries of the post-Soviet Union. He comes to the 
conclusion that ‚ethnic diversity does not affect the 
outcomes of democratization directly, but does so only 
indirectly, through its interaction with and influence over 
other processes < that do have a direct effect on 
democratic outcomes‛ (Beissinger, 2007, p. 78). In addition 
to this, unresolved questions of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity present serious obstacles to democratic 
stability. Robert Dahl (1989, p. 207) correctly observes that 
‚the democratic process presupposes a unit < If the unit is 
not considered proper or rightful – if its scope or domain is 
not justifiable – then it cannot be made rightful simply by 
democratic procedures.‛ Linz and Stepan have also 
emphasized the importance of ‚stateness‛ for the 
democratic development.   According to them, ‚democracy 
is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus without a 
state no modern democracy is possible‛ (Linz and Stepan, 
1996, p. 17). When they refer to ‚stateness‛, they 
presuppose the existence of the following three elements: 
territorial borders, national identity and the right of 
citizenship in the state. Thus, in the case of multinational 
states, the democracy consolidation is hardly possible if the 
state leaders neglect the multinational character and the 
different identities residing within the state, simply because 
that usually leads to violence and political instability. In 
other words, state and nation building process can be 
particularly problematic in ethnically fragmented countries. 
In addition to the domestic context for democratic 
consolidation, there are also external forces that shape this 
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process. They can be divided into ‚transnational 
phenomena, regionalism, non‐governmental organizations, 
and state as well as international institutional actors‛ 
(Zielonka and Pravda, 2001, p. 7). Morlino (2011, p. 145) 
proposes the term ‘external anchoring’ to denote the 
interaction between external influence and domestic 
change processes and distinguishes four key methods of 
influence: imposition, example, conditionality and 
socialization. Governments’ main course of action aimed at 
democracy consolidation, marketization and stability is 
developing economic and political relations with the 
countries in transition. The most important international 
actor that shapes and fosters the process of democratization 
in Central and Eastern Europe is the European Union. The 
aspirations for membership in the EU not only provided 
the impetus to break from the old communist structure, but 
also an institutional framework to support the democratic 
development. The most powerful EU’s tool to induce policy 
change in the candidate and potential-candidate countries 
is conditionality. ‚It is regional, sub-regional, bilateral and 
project-specific and relates to economic, political, social and 
security related criteria‛ (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003). 
Yet, the objectives of democratic consolidation and market 
transformation in some post-communist countries are often 
hard to reach mainly as a result of lack of strategic direction 
on the EU side, and deficit of commitment on the other. 
Many researchers have analyzed the EU conditionality, as 
well as its democracy promotion and assistance targeting 
the post-communist countries in Europe for it to be 
necessary to review all major contributions here.  NATO is 
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another international organization that uses its 
conditionality leverage and influence to encourage states to 
settle outstanding disputes and relieve tensions. However, 
its influence for encouraging democracy is less 
considerable than the EU’s. It is important to note here that, 
although the international factors may induce, condition or 
constrain the course of democratic development, it is the 
domestic dimension that is critical. Therefore the analysis 
of the democratization processes remains essentially within 
the domestic political, economic and social context 
(Morlino, 2011; Zielonka and Pravda, 2001). 
Before proceeding any further, I would like to point out 
that ‘democratic consolidation’ and ‘quality of democracy’ 
denote different things, though the two concepts do 
overlap in some aspects. Because of that, there often is a 
conceptual confusion regarding the use of these two terms. 
The main reason is that the definition of democratic 
consolidation has varied greatly in terms of coverage of 
civil and political rights. As we saw earlier, minimalist 
concepts compete with more demanding classifications. 
Still, ‚consolidation is not just a new phase after the end of 
the transition and institutionalization, as it has been seen 
by many. It is a different process the beginnings of which 
overlap with the second phase of the transition (after the 
founding elections) and which in most cases continues after 
the end of the transition until a characteristic threshold is 
reached after which the new democracy can be considered 
to be consolidated‛ (Puhle, 2005). This suggests that 
‘consolidating democracy’ doesn’t refer only to the 
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survivability of the new democratic regime, but also to the 
moving toward some higher stages of democratic 
performance. And apparently this is where ‘democratic 
consolidation’ often intersects with the term ‘quality of 
democracy’. Leonardo Morlino has put forward one of the 
most systematic conceptual scheme that describes quality 
of democracy. According to him, a ‘quality democracy’ i.e. 
‘good democracy’ is ‚first and foremost a broadly 
legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens 
(quality in terms of result); is one in which the citizens, 
associations, and communities of which it is composed 
enjoy liberty and equality, even in different forms and 
degrees (quality in terms of content); and the citizens 
themselves have the power to check and evaluate whether 
the government pursues the objectives of liberty and 
equality according to the rule of law (quality in terms of 
procedure)‛ (Morlino, 2011, p. 196). And again, ‚the use of 
gradation is essential to understand the extent to which the 
quality under scrutiny is present in a democracy‛ (Morlino, 
2011, p. 35). 
The above said implies that ‘quality of democracy’ is a 
more demanding concept, and as such requires broader 
framework of analysis which combines quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Still, taking into consideration the 
plurality of concepts that describe both the democratic 
consolidation and the quality of democracy and their 
eventual overlapping, I am aware of the risk to create a 
conceptual confusion at some point. This might be 
particularly relevant when it comes to the empirical part of 
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this thesis, as the data that measures the level of democracy 
besides operationalizing democratic consolidation, also 
captures certain qualities of democracy. 
 
1.2. Process-oriented approach in 
explaining democratization 
 
For quite a long time, political scientists have tried to 
explain the dynamics of democratic transition and 
consolidation through the lenses of two alternative 
approaches: structural- vs. process-oriented approach. 
Structure-oriented scholars (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966) typically assume that democracy 
is more likely to emerge and endure in countries with 
higher levels of socio-economic development. However, the 
Third Wave of democratization challenged the structural 
approaches in explaining transitions to democracy. 
Namely, formal transformation to democracy took place in 
countries where it was not expected based on the low level 
of socio-economic development. As a result, new literature 
on democratic transition and consolidation emerged in the 
1980s. It adopted the so-called agency- or process-oriented 
approach which advocates that the establishment and 
advancement of democracy is rather a product of strategic 
interactions and arrangements among political actors (see, 
among others O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 
1988; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). 
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Although process-oriented scholars agree that the process 
of democratization and consolidation largely depends on 
the actions of individuals, they depart on the view whether 
it is the elites or the masses that have the decisive role. 
While some analysts emphasize the role of the ruling elites 
in consolidating the democracy (O'Donnell et al., 1986; 
Przeworski, 1991; Rustow, 1970), others claim that active 
citizens’ engagement in politics provides the system with 
legitimacy, which is crucial for the survival and 
consolidation of the democratic governance (see Almond 
and Verba, 1963, 1989; Diamond, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 
1996; Paxton, 2002; Pollack et al., 2003; Putnam et al., 1993; 
Shils, 1991). However, there are also analysts who argue 
that both participation and competition are qualities that 
can affect all other dimensions of democracy8 (see Morlino, 
2011). With regard to the post-communist countries in 
Europe, Morlino (2011, p. 137) suggests that the political 
legitimation is largely inclusive and that it has three 
characteristics that need to be emphasized. The first one is 
the strongly negative attitude towards the former 
authoritarian regime; the second one is the firm decision of 
East European elites to join EU and NATO as a means to 
                                                 
8 Morlino (2011, p. 197) indicate eight possible dimensions or qualities 
on which democracies might vary. These are: rule of law, electoral 
accountability, inter-institutional accountability, political participation, 
political competition, freedom, equality and responsiveness of 
government. With regard to the claim that participation and 
competition are qualities that can affect all other dimensions of 
democracy, please see the results on the research conducted by 
Diamond and Morlino (2005). 
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achieve all possible political and economic advantages; and 
the third one is the preference of the masses to adopt the 
Western European democratic patterns. With regard to 
anchoring, however, Morlino (2011, p. 137) notes that ‚the 
mobilizational authoritarian past left an unarticulated and 
poorly differentiated civil society‛. Consequently, the civil 
societies in Eastern European countries are very vulnerable 
to political pressure with a widespread party patronage 
and a prevalent practice of political appointment in all 
relevant bureaucratic positions. 
In this study I take as a point of departure the process-
oriented approach in explaining democratization and 
accept the assumption that democracy can survive and 
advance when both, mass public and political elites are 
committed to meet the challenges of democratization. 
However, because for the most part there is a lack of 
consensus to uphold democracy as the only viable system 
of rule, hybrid regimes tend to be particularly unstable 
(Levitsky and Way, 2005). Further on in the chapter I 
discuss both, the process of mass mobilization and the elite 
interaction. 
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1.2.1. Democracy from below: process of 
mass mobilization 
 
Mass participation in elections and other forms of political 
engagement is considered essential for vital democracy. 
Verba et al. (1995, p. 38) defined political participation as an 
‚activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
government action—either directly by effecting the making 
of implementation of public policy or indirectly by 
influencing the selection of people who make those 
policies.‛ Political theory distinguishes between 
conventional (institutional), unconventional (protest-
oriented) and illegal political participation.9 
The classic works by Bendix (1964), Moore (1966) and 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) describe the development of the 
civil society as a result of the demands of the working class 
for integration into the socio-political system. In the words 
of Bendix (1964, p. 73): ‚Rather than engage in a 
millenarian quest for a new social order, the recently 
                                                 
9 The most prominent example of conventional political participation is 
voting. However, it also includes other institutionalized activities such 
as: party membership, involvement in electoral campaign, belonging to 
different activist groups etc. Unconventional political participation 
includes activities that are legal, but often considered inappropriate 
such as: signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful 
demonstrations, joining in strikes. And finally there is illegal 
participation which among others includes activities such as: 
occupying buildings or factories, vandalism, terrorism etc. 
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politicized masses protest against their second-class 
citizenship, demanding the right of participation on terms 
of equality in the political community of the nation-state.‛ 
While the elite-choice approach has become the leading 
paradigm in transition literature, several democratization 
theorists (Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Markoff, 1996; 
McAdam et al., 2001; Paxton, 2002) emphasize that elite 
actions do not happen in social vacuum. Rather, it is the 
mass mobilization and other forms of public involvement 
that make democratic outcome more likely. However, as 
this section is rather aimed at determining the impact of 
citizens’ engagement in democratic consolidation, I will 
further elaborate only this aspect. Having said that, as soon 
as democracy becomes ‘the only game in town’, two very 
different schools of thought collide on whether citizens’ 
participation is an essential ingredient for the success of the 
advanced democracies. Schumpeter and Dahl are the most 
prominent supporters of the concept that vibrant civil 
society is of limited importance to democracy. Dahl (1956, 
p. 89) for instance argues that the active citizens’ 
participation in politics, especially among the lower socio-
economic classes can be dangerous and can lead to 
authoritarianism. Hence, citizens’ role is only to produce a 
government, i.e. to vote. Huntington (1991, p. 9) on the 
other side emphasizes that such a definition of democracy 
is ultimately a ‘minimal definition.’ Some of the most 
outstanding modern critics of electoral democracy such as 
Pateman (1970), Verba et al. (1978), Verba et al. (1995), 
Putnam (2000) argue that active participation of citizens in 
political decision making is vital for the advancement of 
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democracy. It can be said that these two very different 
schools of thought coincide with the two different models 
of democracy: participatory (or direct) and representative 
(or indirect) democracy. 
The introduction of democracy in CEE at the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s created a space for 
civic and political activism. However, it is questionable 
whether citizens of these states adopted the mindset, 
attitudes and behaviors of a civic, participatory culture. 
During the last two decades, scholars have argued that civil 
society in post-communist Europe is particularly weak (see 
Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Howard, 2003; Karp and 
Banducci, 2007; Letki, 2003; Mierina, 2011; Pierobon, 2010). 
This persistent deficit of civil society in CEE is seen as a 
great obstacle to building strong and stable democratic 
systems. The main factors contributing to the low levels of 
political engagement are believed to be part of the 
communist past such as low levels of social capital and 
anti-democratic norms and attitudes (Letki, 2003), as well 
as skepticism regarding the responsiveness of the political 
authorities (Mierina, 2011). At the same time, there were 
cases where the institutions and laws were constructed in a 
way that didn’t leave much space for genuine political 
participation and fair political competition. 
It is important to point out that most of these scholars 
analyze post-communist Europe as a coherent group, 
without paying much of their attention to the variation 
among the countries or regions within the group. However, 
the empirical analysis indicates that there is a fairly wide 
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variation in the levels of political participation among the 
Western Balkans and the rest of Eastern Europe. To be 
precise, Western Balkan states have distinctively higher 
levels of citizens’ engagement in politics than their Eastern 
European neighbors and yet lower levels of democracy. 
The fourth chapter aims to assess and explain this 
discrepancy statistically. 
 
1.2.2. Democracy from above: process of 
elite interaction 
 
As previously mentioned Rustow (1970) and Linz and 
Stepan (1978) were among the first theorists who stressed 
the importance of political processes and elite choices as 
key elements for countries’ democratization. Rustow (1970, 
p. 356), for instance, has argued that democracy ‚is 
acquired by a process of conscious decision at least on the 
part of the top political leadership... A small circle of 
leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role.‛ In other 
words, if the political elites lack a firm commitment to 
democracy, prospects for democracy are dim. As the third 
wave of democratization gathered momentum in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, the scholarly attention to elite behavior 
continued to expand (see Di Palma, 1990; Higley and 
Gunther, 1992; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1992). 
Scholars have mostly focused on whether the institutional 
changes that have occurred with the collapse of the 
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communist regime have altered the composition of the new 
elite (Adam and Tomšič, 2002; Dobry, 2000; Hanley et al., 
1998; Szelényi and Szelényi, 1995). There are basically two 
general theoretical approaches to this issue: circulation vs. 
reproduction of the elites. The elite reproduction theory 
suggests that the changes in CEE did not have an impact on 
the social composition of the elites. In other words, the 
previous elites managed to adapt and remain at the top of 
the social order. According to the theory of elite circulation, 
however, the institutional changes resulted in a structural 
change at the top of the social hierarchy. More precisely, 
the new elite has overtaken the command positions in the 
society (Szelényi and Szelényi, 1995, p. 616). 
A prominent feature of all the Western Balkan states is that 
the collapse of a one-party regime was characterized by a 
wide-ranging ‘reproduction’ of the old regime elites, which 
was in a sharp contrast to the evident ‘circulation’ of elites, 
typical for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.10 At 
the same time, the deep and persistent ethno-political 
polarization has weakened the influence of reformist 
movements that was expected to remove old-regime 
officials from positions of power. 
It is a well-accepted fact that when the elites are willing to 
work within the democratic constitutional rules, the 
chances of survival of the liberal democracy are quite high. 
                                                 
10 For more information on the incumbent party configuration in the 
first decade of the pluralist rule in the Western Balkan states, please see 
Table 1 in Appendix 1. 
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However, very often the political elites in the Western 
Balkans perceive that compliance with the rules of the 
democratic political system is not in line with their interests 
and might undermine their political power. As a result, the 
Western Balkan democracies suffer from a widening gap 
between the interests of their elites and citizens. Cohen and 
Lampe (2011, pp. 234-236) observe that: ‚the weak 
economic performance of political party elites during the 
post-communist period, and also their role in fueling social 
and ethnic divisions in many cases, along with the 
continued presence of extensive corruption in political life, 
has reinforced negative perceptions about political parties. 
[And] ‚the deep mistrust of political party organizations 
and party leaders< in recent years may have crossed the 
threshold of skepticism that is productive for democratic 
consolidation.‛ 
The academic debate on democratic deepening as a factor 
of the political processes in the society goes beyond the 
composition of the elites and their behavior. It also 
encompasses the patterns of political competition between 
and within political parties (Birch, 2001; Filho et al., 2012; 
Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Innes, 2002; Kitschelt et al., 1999; 
Stojarová and Emerson, 2010; Vachudova, 2005a; Wright, 
2008). Vachudova (2005a, p. 11) for instance, proposes that 
the countries which after the fall of the communist regime 
managed to establish genuine competitive political system 
had relatively rapid progress in building liberal democratic 
political institutions, whereas the countries where the 
collapse of communism was followed by the creation of 
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noncompetitive democratic system experienced 
suppression of liberal democratic institutions. She also 
emphasizes that the alternation of political parties in power 
is the most important factor contributing to the quality of 
political competition. 
In most of the Western Balkan states the real political 
competition is rather weak and the ruling elites are free to 
develop rent-seeking strategies at the expense of the society 
as a whole. At the same time, there is a low degree of intra-
party democracy, strong personalization of the parties, 
clientelism, corruption etc. The fourth chapter of this thesis 
deals with the question whether the political competition 
among and within the political actors in the Western 
Balkans is capable to limit the rent-seeking and patronage 
opportunities of the governing parties, as well as to 
accelerate the pace of democratic consolidation. 
 
1.3. Previous research on democratization 
in the Western Balkans 
 
As the third wave of democratization swept across the 
globe, the research on democratization processes has 
occupied the central place of the comparative politics field. 
However, the interest in democracy was at its peak by the 
end of the 1980s, as the wave of democratization reached 
those countries which practically have never experienced a 
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democratic rule (as it was the case with most of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe). As the political 
scientists failed to anticipate the collapse of the communist 
systems in Eastern Europe, they faced a real challenge to 
explore the causes and patterns of democratization in the 
region. Having said that, one should not lose sight of the 
fact that, the process of transition to a liberal democracy 
and its subsequent consolidation are far from complete in 
some of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
most prominent example of this are the Western Balkan 
countries. Having in mind these interregional differences, 
dividing the post-comunist Europe in smaller study units 
would provide us with a more profound understanding of 
the transition and democratization processes of these 
countries (Stojanova, 2013, p. 52). 
Bunce (2000), for example, classifies the post-communist 
countries in Europe with regard to their transitional modes 
– whether they contain elements of pacting (i.e. bridging 
strategy) or elements of mass mobilization (i.e. breaking 
strategy). Namely, she argues that the most successful 
democracies in the post-Socialist world – Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states have 
used a breaking strategy. That is to say, they managed to 
overrule the ex-Socialist elites in the founding years of their 
democratic governance. On the other hand ‚<when the 
electoral strength of the communists versus the opposition 
forces was roughly equal or tilted to the advantage of the 
communists, the costs for both democracy and economic 
reform were high‛ (Bunce, 2000, p. 717). That strategy, as 
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Bunce calls it, is a bridging strategy. Analyzing the first 
years of the transition period in the Western Balkan 
countries where the transformed communist parties won 
the first elections, we see a clear evidence of bridging over 
the communist past. This is evidently illustrated in Table 1. 
What we see in the table is that the old regime parties11 won 
the first parliamentary elections in all the Balkan countries 
(with the exception of Croatia), while the new regime 
parties12 won the first parliamentary elections in all the 
other CEE countries (with the exception of Lithuania). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
However, besides the fact that the Western Balkans is 
acknowledged as a separate political unit in terms of its 
specific democratic transition, there is a substantial gap in 
the literature dedicated to the democratization of the 
region. That is, most of this literature is focused on EU 
democracy promotion in separate countries of the region or 
in the Western Balkans as a whole (see Balfour and 
Stratulat, 2011; Belloni, 2009; Bieber, 2011; Mikovic, 2005; 
Panebianco and Rossi, 2004; Vachudova, 2002, 2005a, 
2005b; Yenigün, 2008). Most of these authors agree that the 
EU has played an important role in stabilizing the region, 
helping to build democratic states and transforming the 
                                                 
11 The old regime parties are the parties most closely associated with 
the prior non-democratic communist regime. 
12 The new regime parties are the parties most closely associated with 
the movement away from communism. 
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formerly state-socialist institutions.13 Therefore, if the pace 
of the EU accession of the Western Balkan states slows 
down, this will almost certainly lead to a deterioration of 
their fragile democracies. As a result ‚Europe might ‘lose’ 
the Balkans once more to nationalism, violence and further 
breakdowns of agreed states and borders, or it might lose 
its leverage to other actors who may not share similar 
views and values with the EU‛ (Balfour and Stratulat, 2011, 
p. 10). 
Nevertheless, some scholars question the effectiveness of 
the EU conditionality in these countries and contend that 
the EU’s leverage as a driving force for policy change is 
quite limited in the Western Balkans (see Djordjevic, 2008; 
Freyburg and Richter, 2008). Arguing that the national 
identity strongly impacts the effectiveness of 
democratization driven by political conditionality, 
Freyburg and Richter (2008, p. 1) wrote: ‚It is questionable 
whether the EU will be able to repeat the story in South 
Eastern Europe (SEE), where again, it made the 
membership offer conditional on democratic criteria. 
Recent developments in the remaining candidate countries 
– Serbia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and also 
                                                 
13 The Balkan countries were offered a clear prospect of EU 
membership at the Thessaloniki Summit held on 21 June, 2003. ‘The 
Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European 
Integration’ proclaimed that ‚The Western Balkans and support to their 
preparation for future integration into European structures and 
ultimate membership into the Union is a high priority for the EU. The 
Balkans will be an integral part of a unified Europe‛ (Council of the 
European Union, 2003). 
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Turkey – raise doubts about its impact on democratization 
processes.‛ I also contend that the success of the EU 
conditionality in the Western Balkan countries is limited by 
the strength of their citizens’ ethnic national identities. In 
other words, there is an inconsistence compliance with the 
accession conditions, which eventually leads to façade 
implementation of the democratic principles. 
Some of the studies analyze the EU’s influence on the 
domestic political change (see Cierco, 2006; Dolenec, 2008; 
Hoffmann, 2005; Papic, 2006; Trauner, 2008) or state-
building process (Bieber, 2011; Pickering, 2011) in separate 
countries of the Western Balkans. Investigating the impact 
of the EU’s approach to democratic state-building in three 
of the Western Balkan countries - Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Macedonia, Pickering (2011) argues that 
the EU’s leverage is inadequate in facilitating the process of 
building democratic states in the region. Bieber (2011, p. 
1783) also demonstrates that the EU’s conditionality 
approach towards the Western Balkans ‚has been largely 
ineffective in regard to state building, in part due to the 
lack of commitment of political elites to EU integration and 
the persistence of status issues on the policy agenda.‛ 
Several political scholars focus their attention on political 
and economic conditions and perspectives for democracy 
consolidation in the Western Balkans (see Bugajski, 2001, 
2010; Jano, 2008; Škuflić, 2010; Woodward, 2007). 
Recognizing the differences between individual states, 
Bugajski (2001, p. 9) observes that ‚a political culture of 
dialogue, tolerance, and compromise has shallow roots in 
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much of the Balkans [and that+ <in such conditions, 
political life and social interaction can become rapidly 
polarized and intolerant.‛ Close to this view, Jano (2008, p. 
12) implies that ‚<the common element of the region is the 
weakness/failure of the state to respond to the plurality and 
needs of its communities.‛ 
The democratic consolidation of the Western Balkans is the 
central question in the study of Nyenstad (2006). However, 
he tries to explain the developments of the region through 
the legacies of the communist past and to identify the 
defects in the emerging democracies. Similarly, Balfour and 
Stratulat (2011, p. 6) try to assess the extent to which the 
Balkan countries are effective democracies and 
demonstrate that ‚apart from Croatia, all of the countries in 
the region exhibit a clear gap between formal and effective 
democracy, whereby existing democratic rules are not 
properly implemented in practice. Finally, most of the 
literature covering the democratic transition of the Balkans 
deals exclusively with the transition and democracy 
building in one specific country of the region (see Bičanić 
and Franičević, 2003; Bieber, 2003; Bolcic, 2003; Edmunds, 
2009; Gurdulič, 2010; Hagan and Ivković, 2006; Pantic, 
2008; Ramet and Matic, 2007). 
Very few studies have dealt with the patterns of citizen 
participation and particularly with the relation between 
citizen participation and democracy in the Western 
Balkans. The growing body of literature analyzing citizens’ 
political behavior in Central and Eastern Europe generally 
does not include the Western Balkan region (e.g. Bernhagen 
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and Marsh, 2007; Duch and Palmer, 2002; Karp and 
Banducci, 2007; Kostadinova, 2003; Kostadinova and 
Power, 2007; Kostelka, 2010; Letki, 2003; Pierobon, 2010). 
Several of these authors (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Karp 
and Banducci, 2007; Pierobon, 2010) have conducted a 
systematic analysis on the comparability of citizens’ 
political participation in new democracies in CEE on one 
hand and the established democracies of the West on the 
other.14 A frequent finding is that the third wave of 
democratization didn’t narrow the gap between Eastern 
and Western Europe with regard to political participation, 
i.e. Eastern European citizens participate less than their 
neighbors in the West. There are basically two approaches 
that try to explain and predict the cross-national variations 
in citizen political participation. The first one emphasizes 
the importance of current political and economic features 
and policies, while the second stresses the historical and 
cultural context of the communist past. Only few studies 
that deal with Eastern Europe include some of the Western 
Balkan states in their analysis (e.g. Guérin et al., 2004; 
Tavčar Krajnc et al., 2012). However, the aim and the 
research methods of these studies differ substantially from 
my research. For instance, the study of Tavčar Krajnc et al. 
(2012) is rather concerned with the comparison of the 
protest participation in these three regions: seven post-
Yugoslav countries, nine CEE EU member states and 
                                                 
14 None of the above mentioned studies (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; 
Karp and Banducci, 2007; Pierobon, 2010) include the Western Balkan 
countries in their analysis. They rather deal with the CEE EU member 
states. The study of Pierobon (2010) also includes Ukraine and Russia. 
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seventeen established EU democracies. At the same time, 
they analyze the relationship between protest participation 
and pro-democratic political culture in all three regions. 
Their results indicate that mainly democratic motivations 
are behind protest engagement in the post-Yugoslav states. 
This is rather in contrast with my assumption that it is 
purely the self-interest that motivates people in the 
Western Balkans to be politically active within their 
societies. 
The study of Guérin et al. (2004) is concerned with the 
interplay between tolerance and protest, and how it affects 
democratic consolidation in 13 post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.15 Although their results are 
inconclusive, they support the view that the involvement in 
protest activities increases the tolerance between radically 
opposed popular groups. That on the other hand provides 
an environment for accelerating the pace of 
democratization. 
A substantial literature gap also exists with regards to the 
relationship between political competition and democracy 
in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the growing 
literature on the Western Balkans has rarely even dealt 
with the party politics in the region. The book ‚Party 
politics in the Western Balkans‛ by Stojarová and Emerson 
(2010) represents an important contribution in this regard. 
The authors analyze the specific features of party politics in 
                                                 
15 Only two Western Balkan countries (Serbia and Croatia) are included 
in the analysis. 
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the region and provide a comparative analysis of Western 
Balkan electoral and party systems. However, they do not 
examine the role of the political parties in determining the 
durability and quality of democratic performance in the 
region. On the other side, the study by Cohen and Lampe 
(2011, p. 223) touches upon this question, acknowledging 
that ‚progress toward fuller democratic consolidation 
depends on< the institutionalization of competitive party 
systems and the establishment of legitimated and 
uncorrupted electoral systems.‛ More specifically, they 
examine how the Western Balkan parties and party systems 
have changed over the years and if the negative legacies are 
strong enough to impede the process of democratic change. 
The authors suggest that the high levels of distrust toward 
the political parties and electoral systems throughout the 
Balkan region are counter-productive for the democratic 
consolidation. Additionally, they conclude that ‚political 
corruption and the failure of ruling parties and coalitions to 
achieve faster reform and economic progress are key 
reasons for the lack of confidence in party organizations 
and their leaders‛ (Cohen and Lampe, 2011, p. 295). 
This study takes advantage of the political definition of the 
Western Balkans as a region of South-Eastern Europe 
which is not yet a part of the European Union in order to 
address the issue of the delayed democratization in the 
region. It does this by utilizing the actor-based approach in 
explaining democratization while comparing two regions 
in post-communist Europe: CEE EU member states and the 
Western Balkans. Two areas of contribution to the existing 
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literature can be identified in this study. First, I will 
compare the political participation and the political 
competition patterns in the two abovementioned regions. 
Second, I will statistically assess whether there is a 
substantive and significant relation between the levels of 
democracy and proactive citizenry on one side, and levels 
of democracy and inter-elite competition on the other. In 
addition, I will further elaborate and explain the positive or 
negative correlation between these two variables. To the 
best of my knowledge, no one has yet undertaken similar 
research. Eventually, this study could represent a 
benchmark that might catalyze further research on the 
subject. 
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2. Understanding the 
peculiarities of the Western 
Balkans transition 
 
After the fall of the communist regime at the end of 1980s, 
the new established states which emerged from the former 
Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R and Yugoslavia, faced the 
challenge of economic transformation and political 
democratization. Because these states were under 
communist domination for over five decades, they were 
similar in many aspects such as economic structure, state 
ideology, and institutional settings. However, when 
comparing the Western Balkan states with the rest of post-
communist Europe one cannot help noticing the varieties of 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. That is to 
say, Western Balkan countries were far less successful in 
building and consolidating liberal democracy than most of 
the other countries in CEE. As a result, for a quite long time 
they were left in a state of „prolonged transition‟, and ‚the 
political culture of statism and authoritarianism remained 
deeply embedded in the region. These negative trends have 
been particularly evident in several former Yugoslav 
republics, even though their points of departure in the late 
1980s were comparable to that of Central Europe‛ 
(Bugajski, 2001, p. 7). The elements of nationalism and 
ethnic division were manipulated by the policy makers for 
reaching their political ends. The wars within and between 
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the former Yugoslav states and growing international 
isolation in the 1990s further reduced the opportunities to 
institutionalize democratic pluralism in the region.  
However, it is important to note here that besides the 
commonalities cutting across a shared communist past, the 
republics that once made up the post-communist bloc in 
Europe varied considerably from each other with respect to 
their political environment. As a result, some of them were 
far better positioned to pursue a democratic transition 
following their disintegration than others. According to 
Bunce (2003, p. 172), the most successful transitions to 
democracy (such as in Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland) began with mass protests, which 
‚reduced the uncertainty of the transition - by providing a 
clear reading of mass sentiments, by strengthening the 
bargaining power of opposition leaders, and by forcing the 
communists to give up their defense of the old order<‛ At 
the same time, ‚the consequences of armed struggle< 
strengthened antipluralist resistance at both the elite and 
mass levels‛ across the region of the Western Balkans 
(Cohen and Lampe, 2011, p. 2). This lack of broad 
consensus to support democracy as the ‚only game in 
town‛ among public, as well as among elites has left the 
Western Balkan states ‘stuck in transition’, with some even 
reverting to more authoritarian forms of rule, as it is the 
case with Macedonia. The democratization of these states is 
also challenged by the unfinished nation-building process. 
Namely, the borders of several WB countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia) are still 
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contested. Noutcheva (2006) classifies the Western Balkan 
countries into several groups depending on their internal 
and external sovereignty. The first group comprises the 
countries that can be characterized as sovereign, both 
internally and externally (Albania and Croatia). The second 
group of countries lack both internal and external 
sovereignty (that is Kosovo). The third category can be 
described as semi-sovereign countries: those with 
compromised external sovereignty (Serbia and Montenegro 
until their ‚split‛ in 2006) and those with compromised 
internal sovereignty (Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia). The above said indicates that ‚the regime 
change in the Balkans has continued up to the present time 
to evolve around primary problems of political change, 
suggesting that in most cases these countries are still 
somewhat engaged in democratic transition< with open 
prospects for eventual democratic consolidation‛ (Pridham, 
2008, p. 58). 
In addition to the political problems and challenges, 
democratization of these countries has been taking place in 
a harsh economic environment. Namely, the 
transformation of the centrally-planned to market 
economies was accompanied by deep and long recession. 
The dynamics and the magnitude of the crisis varied across 
different countries, but the common trend was drastic 
decrease of GDP, disinvestment, increase of unemployment 
and inflation rates and decrease of monthly salaries. The 
distorted economic structures that developed during the 
years of war resulted in highly unequal distribution of 
59 
social chances and resources (Brusis and Thiery, 2006). The 
economic troubles that the Western Balkan states faced 
since the fall of the communist regime have been 
instrumentally used to uphold political unrest, extremist 
and populist political agendas and inter-ethnic tensions. 
The specific political, economic, social and cultural context 
in the Western Balkans played an important role in the 
development of the civil society sector in the region. 
Despite the fact that the disintegration of the authoritarian 
regime allowed substantial space for development of 
pluralist political activity, it remained largely limited 
during the first years of the Western Balkans transition. 
This was partially due to the suspicion and distrust 
towards the organizations outside traditional networks, as 
well as the low political culture among the citizens. 
However, by the end of the 1990s civil society in the 
Western Balkans had expanded quickly and there was a 
striking increase in the intensity of the NGOs activity. Yet 
their actual influence to the democratic process remained 
largely limited. That was mainly because most of the NGOs 
in the region were established for the purpose of obtaining 
financial resources, rather than to respond to the societal 
problems and needs. At the same time, political elites 
perceived NGOs as disloyal and anti-governmental and 
thus tried to put their activities under state control. This 
resulted in development of clientelist-inspired participation 
which seriously undermined the fundamental principles of 
democratic transparency and accountability. Cohen and 
Lampe (2011, p. 169) note that although there is an 
60 
intraregional variation in the development of the civil 
society sector in the Western Balkans, it is still possible to 
differentiate three distinct phases: (1) emergence of the civil 
society in the years before, during and immediately after 
armed conflicts in the region (1990-98/99); (2) rapid 
expansion of the NGOs following the war in Kosovo in 
1999 and major leadership changes in Serbia and Croatia 
(1999-2000); and (3) more recent (2005-11) efforts to 
normalize the relations among the civil society 
organizations and state policy-making bodies. 
The specific economic and political context in the Western 
Balkans has also played an important role in the 
establishment and development of party systems, as well as 
on the elite’s behavior in the countries that constitute this 
region. As Stojarová and Emerson (2010, p. 1) have noted, 
the development of party politics in the Western Balkans 
‚was influenced by the turmoil of war, the subsequent 
installation of non-democratic regimes in several countries, 
and the delayed process of nation and state building in 
several of them.‛ As such, it lagged significantly behind 
Central and Eastern European party transformation and for 
a long time disrupted the process of democratic change. At 
the same time, while the collapse of one party rule was 
characterized by pronounced ‚circulation‛ or 
‚replacement‛ of elites in most CEE, a prominent feature of 
all WB states was the extensive ‚reproduction‛ or 
‚continuity‛ of the old elites. 
Further below follows a brief overview of democratization 
problems in the five separate WB states with the emphasis 
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on the civil society development, as well as the state of the 
respective political systems. 
 
2.1. Macedonia 
 
I am starting the analysis with Macedonia, as with the latest 
political crisis is causing by far the most concern. Namely, 
the political crises erupted on December 24, 2012 when 
opposition MPs and journalists were forcibly removed 
from the parliament and government parties passed the 
budget for 2013 only minutes after the dramatic event. 
Following the mediation effort by European Union officials, 
the opposition ended its two-month boycott and agreed to 
participate in the upcoming local elections. The 
compromise between the government and opposition has 
offered a temporary reprieve of the crisis. However, since 
the violent unrest broke out between paramilitary Albanian 
groups and Macedonian security forces in 2001, the country 
remains fragile. The ongoing name dispute with Greece is 
further undermining Macedonia’s democracy and its 
prospects for joining the EU and NATO. Economic 
stagnation, staggering unemployment, institutional 
inefficiency, deterioration of the independence of media, 
high-level corruption and politicization of almost all 
segments of society remain the biggest challenges for 
further democratic transformation of the country. 
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With regard to the civil society in Macedonia, it can be 
justly claimed that it is still underdeveloped and as such 
does not exert substantive influence on the democratic 
development of the country. The reasons for this are 
numerous, starting from a highly politicized, ethnicized 
and incompetent civil society community. Macedonian civil 
society report prepared by the Blair et al. (2003) for the 
needs of USAID has identified a very unfavorable view of 
the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some of the 
criticisms were: 
- NGOs activities are largely irrelevant to calculations 
of political power in the community; 
- Rather than addressing the real problems of 
Macedonia society, they are more interested in 
serving the needs of the donors; 
- Although they request support from the 
government, they are not democratic, not 
accountable, not transparent and not representative 
of the people; 
- They are corrupt; 
- They are highly politicized, personalized and 
ethnicized. 
This lack of general trust in the civil society sector has 
resulted in a quite low rate of involvement of citizens in 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). According to a survey 
conducted by CIVICUS16 in 2011, only a small minority of 
citizens are engaged (14.9% participate and 17.5% 
                                                 
16 Klekovski et al. (2011) 
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volunteer) in at least one socially-based organization. 
However, the level of political engagement (protests, 
petitions, boycotts) is significantly higher compared to the 
participation in CSOs. ‚In total, 49.4% of citizens have 
participated in political non-partisan activities in the course 
of the last five years (2005-2010)‛ (Klekovski et al., 2011, p. 
27). It is also important to note that citizens in Macedonia 
are most likely involved in political parties (37.5%). 
The Macedonian party system is a relatively stable one and 
is divided by an ethnic cleavage between Macedonian and 
Albanian parties. The Macedonian side is divided into two 
large coalitions (formed around two parties: SDSM and 
VMRO-DPMNE) and the Albanian in two unaligned 
parties (DUI and DPA). Parties outside these two blocks 
have managed to survive on the political scene only for a 
short period of time. Under the terms of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement that ended the conflict in 2001, 
Macedonian electoral system was changed into fully 
proportional. Nevertheless, besides the high degree of 
inclusiveness of the proportional representation system, 
there is still a deep elite division between Slavic 
Macedonians and Albanian party leaders. Also, the weak 
economic performance of the political elites, the extensive 
corruption of parties and low accountability further 
undermine the political party system in Macedonia and 
reinforce the deep mistrust towards the political parties 
and their leaders.  
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2.2. Serbia 
 
The democratic transition of Serbia has also proved to be 
quite slow and complex. The country started its true 
transition to democracy no earlier than 2000 after Slobodan 
Miloševič was removed from power. However, the illiberal 
legacies of his regime proved to be difficult to overcome. A 
new coalition government formed by the Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) committed itself to breaking 
the past political practices and democratizing the country. 
Yet, the lack of consensus on how to implement the basic 
democratic principles and to some extent the lack of 
political skills and personal rivalries among top leaders led 
to failure of the democracy consolidation in Serbia. Since 
then, there is a sharp contrast between radical-conservative 
parties (which ideologies are based on Serbian nationalism) 
such as the incumbent Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) on 
one side, and more moderate parties, particularly the 
Democratic Party (DS) led by Boris Tadič on the other. 
Stefan Ralchev (2010b, p. 113) observes that ‚the fall of 
Miloševič was a turning point in Serbia’s political 
development, but what has kept the country on the track to 
real democratization are the governments led by the 
Democratic Party (DS) - first the cabinet headed by Prime 
Minister Zoran Đinđič, assassinated in 2003 by organized 
crime groups for his decisive crackdown on criminality, 
and then by the (former) president and party leader Boris 
Tadic.‛ The extradition of the last two suspected war 
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criminals Goran Hadžič and Ratko Mladič to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) seemed to be the closure of a dark chapter that will 
move the country toward pro-European democratic future. 
However, the victory of the nationalist Tomislav Nikolič on 
the last presidential election in 2012 and his firm rhetoric 
against recognition of Kosovo’s independence might 
endanger the progress in relations with the European 
Union. At the same time faced with economic recession, the 
most important challenge before the Serbian government is 
undertaking major economic structural reforms which may 
lead to social unrest. Also, prevailing corruption and 
organized crime remain serious causes for concern and 
major challenges to security, democracy and European 
integration of the country. 
The communist regime had a profound influence over the 
development of civil society in Serbia. This is manifested 
particularly through the mentality and passivity of the 
citizens who do not possess the habit and skills to organize 
themselves believing it to be the responsibility of the state 
to solve their problems. On the other side, the state only 
strengthens this attitude by marginalizing the civil society 
sector and exhibiting paternalistic attitudes toward its 
citizens (Milivojević, 2006, p. 36). When considering the 
development of the civil society in Serbia since the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, there are practically two main 
periods: before and after the collapse of Miloševič regime. 
During the 1990s, the authoritarian populist movement 
supported by the autocrat Slobodan Miloševič created 
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highly unfavorable political environment and negative 
public attitude toward CSOs. As it is stated in the CIVICUS 
report (2006, p. 37): ‚during the 1990s, the relationship 
between CSOs and the state was dominated by conflict, 
with the exception of the ‘governmental’ non-governmental 
organizations<‛ The main CSOs during this period were 
formed to oppose the war and the regime, to assist the 
victims and to protect the human rights. As such, they have 
certainly played an important role in ousting the 
authoritarian regime of Miloševič in 2000 and helped 
installing democratic political system. Cohen and Lampe 
(2011, p. 17) observed that ‚Serbia’s civil society 
organizations after October 2000 had shifted from a ‘fight 
against’ the regime, to a ‘fight for’ democracy.‛ 
Nevertheless, the progress in establishing a successful 
partnership between the civil society sector and the state is 
still very slow. As a result, the civil society role in Serbia is 
minimal, and its impact on key political and social 
processes is largely unrecognized. On the other hand, the 
non-partisan political participation is still significantly 
higher compared to the other form of citizens’ activism. 
Namely, during the Miloševič regime 45% of the citizens 
took part in some form of political activism. Although the 
number of those politically active almost halved (25%) after 
the regime was overthrown in 2000, it still remained 
relatively high.17 At the same time, political parties are 
                                                 
17 It is interesting to note here that before the so-called ‚Bulldozer‛ 
revolution of 5th October 2000, the main form of political activism in 
Serbia was participation in protests and demonstration (39%), while 
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among the organizations that attract most of the people. It 
is therefore clearly evident that Serbian citizens consider 
political involvement to be the best way to serve their 
interests and needs.  
Serbia developed a fully autonomous party system in the 
early 1990s, besides the fact that Serbia and Montenegro 
remained united in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
until 2006 when they both became independent states. 
Miloševič decade was characterized by ‚nationalist 
ideology, aggression against its neighbors and internal 
minorities, and an authoritarian system with elections that 
fell short of democratic standards‛ (Bochsler, 2010, p. 99). 
Consequently, Serbian political elite during the 1990s was 
divided between those close to the ruling party and those 
outside this network. This changed in 2000 with the 
‘Bulldozer revolution’ when Miloševič was forced to resign 
from power. A new coalition government formed by the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) committed itself to 
breaking the past political practices and democratizing of 
the Serbian politics. However the lack of consensus on how 
to implement the basic democratic principles and to some 
extent the lack of political skills and personal rivalries 
among top leaders led to failure of democracy 
consolidation in Serbia. In the very same year, the electoral 
system was changed from TRS (Two Round System) to 
proportional with a 5 per cent threshold. However, it was 
even in 2007 when Serbia implemented a major change in 
                                                                                                           
after this date signing petitions has become the most frequent form of 
political action (21%) (Milivojević, 2006, p. 47). 
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its electoral law: it was not necessary for the parties of 
national minorities to pass this threshold. According to 
Bochsler (2010, pp. 103-104), there are four main political 
conflicts that seem relevant for voters and addressed by 
political parties in Serbia. These are: 
- The regime conflict, i.e. the conflict between 
politicians and political parties close to the 
authoritarian Miloševič regime (SPS and SRS) versus 
the democratically oriented reform parties (DS, SPO, 
DSS, NS, G17+); 
- The nationalist-authoritarian values, i.e. the 
authoritarian rejection of civic liberalism and 
promotion of the Serbs as the dominant ethnic group 
have been highly salient on almost all Serbian 
political parties’ agendas in the 1990s; 
- Serbian foreign policy, i.e. pro-EU and NATO 
oriented political parties on one side of the spectrum 
(DS, G17+ and SPO) and anti-EU and NATO 
oriented political parties on the other (DSS and NS); 
- Parties positioning on the economic conflict, i.e. 
parties that advocate strong role for the state in the 
economy (SPS) and parties that favor radical liberal 
economic reforms (G17+). 
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2.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was the country which 
suffered most severely from the painful disintegration of 
the Yugoslav federation. Being the most ethnically diverse 
Yugoslav country, Bosnia was devastated by civil war, 
severe ethnic violence and population displacement. The 
Dayton peace agreement ended the conflict in November 
1995 and established the framework for a new confederal 
state composed of two entities: Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (predominantly Bosniak and Croat) and 
Republica Srpska (predominantly Serb), as well as Brčko 
District. The new country’s constitution was and still is an 
annex of this Peace Agreement. Ever since, Bosnia’s 
domestic political processes have developed along ethnic 
lines strengthening the ethnic divisions in the country. 
‚This makes the Bosnian political system rather 
burdensome, diffused and unable to consolidate decision-
making at a central level because of ethnic voting and 
vetoes interplaying there‛ (Ralchev, 2010a, p. 43). In other 
words, rather than establishing liberal democracy, Dayton 
established a constitutional order designed to balance the 
interests of the country’s three main ethnic groups. ‚And 
what the European Union has made clear is that it needs a 
single authority to talk to in Bosnia – an authority to take 
responsibility of reform and adoption of the acquis 
communautaire‛ (Ralchev, 2010a, p. 43). Therefore, the EU 
is now using its membership conditionality to enforce 
70 
reform of the Dayton constitution. That is, EU’s approach 
to constitutional reform is rather elite-focused, and 
excludes the civil society actors to a large degree. At the 
same time, as it is the case with almost all WB countries, 
corruption remains one of the most serious problems in 
Bosnia. The judiciary system is also heavily influenced by 
the political parties and not in line with EU standards and 
acquis. 
As mentioned above, the civil society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is underdeveloped and largely marginalized 
from decision-making processes. During the war in the 
beginning of the 1990s, sizeable financial resources mainly 
by foreign donors were allocated to domestic CSOs in order 
to address the humanitarian needs and to work on 
reconciliation and transition to democracy. However, since 
then the civil society has developed in a post-Dayton ethnic 
institutional framework, and as such has become a factor 
which has further contributed to the ethno-nationalist 
polarization. It is perceived by many that the role of the 
civil society in Bosnia to build ‚a more inclusive, 
prosperous and democratic country is significantly 
hindered by the country's multilayered governmental, 
political and legislative structures defined along the lines of 
three 'ethnic' groups or 'constituent peoples'‛ (Siebenmann 
and Kolić, 2011, p. 7). At the same time, there is a very 
limited collaboration not only within the civil society 
sector, but also between civil society and governmental 
actors. The processes of government funds allocation to 
CSOs are not entirely transparent and free from larger 
71 
political interests. As a result, most civil society actors in 
Bosnia lack the financial and technical capacity to 
effectively develop and implement projects and initiatives. 
At the same time there is a negative perception among the 
public regarding the CSOs and their activities. 
As nationalism and ethnicity were and still are very 
significant factors in the Bosnian society, the parties that 
emerged following the country’s independence represented 
one or other of the three ethnic groups. The three main 
nationalist parties were: SDA found by Alija Izetbegovič 
(Bosniaks), SDS (Serbs) whose first leader was Radovan 
Karadžič, and HDZ (Croats). The initial electoral system 
TRS (Two Round System) allowed voters to express only 
one preference, which resulted in an inaccurate expression 
of the collective opinion. The post-Dayton 1996 elections 
were also based on a single-preference system, closed-list 
PR. After being reviewed by the NWG (National Working 
Group), the electoral system has been changed to a PR 
open-list format (Emerson and Šedo, 2010, p. 11). However, 
the nationalist rhetoric and demands for independence of 
the separate entities are still widely used with the aim to 
mobilize voters. This confirms the strong ethnic character 
of the parties in Bosnia. (Šedo, 2010a, p. 88) observed that 
‚parties in BiH are very personalized, with the party leader 
playing a crucial role (especially in Serb parties, which 
present the name of the leader as part of the party name). 
[As a result] the intra-party democracy is very limited.‛ 
The deep ethnic division in the country does not allow for 
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the reformist elites to emerge in the political arena, but 
rather support the rent-seeking activities. 
 
2.4. Albania 
 
Albania is one of the most backward countries in Southeast 
Europe, both socially and economically. However, the 
biggest problem of the country is in the political sphere. 
Namely, the Albanian political elites are characterized by 
authoritarian propensities which results in a very weak 
dialogue among the political parties (Stojkovski, 2010, p. 
30). At the same time, since 1992 none of the elections held 
in Albania have been considered to be free and fair and 
almost all have been contested by the losing party. A 
certain progress with regard to the voter registration and 
the legal framework has been made in the last 
parliamentary elections held in June 2009. However, both 
OSCE and EU raised concern over the politicization of the 
vote count and other procedural issues. The political crises 
following the 2009 elections when Albanian Socialist Party 
(ASP) launched its protests and boycotted the parliament 
for six months, has hampered Albania’s Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations. Nevertheless, Albania joined NATO in 2009 
and is irreversibly oriented toward integration in the 
European Union. In order to fulfill its responsibilities with 
regard to the EU and at the same time to consolidate its 
democracy, Albanian political elite needs to make further 
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progress in reforming the judicial system, fight against 
organized crime and corruption, strengthening the state 
institutions and decreasing the media politicization. 
Although Albania’s democratization process started more 
than 20 years ago, there is still low level of civic activism in 
the country. The civil society sector is burdened by more or 
less the same problems as in other states of the Western 
Balkans. Namely, the communist legacy has left Albania 
unprepared for the development of vibrant civil society 
and genuine civic activism. Human rights organizations 
and women’s NGOs were among the first CSOs that were 
established in the beginning of the 1990s. Most of the NGOs 
were established in the years before and after the war in 
Kosovo (1997-2001). Following 2005 there has been a 
decline in the Albanian civil society sector. A CIVICUS 
2010 report observed that: ‚generally, Albanian citizens 
display high levels of ‘indifference’ towards involvement in 
various social actions, which is a common feature of 
societies in transition or early stages of post-transition with 
a relatively unsettled middle class and high levels of 
inequities‛ (Vurmo, 2010, p. 12). At the same time, most of 
the NGOs in Albania are donor dependent, and thus very 
often biased. There is also lack of trust and cooperation 
between the civil society and government mainly as a result 
of the widespread corruption in the country, as well as 
because CSOs are one of the main criticizers of the 
governmental policies. It is interesting to note here that 
there is a slightly higher number of people who reported to 
be members or involved in various political organizations 
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or actions compared to the social ones. One possible 
explanation for the higher levels of political engagement is 
the expectation for personal benefits given the nature of 
these organizations/actions, i.e. the ‚desired impact on the 
involved individuals’ lives‛ (Vurmo, 2010, p. 14). 
The first pluralist elections in Albania after the fall of the 
communist regime were held in 1991. However, they were 
rather semi-democratic and the communists under the 
leadership of Ramiz Alia managed to retain control of the 
government. His government fell two months later and the 
Democratic Party of Albania (PDSh) under the presidency 
of Sali Berisha won the next national elections in 1992. 
However, the widespread corruption and the so-called 
pyramid schemes resulted in disorder and anarchy 
throughout the country and eventually to collapse of the 
government. The next elections, organized with the 
assistance of the OSCE were won by the Socialist Party of 
Albania (PSSh) which was the governing party until 2005 
when it was replaced by a coalition of parties under PDSh 
leadership. The current electoral system in Albania is fully 
proportional with a 3 per cent threshold for parties and 5 
per cent for coalitions at constituency level. As can be seen, 
the Albanian political system has been highly polarized 
since the beginning of the transition dominated by two 
large political parties: the Socialist Party of Albania (PSSh) 
and the Democratic Party of Albania (PDSh). ‚The 
polarization is accompanied with a distrust of the political 
actors, who only communicate with each other via the 
media or the other channels‛ (Stojarová, 2010, p. 182). This 
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division of the Albanian political elite seriously hinders the 
democratic, as well as the economic development of the 
country. 
 
2.5. Croatia 
 
Croatia stands out in terms of economic and political 
performance compared to the other WB countries. The 
country started its real democratization process later than 
the rest of Central and Eastern Europe – after the death of 
the autocrat president Franjo Tuđman in 1999 and is 
scheduled to enter the European Union by the summer of 
2013.18 However, the transition path of Croatia was far from 
smooth and painless. After the first democratic elections in 
1991 and with the first constitution Croatia declared itself 
as semi-presidential democratic republic. However, as a 
result of all the political problems that the country was 
facing after its independence, it ‚existed in an authoritarian 
regime with ‘corny capitalism’ for almost a decade after its 
independence‛ (Gurdulič, 2010, p. 33). More specifically, 
Croatia faced the rise of nationalist forces and subsequent 
war which had numerous adverse effects on the country 
and the economy as a whole. However, in the early 2000s 
                                                 
18 Croatia actually joined the European Union as its 28th member state 
on 1 July 2013. However, at the time that most part of this thesis was 
written Croatia was still an EU candidate country. Therefore, any 
reference to it further in the text is under this consideration. 
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with ‚the formation of a coalition government of Social 
Democrats and Liberals under former Prime Minister Ivica 
Račan, Croatia became an exception regarding the situation 
of states of former Yugoslavia. Issues like economy, rule of 
law, functioning of the state administration and civil 
freedoms superseded others like national identity, 
statehood and sovereignty‛ (Cierco, 2009, p. 179).  That was 
mainly because of the relative ethnic homogeneity of 
Croatia compared to Bosnia or Macedonia, for instance. 
Taking into consideration the above said, it would not be 
wrong to claim that Croatia has entered the final phase of 
consolidating its democracy. 
Re-emergence of civil society in Croatia corresponded with 
the outbreak of war which to a large degree determined its 
development during that time. CSOs main course of action 
was assisting the specific social needs in the context of the 
war. However, by the end of the 1990s, the political 
environment was considerably unfavorable for the 
development of the civil society and the civil society sector 
in Croatia faced a negative public perception. Although the 
new government that was elected in 2000 has committed to 
enhance and institutionalize its cooperation with the civil 
society, there were many weaknesses which undermined 
the effectiveness of the sector. Some of them were: lack of 
capacity and expertise, inadequate cooperation with the 
government and poor impact on public policy making. 
Nevertheless, CIVICUS 2011 report observed that since 
2007 there has been an upward trajectory in the 
development of the civil society in Croatia and ‚<so-called 
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cognitive Europeanization has taken place. The principles 
of openness, accountability, participation, consultation and 
others have become an integral part of the public discourse 
on civil society‛ (Bežovan and Matančević, 2011, p. 15). 
With regard to the extent of political engagement, the 
individual political activism score ranges the highest within 
this sub-dimension (39.8% of citizens undertake political 
activism). However, only 13.2% of citizens in Croatia are 
active members of at least one political organization. 
Therefore, there is a need for further improvement of the 
institutional and legal framework that will enhance 
citizens’ engagement within the civil society sector. 
As previously mentioned, during the first years after its 
succession from Yugoslavia, Croatia underwent a period of 
dominance of strong nationalism which served as a ruling 
strategy of Tuđman’s government. Besides the fact that the 
development of political party system, the emergence of 
party competition and political plurality became evident, 
Croatia entered into the trap of partial democratic reform. 
As a result of the uninterrupted rule of only one party - 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the autocratic 
behavior of Tuđman, Croatia’s democracy during the 1990s 
remained unconsolidated and was characterized by 
postponed economic and political reform, clientelism and 
corruption. The elections held in January 2000 and the 
winning of the center-left coalition led by the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) under the leadership of Ivica Račan 
are considered as the beginning of consolidation of 
democracy in Croatia. During the so-called second Croatian 
78 
transition, the semi-presidential system was changed to a 
parliamentary one. At the same time, the previous FPP 
(First Past The Vote) electoral system was abandoned 
altogether. (Šedo, 2010b, p. 74) has observed that ‚the 
return of HDZ to power in 2003 did not mean the return of 
authoritarian practices; the ‘second’ democratization in 
Croatia was successful, and the country was offered 
membership in NATO in 2008 and became and EU 
candidate country.‛ The two largest parliamentary parties 
in Croatia remain HDZ and SDP. The current electoral 
system is PR-list with ten regional constituencies each 
electing 14 representatives with a 5 per cent threshold.  
 
All of the above clearly indicates that out of the five 
countries studied here, only Croatia can be considered a 
functioning democracy in the process of consolidation. 
Based on the findings of the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (Donner et al., 2012), the other four countries (Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Albania) can be considered 
defective democracies with most pronounced weaknesses 
in the areas of rule of law, institutional stability and 
political and social integration. The gap between Croatia 
and other Western Balkan countries is also particularly 
large for the criteria measuring the state of market economy 
(see Table 2 and Table 3). 
[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
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Regarding the state of the civil society sector, the NGO 
Sustainability Index19 developed by USAID (2012) for the 
period 1997-2011 reveals that there is also a gap in the 
development of the civil society between Croatia and the 
other four countries in the Western Balkans. This gap is 
even more striking if we compare Western Balkans with the 
CEE EU member states (see Table 4). However, it seems 
that the citizens of the Western Balkans prefer to be 
politically engaged rather than to be involved in activities 
of a social or recreational nature. At the same time, they 
favor membership in politically-based organizations before 
the membership in socially-oriented CSOs. Therefore, I 
contend that the citizens in the Western Balkan states 
observe civil society through their political preferences and 
participate mostly in collective community actions that 
match those preferences. Hence, political participation in 
the region is in the focus of my theoretical and empirical 
analysis. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
When it comes to the political party development in the 
Western Balkans, it also lags behind the rest of Eastern 
European parties’ transformation. Specifically, although the 
political environment seems to have stabilized in the last 
                                                 
19 The NGO Sustainability Index developed by the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) assesses NGO activity along 
several complementary dimensions: legal environment, organizational 
capacity, financial viability, advocacy, public image, service provision 
and NGO infrastructure. 
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few years, there is still a higher volatility and fluidity in the 
party systems compared to the newer EU member states. 
At the same time, there are some different forms of 
informal power networks which paralyze the democratic 
progress of the region. Cohen and Lampe (2011, p. 225) 
note that there are several important factors responsible for 
the retardation and distinctiveness of post-communist 
party development in the Western Balkans. Some of them 
are: ‚limited tradition of democratic experience, the 
disruptive consequences of radical nationalism in several 
countries afflicted with deep subcultural cleavages, the 
direct and indirect impact of warfare and sectarian violence 
that occurred during the 1990s and beyond, and the 
persistent uncertainties and insecurities in the region with 
regard to the process of European Union enlargement.‛ 
It is clearly evident that the dissolution of the multinational 
communist federation of Yugoslavia has led to reassessing 
and strengthening of the national identities in almost every 
state of the former federation. Serbia’s denial to recognize 
the independence of Kosovo, Macedonia’s anxiety over its 
territorial integrity that was seriously questioned in 2001 
ethnic conflict, Bosnia’s ethnic intolerance and inexistent 
common national identity only confirms that even today, 
the factor of ethnicity and nationality still shape to a great 
extent the politics in the region. Furthermore, 
strengthening of nationalism within the society driven by 
ethnically motivated policies usually leads to perpetuation 
of undemocratic principles. Pridham (2008, p. 58) rightly 
claims that: ‚<the Balkan countries may be collectively 
81 
described as difficult democracies in terms of their legacy 
problems imposed on regime change, their actual 
functioning as political systems, the extraordinary effort 
required to construct and maintain domestic consensus 
behind political reform and, of course, the magnitude of 
socio-economic problems with an obvious potential for 
political impacts.‛ Therefore, it is highly probable that the 
only way to prevent the WB countries from shrinking into 
further political and economic instability is to keep the EU 
aspirations alive. Meeting the EU’s accession criteria would 
ensure better control over their government’s behavior. 
However, the question remaining is whether the EU 
conditionality policy is well suited to deal with the 
sovereignty, statehood and national identity issues still 
present on the Western Balkans agenda. 
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3. Political participation and 
democracy 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Democratization and citizens’ participation in politics have 
occupied a central place in the comparative politics field 
since the 1960’s (see Almond and Verba, 1963; Parry et al., 
1992; Pateman, 1970; Verba et al., 1978). As the collapse of 
communist rule in Eastern Europe in the beginning of the 
1990s has brought an economic and political opening of 
these societies, the discussion on the ‚citizens’ awakening‛ 
became even more prominent, especially in the context of 
the new democracies (see Howard, 2003; Lipset and Lakin, 
2004; Morales and Geurts, 2007). 
The steady and continuous decline of voting turnout and 
other forms of political participation are considered to be 
the main malady of the modern mass democracies: ‚where 
few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the 
more participation there is in decisions, the more 
democracy there is‛ (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 1). Although 
elections are regarded as a primary expression of the 
sovereignty of the people, electoral participation is just one 
dimension of political participation. Therefore, this study is 
not confined only to voting in national elections, but it is 
rather concerned with more regular patterns of citizens’ 
83 
political activity in the post-communist countries of South 
Eastern Europe. 
As long as the high levels of involvement by the citizenry is 
perceived to be critical to democratization process and 
deepening of democracy, the weak participation in politics 
by ordinary citizens in the ‚young European democracies‛ 
is considered to be one of the main reasons for the peculiar 
practices of illiberal democracy in these countries. Several 
studies have tried to identify the reasons for the different 
levels of citizens’ participation between the established 
democracies of the West and the post-communist East 
(Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Howard, 2003; Mierina, 2011; 
Pierobon, 2010). Most often, the weakness of civil society in 
CEE is considered to be due to the distrust among the 
citizens in the political authorities and institutions, less 
opportunities for participation and skepticism regarding 
the responsiveness of their governments. In a similar way, 
there are also differences in political participation rates 
between the different blocks of post-communist countries. 
The 10 new CEE EU member states which have had 
remarkably successful transitions to democracy represent 
the first block of analysis in this study and serve as a term 
of comparison. Western Balkan countries that have faced 
many difficulties in consolidating their democracies will be 
in the focus of my cross-national analysis. Contrary to the 
expectations for higher levels of citizens’ participation in 
the first block of countries, Figure 1 clearly shows that the 
levels of almost all dimensions of political participation are 
higher in the Western Balkans. Taking into account this 
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empirical evidence, I would argue that while low levels of 
citizens’ participation leads to hollow or stagnant 
democracy in most democratic systems, higher levels of 
civic engagement is not necessarily an indication for better 
democracy in post-communist Europe. Therefore, the 
following question emerges: which kind of political 
participation (if any) is particularly relevant for the 
advancement of democracy in Central Eastern Europe and 
particularly in the Western Balkans?  
This chapter is structured as follows: first, I compare the 
political participation rates among the Western Balkan 
countries and 10 CEE EU member states. In the third 
section I review the theoretical background on citizens’ 
participation and democratic deepening. Further on, I give 
detailed description of the variables, methodology and 
data. In the fifth section I test whether a proactive citizenry 
exerts significant positive or negative influence on the 
levels of democracy in the regions of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Western Balkans. After discussing the results 
of the analysis, I offer several possible explanations for the 
phenomenon of having higher levels of political 
participation in the Western Balkan countries in 
comparison to their post-communist neighbors, and yet 
lower levels of democracy. Finally, in order to illustrate this 
chapter’s propositions, I conduct a case study analysis by 
comparing two countries (one of each block of countries). 
Hopefully, these explanations will represent subjects that 
might catalyze further research on the topic. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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3.2. Political participation in comparative 
perspective: Western Balkans vs. CEE 
EU member states 
 
In this section I present and analyze recent empirical data 
by comparing the level of political participation among the 
regions of Central Eastern Europe (part of the EU) and 
Western Balkans, as well as among the countries of these 
regions as separate units. In order to ensure country level 
comparability, I concentrate here on the ten CEE countries 
that became members of the European Union in 2004 and 
2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 
the five Western Balkan states: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. I 
purposefully exclude Kosovo and Montenegro from the 
analysis because they have gained their independence only 
recently (Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008) and 
there is practically no data for them as separate units before 
independence. Official election turnout data is taken from 
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IIDEA, 2011) and consists of voter turnout 
figures for national parliamentary elections since 1994 
expressed as a percentage of the Voting Age Population 
(VAP) that actually voted. The data for the other 
dimensions of political participation such as party 
membership, signing petitions and attending peaceful 
demonstration is taken from the European Values Study 
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(EVS, 2011) and World Value Survey (WVS, 2009) – two 
major survey projects executed in five waves of surveys, 
from 1981 to 2009. However, for the purpose of this study, I 
use only data that covers the period 1994 – 2009. That is 
because in the first few years of the transitional period the 
political participation rates were unrealistically high as the 
collapse of the communist regime was regarded as highly 
emotional event, prone to maximize participation. That is 
particularly relevant for the electoral participation (see 
Kostadinova, 2003; Kostelka, 2010).20 
Table 5 lists the average levels of political participation in 
each of the 15 European post-communist countries, along 
with the group averages, thus providing a general 
reference point for comparison both between countries and 
groups. Close inspection of the scores on Table 5 makes the 
puzzle immediately evident when the new democracies of 
the Western Balkans score higher than the other 
consolidated CEE democracies in all dimensions of political 
participation. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The most striking difference within the two groups is party 
membership. Namely, all Western Balkan countries show 
much higher rates of party membership than the average 
rate of the other post-communist countries in Europe. 
Therefore it can be argued that the countries of CEE that 
                                                 
20 Please see Section 4 and Appendix 2 for more detailed information on 
the data used in this study. 
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were much more successful in consolidating their 
democracies follow the Western trends of decreasing 
number of party members. But the question here is why the 
level of party membership remains on such high level in 
the Western Balkans? There are several reasons for this. 
First, after the collapse of the communist regime in the 
Western Balkan states, the parties that won the first 
democratic elections and held the power for almost a 
decade were either the Old Regime Parties21 (Macedonia), 
parties with strong nationalistic agenda (Serbia and 
Croatia) or ethnically based parties (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). That resulted in an ‚inherited‛ value of 
loyalty to the political party among the citizens. Second, the 
Western Balkan societies remained highly politicized for 
almost two decades after the fall of the communist regime, 
mainly as a result of limited electoral competition. The 
most prominent example is the politicization of the public 
administration where civil servants employed by any 
previous government were replaced by members or loyalist 
of the ruling party. Therefore, in a situation of very high 
unemployment rates, having a party membership card was 
seen as the best guarantee for becoming a civil servant. At 
the same time the politicization practice did not stop at the 
threshold of public administrative bodies, but embarked 
                                                 
21 Tucker (2006) in his study on Regional Economic voting in five 
European post-communist countries distinguishes between Old 
Regime and New Regime Parties. The Old Regime Parties are identified 
as the parties that are most closely linked to the prior non-democratic 
communist regime, while New Regime Parties are those most closely 
linked to the newly emerging democratic world. 
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almost all socio-economic layers of the countries 
(Sulejmani, 2011; UNODC, 2011). 
I must also pay due attention to the evolution of electoral 
participation in national contexts in the post-communist 
states of Europe since voting is considered as one of the 
central forms of political participation in contemporary 
democracies. Figure 2 shows the trends of voter turnout in 
parliamentary elections in the CEE EU members and 
Western Balkan states for the period 1990-2009. Similarly to 
the phenomena observed in established democracies, there 
is a trend of decreasing voter turnout in post-communist 
countries, as well. But what is interesting about this region 
is that almost all of the countries (with few exceptions) 
experienced abrupt rather than a gradual turnout decline 
following the first or second parliamentary elections. 
Kostadinova (2003) and Kostelka (2010) point out that the 
first democratic elections in these countries were depicted 
as strongly emotional and euphoric events, prone to 
maximize electoral participation. However, as the 
expectations of the electorate are unrealistically high, the 
dissatisfaction with government’s economic performance, 
as well as with democratic processes prevails and 
eventually leads to turnout decline in the subsequent 
elections. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
It is also interesting to note that the Western Balkan states 
show more consistent trend of voter turnout than the new 
EU members. The specific political conditions in two of the 
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Western Balkan countries explain the sudden jump of the 
voter turnout in the period of third parliamentary elections. 
Namely, the 2002 elections were basically the first 
legislative post-conflict elections in Macedonia and they 
were an integral component of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement that ended the crisis in 2001. To a great extent 
this contributed to the high voter turnout in the elections 
held the subsequent year. On the other side, the elections 
held in January 2000 in Croatia (following the death of 
Tudjman) are considered as the beginning of consolidation 
of democracy in Croatia. That might explain to a certain 
extent the increased voter turnout in the country compared 
to the previous legislative elections. 
The next section presents the different views on the 
relationship between participation and democracy. The 
exposition of several different schools of thought will be 
directed towards demonstrating the differences between 
the theories trying to explain the relation between political 
participation and democratic governance. 
 
3.3. Citizens’ participation and democratic 
consolidation 
 
According to Linz and Stepan (1996), a democracy is 
consolidated when it has become ‚the only game in town.‛ 
More specifically, a democratic regime becomes 
consolidated when: 1) there are no significant actors 
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engaging in secession or regime change; 2) the majority of 
the population holds the belief that democracy is the best 
form of government; and 3) when the governmental and 
nongovernmental actors of the state become subjects and 
act according to the democratic institutions. In addition to 
this, a consolidated democracy should display sufficient 
levels of input and output legitimacy. The input legitimacy 
is produced when citizens are able to articulate their will in 
the political decision-making process, while the output 
legitimacy results from political decisions based on the 
common preferences of the citizenry (Scharpf, 1997, 1999).  
As long as we accept that legitimacy is a core component of 
democratic consolidation and that it is the political 
participation that provides the system with legitimacy, we 
cannot ignore the importance of citizens’ political activism 
for sustainability of democracy. Nevertheless, some 
theorists of democratic transition (O'Donnell et al., 1986; 
Przeworski, 1991) put much greater emphasis on the role of 
elite commitment for the consolidation of democracy, than 
on the mass political culture. According to Pollack et al. 
(2003, p. 92), the concept which neglects the role of mass 
political activism in the early stages of shaping the 
character of democracy is a ‚minimalistic‛ concept. By 
contrast, ‚maximalistic‛ concepts include political support 
as a key indicator of consolidation‛ (Pollack et al., 2003, p. 
92). Diamond (1999, p. 172) for example argues that while 
the commitment among the political elites is crucial for the 
emergence of the democratic polity, ‚mass political culture 
becomes increasingly important in shaping the character 
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and viability of democracy.‛ Almond and Verba (1989) and 
Linz and Stepan (1996) are also among the scholars who 
consider citizens’ political participation as one of the crucial 
elements for the course of democratic consolidation. As 
Almond and Verba (1989) would note, democracies are able 
to persist and consolidate only if there exists a congruency 
between their political culture and political structure. This 
means that the stability of democracy can be achieved only 
when a critical mass of the citizenry develop an active 
commitment to it. ‚This does not imply so much a 
permanent active participation of each single member of a 
society in the process of consolidation but rather the 
marginalization of forces working against the democratic 
system<‛ (Pollack et al., 2003, p. 93). This is consistent 
with Linz’s view (1978: 18) that ‚a legitimate government is 
one considered to be the least evil of the forms of 
government. Ultimately, democratic legitimacy is based on 
the belief that for that particular country at that particular 
historical juncture no other type of regime could assure a 
more successful pursuit of collective goals.‛ 
Once the democracy is consolidated, it is considered that 
political engagement is an important indicator of the health 
of democracy and at the same time the development of 
democratic institutions creates conditions for larger citizen 
involvement in decision-making. The continuous decline of 
voting turnout and disengagement in politics is considered 
to be a serious threat to the modern democracy. That is 
mainly because it severely undermines the political culture 
and appeals to democracy. However, although high 
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electoral turnout usually signals a healthy and vibrant 
democracy, it would be misleading to claim that low voter 
participation is always a sign of flawed democratic regime. 
Namely, ‚low election turnouts can signal a lack of 
confidence in the electoral system—but may also signify 
apathy or satisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, 
strong voter turnout may hint at a vibrant democracy, but 
it could also indicate intense propaganda, authoritarian 
rule, and false reports<‛ (Zelenko, 2012). 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, there are 
two very broad schools of thought on the role of 
participation in the advanced democracies. According to 
the classics of participatory democratic theory (such as 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill) maximum 
political engagement by the citizens is essential for the 
advancement of the modern, democratic states. In 
Rousseau’s view, direct involvement of each citizen in 
political decision making constitutes an essential element of 
democracy, i.e. for him participation is more than just 
voting in elections (Rousseau, 1762). In Du Contrat Social, 
he describes a political system in which the social contract 
constitutes a basis on which a proper society can be built. 
Under this social contract citizens assemble in one place to 
debate and to create rules and policies that will be 
beneficial and acceptable to all. Similarly like Rousseau, 
John Stuart Mill (1861) also argues that politically active 
citizens can better protect their interests. However, it is 
highly doubtful that this form of representative democracy 
is actually functional in the context of the modern complex 
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societies. Some of the recent scholars who recognized the 
limitations and drawbacks of direct political involvement 
of the ordinary citizens are Pateman (1970) and Barber 
(1984).  Although still arguing that high degree of citizens’ 
engagement in political decision making is essential for the 
democratic performance, they offered a somewhat 
moderate view on modern participatory democracy. They 
are portraying a political system where people express 
interest in politics and display high levels of engagement in 
different forms of political participation (such as voting, 
protesting, contacting politicians, etc.). Pointing out that 
‘strong democracy’ requires more than elections, Barber 
(1984, p. 267) contends that ‚if all of the people can 
participate some of the time in some of the responsibilities 
of governing, then strong democracy will have realized its 
aspirations.‛ 
According to the ‘realist’ theory of democracy, 
participation plays only a limited role and can even be 
harmful for the stability of democracy. Therefore, citizens’ 
role in the political process should be limited to voting 
only. Joseph Schumpeter is the main protagonist of this 
theory. In his view: ‚the democratic method is that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote‛ 
(Schumpeter, 1943, p. 269). In other words, democracy is an 
instrument for competition among the rival leaders and the 
role of citizens is to choose between them. This implies that 
mass participation is not essential to democracy and even 
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undesirable in certain aspects. Among the recent theorists 
who are critical of the participatory model of democracy 
are Dahl (1956) and Sartori (1962, 1987). Dahl (1956, p. 89), 
for instance, also argued that an increase in citizens’ 
engagement in politics, especially among the members of 
lower socio-economic classes may not always be beneficial 
for democracy. That is because they tend to be more 
authoritarian-minded. This suggests that contrary to the 
participatory democrats, the so-called ‘realists’ do not 
measure the strength of democracy by high levels of 
citizens’ engagement in politics, but rather by its capacity 
to perform checks on the leaders (Parry et al., 1992, p. 5). 
Finally, there are scholars who argue that participation 
should be seen as quality of democracy. That is, without 
citizens’ participation in politics, it would be inconceivable 
to have ‘a government of the people’. Diamond and 
Morlino (2005, p. xvi) for instance, argue that political 
participation is one of the dimensions of the democratic 
quality and point out that: ‚No regime can be a democracy, 
unless it grants its adult citizens formal rights of political 
participation, including the right to vote.‛ Merkel (2011, p. 
9) adds that a democratic quality is high when citizens have 
equal rights to participate and at the same time, when these 
rights are used in an equal manner. That said a distinction 
between the quality and the level of democracy is being 
made. While the level of democracy is concerned rather 
with consolidation of democracy, the quality of democracy 
is about the norms and legitimacy of the democratic 
system. 
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3.4. Democratic reform as an engine for 
political participation 
 
As much as democracy is inconceivable without citizens’ 
participation, it is also a mechanism that can engineer more 
political participation. The recent decline in electoral 
participation, as well as the decrease in party membership 
and other forms of citizens’ engagement in politics in the 
old, as well as in the newly-established democracies 
throughout the world generated a discussion of whether 
there is crisis of the democratic governance. Therefore it 
was suggested by some scholars that different types of 
democratic systems or institutional framework can increase 
or decrease the opportunities for political participation 
(Baglioni, 2007; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; 
Zittel and Fuchs, 2007). It is considered that participatory 
democracies are more prone to foster citizens’ participation 
in the public sphere than representative ones (Baglioni, 
2007, p. 91). Zittel and Fuchs (2007) argue that the upsurge 
of the policies that would provide new opportunities for 
political participation, particularly in the advanced 
democracies is actually an answer to the perceived crisis of 
democracy. It is believed that such policies are examples of 
‘participatory engineering’ that will counter downward 
trends in citizens’ engagement (Zittel, 2007). Therefore, 
according to the participatory theory, the more advanced 
the democracies are, the bigger their capacity to implement 
institutions of participatory democracy. Nevertheless, 
Fuchs (2007) is rather skeptical that the modern democracy 
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can allow the implementation of the model of participatory 
democracy that implies broad mass participation. 
From the above mentioned theories of democracy, several 
different relations between participation and democracy 
can be distinguished. Those are: 
- Politically active citizenry is crucial for consolidation 
and advancement of democracy; 
- Mass political participation can be harmful for 
democracy; 
- Political participation is dimension of the quality of 
democracy; and 
- Different democratic settings can increase/decrease 
the level of political participation. 
As can be seen, the causality between political participation 
and democracy does not run in one direction only, but is 
rather a multi-directional one. As a result, an endogeneity 
problem might arise, which will eventually lead to 
inconsistent estimates. Being aware that there is no obvious 
way to unambiguously determine the cause-effect 
relationship in this case, I focus my attention in 
determining the correlation between these two variables in 
CEE and Western Balkans, rather than in establishing a 
causal link between them. 
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3.5. Methodology, variables and data 
 
3.5.1. Dependent variable 
 
Coming up with an appropriate definition of democracy is 
important in order to decide which democracy indicator to 
use as a dependent variable for my first model. Even 
though the concept of democracy is highly contestable, the 
choice of leaders through conduct of ‚free, competitive and 
fair‛ elections appears in almost all definitions of 
democracy. Such a minimalist definition of democracy or a 
definition of electoral democracy is offered by Lipset (1981) 
and Schumpeter (1943). Lipset (1981, p. 27), for example 
describes democracy as ‚a political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for changing the 
governing officials and a social mechanism which permits 
the largest possible part of the population to influence 
major decisions by choosing among contenders for political 
office.‛ Nevertheless, Dahl (1989, pp. 112-114) argues that 
the concept of democracy extends beyond constitution of 
government and he considers the presence of the 
substantial array of civil rights as crucial. Following the 
argument that the political rights cannot be effectively 
exercised in the absence of some civil liberties (such as 
freedom of association, expression and belief) and rule of 
law, I come up to the concept of liberal democracy. Thus, a 
country can be considered ‘democratic’ if there is free and 
fair elections based on universal suffrage, as well as 
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political and civil freedoms of speech, press, assembly and 
organization (Dahl, 1971). 
So far a number of strategies were adopted to 
operationalize and measure democracy: scale measures, 
objective measures, perceptions of democracy etc. 
Nonetheless, the two democracy indicators with the 
broadest coverage of the above mentioned concepts are the 
Polity democracy score (Marshall et al., 2012a) and the 
Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indicator 
(Freedom House, 2013). The Polity democracy score 
described in Marshall et al. (2012b) and based on work by 
Ted Robert Gurr (Gurr, 1974; Gurr and Jaggers, 1990) is 
constructed after the evaluation of the following 
components: competitiveness of participation, regulation of 
participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, 
openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
executive. It ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy).  Although the Polity democracy 
score (Marshall et al., 2012a) is the most commonly used 
democracy index among the political scientists that became 
even more attractive after the introduction of the new 
variant of the polity score (polity2)22, it has one important 
limitation for this study. That is, it doesn’t provide a 
democracy score for the cases of so-called foreign 
                                                 
22 Polity2 or the Revised Combined Policy Score is the modified version 
of the Polity IV variable. It is intended to convert the instances of 
‚standardized authority scores‛ (so-called ‘‘interregnum’’ and 
‘‘transition‛ periods, coded as -77 and -88, respectively) to conventional 
polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 
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‘interruption’, i.e. they are treated as system missing. This 
is the case with Bosnia (one out of five countries of the 
Western Balkans) for the period 1994-2009. 
Based on the work of Gastil and Sussman (1987), the 
Freedom House project provides a measure of democracy 
based on evaluation of two broad categories: political rights 
and civil liberties. Political rights ratings combine the 
average of the following three subcategories: electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and 
functioning of government; civil liberties ratings are based 
on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual 
rights. The Freedom House scale assigns each country a 
numerical rating from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) for both 
political rights and civil liberties. 
For the purpose of this study I believe that it is most 
appropriate to use the average Freedom House/Polity 
Index based on the work of Teorell et al. (2011) and 
incorporated in the Quality of Government Dataset. There 
are several reasons for this. First, this composite index of 
democracy has imputed values for countries where data on 
Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average 
Freedom House measure. Second, it is composed of two 
sub-indexes which do not capture certain context-specific 
features of democracy, such as political participation. And 
finally, I believe that this average index would perform 
better both in terms of validity and reliability than its 
constituent parts (as it is argued and showed in the work 
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by Hadenius and Teorell (2005). In order to construct this 
index both, Freedom House and Polity2 democracy scores 
are averaged and transformed to a scale of 0 (least 
democratic) to 10 (most democratic). 
Before proceeding any further I would like to point out that 
the data that measures the level of democracy besides 
operationalizing democratic consolidation, it also capture 
to a certain extent the quality of democracy. In other words, 
the observable chronological gradation of democratic 
development might reflect both, democratic consolidation 
and quality of democracy. Yet, it is my belief that assessing 
the quality of democracy requires a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. For that reason and 
being aware of the fact that it is often difficult to draw a 
strict differentiation between what really determines 
consolidation and quality of democracy, I allowed myself 
certain degree of freedom when selecting the indicator for 
my dependent variable. 
 
3.5.2. Independent variables 
 
As one of the aims of this study is to investigate the 
influence of political participation on the levels of 
democracy in the regions of Central Eastern Europe and 
Western Balkans, the key independent variable to test the 
above hypotheses is political participation. More 
specifically, four different forms of political participation 
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(voter turnout, party membership, signing petitions and 
attending demonstrations) will be considered as 
independent variables. I focus specifically on them because 
(as Figure 1 shows), most of the people in Eastern Europe 
who take part in the political life engage in these four 
modes of political participation. The influence of all four 
independent variables on the levels of democracy in CEE 
and Western Balkans is tested in four separate independent 
models. 
Voting in parliamentary or presidential elections is 
considered to be one of the most common political actions 
that citizens can take part in. As almost all countries in 
Eastern Europe are parliamentary democracies (except 
Romania and Ukraine which are semi-presidential 
republics and Belarus which is presidential republic), I take 
into consideration only the variation in parliamentary 
elections. As mentioned in Section 2, the data for the first 
key independent variable – voter turnout is taken from 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IIDEA, 2011) and consists of voter turnout 
figures for national parliamentary elections since 1994 
based on the Voting Age Population (VAP)23. 
The data for the other three key independent variables 
(party membership, signing petitions and attending 
peaceful demonstrations) is taken from the European 
Values Study (EVS, 2011) and World Values Survey (WVS, 
                                                 
23 The voting age population (VAP) includes all citizens above the legal 
voting age. 
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2009). This data collection contains survey data from five 
waves of the World Values Survey and European Values 
Study, carried out in 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-
2004 and 2005-2007. During each wave, surveys are 
conducted in a variety of countries with the aim to enable a 
cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide 
variety of topics, such as environmental issues, religion and 
morale, politics and society, working conditions etc. 
However, for the purpose of this study, I take only the data 
starting from the third wave (1995-1997), as in the first few 
years of the transitional period the political participation 
rates were unrealistically high as a result of the euphoria of 
the newly gained freedom of communism. I believe that 
taking them into consideration will produce unreliable 
results. 
The questions used to measure the percentage of political 
party membership are: 
- In WVS: ‚Could you tell me whether you are a 
member, an active member, an inactive member or 
not a member of a political party?‛ The possible 
responses and the corresponding codes are: ‚Don’t 
know (-1)‛, ‚Not a member (0)‛, ‚Inactive member 
(1)‛ and ‚Active member (2).‛ 
- In EVS: ‚Do you belong to political parties or 
groups?‛ The possible responses and their 
corresponding codes are: ‚Don’t know (-1)‛, ‚Not 
mentioned (0)‛ and ‚Mentioned (1).‛ 
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Since I am interested only in the total number of 
respondents that are members of a political party, I take 
into consideration both responses: ‚Inactive member‛ and 
‚Active member‛ from the World Values Survey and only 
the response ‚Mentioned‛ from the European Values 
Study. 
The questions used to determine the percentage of 
individuals who have engaged in a political action by 
signing a petition and/or attending lawful/peaceful 
demonstrations (for both WVS and EVS) are: 
- ‚I'm going to read out some different forms of 
political action that people can take, and I'd like you 
to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually 
done any of these things, whether you might do it or 
would never, under any circumstances, do it: 
 Signing a petition 
 Attending lawful demonstration.‛ 
The possible responses and their corresponding codes are: 
‚Don’t know (-1)‛, ‚Have done (1)‛, ‚Might do (2)‛ and 
‚Would never do (3)‛. The only response that I am taking 
into account for both questions is ‚Have done.‛ 
Besides including the measures of four modes of political 
participation as independent variables, the first statistical 
model (Models 1a-1d) also includes several control 
variables that according the democratization theory are 
commonly regarded as correlated with the levels of 
democracy. Therefore the following variables have been 
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identified in the literature to have certain impact on the 
level of democracy: lagged levels of democracy, GDP per 
capita based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)24, average 
years of schooling in the population aged 25 and above, 
trade openness, ethnic fractionalization, religious 
fractionalization, political stability and absence of 
violence.25 
 
3.5.3. Methodology 
 
The main implication of my theoretical analysis is that an 
increase in the political participation rates has significantly 
positive impacts on the levels of democracy. This 
implication, however, does not seem to hold for all post-
communist states in Europe. The empirical evidence shows 
that the levels of almost all dimensions of political 
participation (voter turnout, membership of political 
parties, signing petitions, joining in demonstrations etc.) 
are higher in the Western Balkan states compared to their 
Eastern European counterparts. Yet, they have distinctively 
                                                 
24 GDP per capita might be an effect rather than the cause of the 
democracy level, which might result in underestimating the effect of 
the political participation variables. Nevertheless, I have decided to 
include it in the models because the robustness check has showed that 
there is no statistical change in the other explanatory variables when 
GDP per capita is omitted from the regression analysis. 
25 For more information about the data and the sources used for the 
control variables, please see the Appendix 2 at the end of the thesis. 
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lower democracy levels. Thus, it appears that the citizen’s 
participation in politics is negatively correlated with levels 
of democracy in the Western Balkan region. With the aim to 
test this hypothesis I constructed a dataset which consists 
of panel data for 18 post-communist countries in Europe 
for a period of 16 years (1994-2009). The countries can be 
divided in three groups. The first group comprises five 
Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. The second 
group includes the ten CEE EU member states: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. And finally, the 
third group comprises the other three Eastern European 
countries: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, which I use as 
controls. That said, I use pooled-OLS with a constant term 
as a method of estimation. More specifically, to formally 
test my first hypothesis, I estimate four variants of the 
following time-series cross-section regression model 
(TSCS): 
                                           (              )
  ∑    (   )
 
   
       
The subscript         denotes a country;         
denotes a year;          denotes a specific control 
variable; while    is the regional dummy that takes a value 
of one for the Western Balkan countries and zero otherwise. 
Including the regional dummy for Western Balkans in the 
regression will allow controlling for the effects caused by 
the countries that belong to this group on the dependent 
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variable.    ,      and    refer respectively to dependent, 
independent and control variables for unit   and time  ;      
is a random error and    and    refer, respectively, to the 
intercept and the slope parameters. I include interaction 
terms between the key independent variables and the 
Western Balkan dummy in order to check if the effects of 
political participation are different depending on whether a 
country belongs to the Western Balkan region or not. 
As said, four separate statistical investigations will be 
conducted. The intention behind this is to capture the 
isolated effects of the four main explanatory variables: 
voter turnout, political party membership, signing petitions 
and attending peaceful demonstrations while controlling 
simultaneously for other explanatory factors. The 
regression results will eventually show whether there is 
indeed a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between the citizen’s participation rates and the levels of 
democracy in the Western Balkans. Table 6 (Model 1a-1d) 
reports the estimation results of the four models. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
3.6. Results and analysis 
 
The results in Table 6 suggest that generally citizens’ 
participation in politics represents a supportive component 
to the democratic deepening in post-communist Europe. 
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However, the results on the interaction terms reveal that 
the effects of political participation on the levels of 
democracy significantly differ on whether a country 
belongs to the Western Balkan region or not. In other 
words, high levels of political participation in the Western 
Balkan states turn the coefficient from positive, non-
statistically significant into negative, statistically 
significant. This basically supports my argument that a 
high level of political participation is not necessarily an 
indication for better democracy in post-communist Europe. 
I elaborate this in more details further below. 
Low electoral turnout is often considered detrimental to 
democracy because it puts legitimacy into question and 
could result in enacting certain egalitarian policies 
(McAllister and White, 2007; Patterson, 2002; Piven and 
Cloward, 1988, 2000; Teixeira, 1992; Verba and Nie, 1972; 
Wattenberg, 2002). As Verba and Nie (1972, p. 1) put it: 
‚where few take part in decisions there is little democracy.‛ 
Thus, the usual hypothesized relationship between election 
turnout rates and democracy levels is a positive one. 
Nevertheless, contrary on what one would expect on the 
basis of the recent empirical findings, the results in Table 6 
(Model 1a) indicate that the turnout rates and democracy 
levels in Western Balkans are negatively correlated. 
Moreover this relationship proves to be a strongly 
statistically significant one. 
Here I will offer several possible explanations for this 
puzzle. First, over the last several decades, studies have 
consistently acknowledged that there is a decline in the 
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voter turnout in the established democracies (Franklin, 
2004; Ghobarah, 1998; Gray and Caul, 2000; Jackman, 1987; 
Jackman and Miller, 1995; Powell, 1986). It seems that in 
less democratic regimes people are much more likely to use 
electoral participation to express the dissatisfaction with 
the policy course of the current government. However, that 
does not necessarily lead to the deepening of democracy in 
the first place. Sometimes (as it is often the case in the 
Western Balkans countries), as a result of the ineffective 
exercise of the rule of law, politicians abuse the power by 
engaging in a corrupt relationship with the lawmakers. 
Second, very often the citizens of selected Western Balkan 
countries are subjects of vote-buying practices before the 
elections. That can have a serious impact on the fairness 
and transparency of the electoral process. In the survey 
conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC, 2011), citizens of six Western Balkan states 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Macedonia) were asked if they were exposed to 
a vote-buying at the last general elections in their countries. 
The findings showed that ‚<an average of 8 per cent of 
citizens were asked to vote for a certain candidate or 
political party in exchange for a concrete offer, such as 
money, goods or a favor.‛ Unfortunately, to the best of my 
knowledge there are no surveys that measure the trend of 
vote-buying in the other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Third, turnout tends to be higher in nations where 
political commitment is closely linked to class, ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious loyalty (Powell, 1980). Bochsler 
(2007, p. 7) also argues that ‚ethnic minorities are a relevant 
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political factor in terms of voting power all across Central 
and Eastern Europe; their parties have frequently been 
included into governing coalitions in many countries of the 
region‛ with the ‚Southeast European countries *being+ 
among the front-runners with regards to ethnic minority 
representation.‛ In other words, considering the region’s 
recent past in which the ethnic tensions and nationalism are 
prominent features, the ethnic minority parties manage to 
mobilize much larger part of their minority members to 
vote for them than the parties of the ethnic majority. 
Looking at the second type of political participation 
(political party membership – Model 1b) analyzed in this 
study, we can also see a very strong and statistically 
significant negative correlation with the democracy levels 
in the Western Balkans. That was expected taking into 
consideration that without any exceptions, Western Balkan 
countries have much higher rates of party membership 
than the average rate of the other post-communist countries 
in Europe, and distinctively lower democracy levels. 
However, this result also exhibit a very different pattern 
from the one described by the conventional theories of 
political participation, according to which political parties 
are one of the core institutions of democracy (e.g. Diamond 
and Gunther, 2001). 
I argue that the main explanation behind this puzzle is the 
clientelist linkage building between politicians and their 
voters – a practice very common for the Western Balkan 
states. Namely, the very close intertwining of party 
building and state building in these countries created 
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conditions for patronage politics.26 What is quite particular 
for this region is that party’s monopoly on the state 
apparatus and politicized party administration remained 
strong features long after the fall of the communist regime 
and is still present in most of the Western Balkan states. ‚< 
Public administration in the Western Balkan regimes 
entered the post-communist period with one historical 
legacy in common. They all lacked the experience of 
sustained democratic consolidation, i.e., transparency and 
separation of powers sufficient to make their bureaucracies 
responsible to legal norms and standards of efficiency, as 
well as external oversight. They were burdened instead 
with a heritage of clientelism and corruption not open to 
public view‛ (Cohen, 2010). Practically, little has changed 
in the countries of the Western Balkans since then. Despite 
the EU conditionality pressures to reform the public 
administration in these countries, the recruitment of the 
civil servants continues to be based more on party loyalty 
than on professional merits. Therefore, in a situation of 
high unemployment, becoming a party member is seen as 
one’s guarantee for securing a job. And as long as the 
democratic state-building rests on establishing 
administrative institutions accountable to the elected 
officials and the public and at the same time capable to 
                                                 
26 This is the main argument made by O'Dwyer (2004) in his study on 
political parties and states bureaucracies in post-communist Eastern 
Europe. Nevertheless, his analysis is constrained on three cases only: 
Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. I argue here that the patronage-
led state building is a particularly significant feature for the Western 
Balkans region. 
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perform its duties effectively, politicization of the 
bureaucratic agencies constantly undermines that process 
in the region. 
In the cases of signing petitions and attending peaceful 
demonstrations, the analysis also confirmed my initial 
intuition that they are not likely to encourage the 
deepening of democracy in the Western Balkans. Models 1c 
and 1d confirm the strong negative relationship between 
these two types of unconventional political participation 
and the levels of democracy in the Western Balkans. 
If we allow ourselves to suppose that the political 
participation in the countries of the Western Balkans is 
motivated primarily by a self-interested desire to gain the 
political benefits promised by a certain political party or 
candidate, then the above mentioned puzzles resolve 
themselves. However, it is difficult to measure and 
quantify clientelism, or create any sort of index which I 
would be able to incorporate into the regression analysis as 
a control variable that will capture some part of the 
variation between the levels of democracy and political 
participation in the Western Balkans. Therefore, more exact 
mechanisms of the clientelism argument will be 
investigated through a small-N analysis (SNA), where I 
will compare two ex-Yugoslav countries that represent two 
of the most different cases in terms of popular movements, 
clientelism and democratization process. 
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3.6.1. Clientelist linkages and public 
political participation: comparing 
Macedonia and Slovenia 
 
This section aims to assess the commonalities and 
differences found in Macedonia and Slovenia with respect 
to clientelism, party patronage and vote-buying practices 
and their impact on the political participation levels. I have 
purposefully chosen these two former Yugoslavian 
republics as for almost half a century they shared common 
political, economic and institutional settings, but after the 
fall of the communist regime they have pluralized and 
democratized in most opposite directions. 
While the traditional clientelist relations have been eroded 
by the democratization process in most CEE countries, 
clientelism and patronage politics continue to impact 
political participation in the Western Balkans. ‚Clientelism 
denotes such social relations where personal loyalty to the 
patron prevails over democratic decision-making, 
professional duties and ethical behavior‛ (Kotchegura, 
2008). A large percentage of the Western Balkans’ political 
class has emerged from the lines of the former regime, 
formed by people who had inside knowledge and were 
willing to continue to use the power for their own personal 
profits, rather than for public interest. In order to achieve 
this, they formed different networks of interest-driven 
alliances. Ethnic division in some of the Western Balkan 
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countries (such as Macedonia and Bosnia) serves as a tool 
to legally cement the positions of certain political parties 
and figures. Western Balkan countries proved to be too 
weak, fragmented and polarized to resist these practices 
and as a result were, and some of them still are, held 
hostages of large clientelist and patronage groups. I 
contend that clientelist-inspired participation seriously 
undermines the democratic process of the region, as well as 
its capacity to make elected officials accountable to citizens. 
Having said that, ‚the political space has to be opened for 
new forces. Society has to find the strength to do away with 
the patronage groups, overcome ethnic division and think 
of politics as a competition of ideas if not ideologies< It 
has to take the initiative from the patronage groups and 
bring it to the centre of society, to the people‛ (Schenker, 
2012). Further bellow I will try to explain the development 
of the divergent patronage paths and their effect over the 
political participation rates in two ex-Yugoslavian 
countries: Macedonia and Slovenia. 
After the collapse of the communist regime in CEE, the 
political parties became the dominant actors of the 
democratic processes. However, in some countries of the 
region, parties managed to penetrate both the state and the 
society to a much larger extent than others. This became a 
particularly evident feature for the Macedonian society. 
Namely, the inherited value of loyalty to the political party 
gave rise to a tendency of strong politicization of the 
Macedonian public administration. Although party 
membership is not an official requirement for employment, 
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it is a best guarantee for getting a job. ‚Hence, there has 
been no discontinuation of political interference in 
Macedonia’s public administration after its succession from 
Yugoslavia in 1991. Indeed, political intrusion has 
remained a practice taken for granted by politicians ever 
since‛ (Sulejmani, 2011, p. 2). The economic hardship and 
poverty have made the political parties the main employees 
which assign state positions on the basis of political 
affiliation and activism, rather than professional 
qualifications. This trend is particularly evident before any 
elections in the country. A promised job in the public 
administration became a powerful tool in the hands of the 
ruling party for obtaining more votes on the upcoming 
elections. According to the survey conducted by the 
UNODC (2011), about three quarters of the applicants not 
recruited in the public sector in Macedonia believe that 
somebody else was employed either due to cronyism, 
nepotism or bribery (70%), or due to the payment of money 
(5%). These percentages are higher than the average for the 
Western Balkan region (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
 This tendency in not only manifested on a national level, 
but also at the level of the local government directed by the 
party the mayor belongs to and reaches even the lowest 
ranking positions. The consideration of the administration 
as a possession of the ruling party has resulted in de-
professionalization and oversizing of the public sector and 
at the same time opened more space for further political 
intrusion and manipulation. There have been several 
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efforts to reform the public administration in Macedonia, 
which however, did not give the expected results mainly 
due to the ruling party’s desire to maintain the status quo. 
The other countries of the Western Balkans are in quite 
similar position regarding the politicization of the state 
administration. In the Policy Report made by Analytica 
(2011, pp. 11-12) is suggested that ‚the problem with the 
administration of states in the Western Balkans is not the 
absence of strategies for reforms, rather the failure to 
execute those strategies.‛ 
At the same time, Slovenia managed to implement reforms 
to the public sector even under the communist regime and 
had an already functioning system of public administration 
since its independence in 1991. However, since 1996 the 
public administration reform has been a priority task for 
the Slovenian government. More specifically, the 
government adopted a strategy which main goals were to 
increase the efficiency of the Slovenian public 
administration and to harmonize its functions according to 
the European standards. Special governmental strategies 
for further development of the public sector were passed in 
2003 and 2005. Contrary to the practice adopted by the 
Macedonian political figures, the staffing decisions in the 
Slovenian public sector are not part of the patronage 
politics, but are rather based on the merit principle. As 
such, they do not exert influence on the levels of political 
participation in the country. However, the main difference 
between the two countries regarding the public 
administration reform is that whereas the Macedonian 
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government failed to effectively implement the adopted 
reforms, the Slovenian government took a pro-active stand 
and provided consistent political support. Since there is no 
available data on the public sector recruitment for Slovenia, 
I use the Corruption Perceptions Index developed by 
Transparency International (2013) which ranks countries 
based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. 
As Figure 5 shows, Slovenia proves to be much better with 
regards to the transparency, accountability and 
performance of the public bodies. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
The second modality on how clientelism impacts the 
political participation is through vote-buying between 
patrons and their clients. Namely, vote-buying is a frequent 
practice before and during elections in the countries of the 
Western Balkans. In this regard, in the survey conducted by 
the UNODC (2011), citizens were asked whether they were 
exposed to vote-buying on the last national and local 
elections. The findings show that ‚an average of 8% of 
citizens were asked to vote for a certain candidate or 
political party in exchange for a concrete offer, such as 
money, goods or a favor‛27 (UNODC, 2011, p. 9). Figure 6 
shows that this practice seems to happen almost twice more 
often in Bosnia than in the other three ex-Yugoslav 
countries. Macedonia is somewhere in the middle, with 
                                                 
27 Data do not include Albania since the topic was not covered in the 
Albania survey. 
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about 5% of its citizens being exposed to vote-buying at the 
last national and local elections. Croatia ranks the lowest. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge there is no data 
available for the vote-buying practices in Slovenia. For that 
reason, I am using the Electoral Process Rating made by 
Freedom House (2013) which practically captures the 
fairness and transparency of the electoral process in the 
country.28 As it can be seen on Figure 7, Slovenia ranks 
much higher than the rest of the Western Balkans states in 
terms of the transparency of the electoral process. 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
Taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, it can 
be said that the elections in the Western Balkans are not 
entirely centered on policy accountability, but to a great 
extent on the exchange of favors and services between 
patrons and clients. 
Finally, clientelist practices in public sector recruitment and 
vote-buying before and during elections ‚are two areas that 
can have a serious impact on both the development of an 
independent, professional public administration and the 
                                                 
28 The Electoral Process Rating by Freedom House (2013) is based on 
evaluation of the answers of the following three questions: (1) Is the 
head of government or other chief national authority elected through 
free and fair elections? (2) Are the national legislative representatives 
elected through free and fair elections? (3) Are the electoral laws and 
framework fair? 
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fairness and transparency of the electoral process‛ 
(UNODC, 2011). In other words, clientelism and patronage 
politics continue to erode the democratic process and to 
negatively impact the legitimacy of the political system in 
the Western Balkan countries. Therefore, it can be justly 
claimed that clientelism represents the intermediary 
variable which explains the negative correlation between 
political participation and levels of democracy in the 
Western Balkans. 
 
3.7. Summary of the main conclusions 
 
It is beyond any doubt that survival of democracy requires 
not only mass support, but also free and vibrant civil and 
political society. Empirical studies have confirmed that 
citizens in post-communist countries in Europe participate 
less in politics than their Western European neighbors. 
Several different factors that account for this difference 
have been identified in the literature. Some of them are: 
lack of political culture, low levels of social capital, as well 
as the state of civil society in the country. Yet, if we take a 
closer look at the variation among the countries within the 
post-communist Europe, we would note that the Western 
Balkan states have particularly higher levels of citizens’ 
engagement in politics than their Eastern European 
neighbors. At the same time, their levels of democracy are 
distinctively lower. Thus, I have argued that higher 
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political participation does not necessarily guarantee that 
democracy will flourish. This argument is reflected in 
concern about the possible negative implications of purely 
self-interest driven political activism on democracy 
consolidation and system stability in the fragile 
democracies of the Western Balkans. The statistical analysis 
has indeed confirmed that all four types of political 
participation (voting, political party membership, signing 
petitions and attending peaceful demonstrations) are 
negatively correlated with the levels of democracy in the 
Western Balkan region. Even more, this relationship is 
strongly statistically significant. I argue that in a situation 
of severe economic hardship, politicization of almost all 
spheres of the society, as well as widespread corruption (as 
it is in the Western Balkans), the self-interest is the primary 
motivator for citizens’ participation in politics. More 
specifically, the clientelistic relations that existed during the 
authoritarian period in the Western Balkan states have 
continued to impact political participation even after their 
democratization. The clientelist linkage building between 
politicians and voters in this region usually takes several 
forms, some of which are: vote-buying, employment in the 
public sector, illegitimate acquirement of tenders etc.  
Finally, I can conclude that this clientelist-inspired 
participation seriously undermines the democratic process 
of the region, as well as its capacity to make elected officials 
accountable to citizens. In other words, when the self-
interest is the primal force for political attitudes and 
behaviors of the citizens, usually the final result is 
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strengthening of the corruptive practices, rather than 
reinforcement of the democratic attitudes and democratic 
quality. 
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4. Political competition and 
democracy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, genuinely 
democratic political involvement of the citizens plays an 
important role in the advancement of the democratic polity. 
But the progress towards fuller democratic consolidation 
also depends from the development of a competitive and 
uncorrupted party system. Even more, some democratic 
theorists emphasize the robust political competition29 as the 
most important determinant for the democratic stability. 
Dahl (1971), for example argued that democracy is most 
likely to endure when the advent of political contestation 
precedes the extension of political participation. This is 
clearly evident if we take into consideration that in a 
democratic polity it is the parties that should ‚provide the 
connective tissue between citizens and civil society actors 
on the one side, and state institutions on the other‛ (Cohen 
and Lampe, 2011, pp. 223-224). Huntington (1968) and 
Przeworski (1992) are also among the scholars who 
acknowledge that a robust political competition enhances 
the democratic stability and legitimacy. 
                                                 
29 Anna Grzymala-Busse (2004, p. 2) defines the robustness of the 
political competition as ‚the degree to which party competition 
presents a credible threat of replacement to governing parties.‛ 
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Numerous studies have dealt with the development of 
political party systems and patterns of party interaction in 
post-communist Europe (see Birch, 2001; Filho et al., 2012; 
Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Innes, 2002; Kitschelt et al., 1999; 
Kostelecký, 2002; Lane and Ersson, 2007; Lewis, 2006; 
Vachudova, 2005a). Almost all scholars dealing with this 
issue agree that post-communist party systems during the 
1990s were less consolidated than those in the established 
Western democracies. However, since the beginning of the 
new millennium this gap has narrowed, and today the 
party systems of CEE resemble much more those of 
Western Europe (Kostelecký, 2002). At the same time, not 
many studies analyze the extent to which the party system 
stability and the political competition are critical factors for 
democratic consolidation in post-communist Europe. 
Another critical aspect in the literature on this topic is that 
many scholars ignore the fact that party system 
development and patterns of party competition are some of 
the features which, among others, distinguish the ten new 
EU members from the rest of post-communist Europe. 
Having said that, despite the vast body of theories about 
party systems and political competition that emerged from 
the experience of the post-communist democracies, they 
often failed to capture and explain the distinctiveness of the 
party development and patterns of political competition in 
the Western Balkans. Among other distinctions, party 
systems in the Western Balkans seem to be less developed 
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(Ágh, 1998)30, more volatile and less institutionalized 
(Abuş, 2003), less distinguishable along ideological stances 
(Cohen and Lampe, 2011) as well as fragmented and 
ethnically polarized (Cohen and Lampe, 2011; Stojarová 
and Emerson, 2010). Consequently, political competition is 
based around ethnic cleavages making the ideological 
dimension less important. In most of the Western Balkan 
states (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Serbia) elections are still centered to a large degree on 
nationalism and territory. At the same time, electoral 
competition takes place both within and between 
coalitions.  
The first aim of this chapter is to track the differences in 
political competition rates between the two different blocks 
of post-communist countries in Europe. In a same way as in 
the previous chapter, the 10 CEE EU member states 
represent the first block of countries and serve just as a 
term of comparison. Apparently, in the focus of my cross-
national analysis are the Western Balkan states. 
Competition will mainly be analyzed with regard to the 
two main salient empirical sub-dimensions as suggested by 
Morlino (2011, p. 205): 
1. On the input side: competition among political 
actors, that is, freedom for all political parties to 
                                                 
30 In his book ‚The Politics of Central Europe‛, Attila Ágh (1998) does 
not concentrate exclusively on the party system development in the 
Western Balkans, but in the Balkan region as a whole. 
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compete with each other and fairness of political 
competition; and 
2. On the output side: competitiveness of participation, 
that is, the extent to which alternative preferences in 
the formation of government and different potential 
choices among policy alternatives can be pursued in 
the political arena, as well as potentiality of 
alternation. 
However, several other sub-dimensions that capture 
certain specific aspects of political competition will also be 
included in the empirical analysis.  
The empirical data indicate that with the exception of 
government fractionalization, Western Balkan states score 
lower in all quantitative dimensions of political 
competition compared to the CEE EU member states (see 
Figure 8 and Figure 9). Consequently, I expect a positive 
correlation between political competition and the level of 
democracy in CEE, as well as in the Western Balkans. More 
specifically, I suggest that political competition represents 
supportive component of democratic development and 
without genuine political competition democracy cannot 
survive in the Balkans. 
This chapter is structured as follows: first, I compare 
political competition rates among Western Balkan countries 
and 10 CEE EU member states and analyze the observed 
variations. The third section gives an overview of the 
theoretical framework on party system development and 
political competition. Further on, I give a detailed 
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description of the variables, methodology and data used in 
this chapter. In the fifth section, I statistically test the 
correlation between political competition rates and levels of 
democracy in the regions of Central Eastern Europe and the 
Western Balkans. After reviewing the results from the 
statistical test, I offer several possible explanations for the 
variation in the political party development among the 
Western Balkans and Central Eastern Europe, through 
which I will try to explain the previously established 
relation between political competition and democracy. 
[Insert Figure 8 and Figure 9 about here] 
 
4.2. Political competition in comparative 
perspective: Western Balkans vs. CEE 
EU member states 
 
In this section I present and analyze the empirical data by 
comparing the levels of political competition among the 
regions of Central Eastern Europe (part of the EU) and the 
Western Balkans, as well as among the countries of these 
regions as separate units. As previously mentioned, the five 
Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia) are in the focus of my 
cross-national and cross-regional analysis, while the ten 
CEE EU member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
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Slovenia) serve just as a term of comparison. Once again I 
exclude Kosovo and Montenegro from the analysis, as there 
is a lack of empirical data for them as separate units before 
becoming independent states. 
To compare the levels of political competition among and 
within the two regions, I use several indicators that capture 
different aspects of this dimension. Those are: opposition 
share, opposition fractionalization, government 
fractionalization, legislature fractionalization, electoral 
success of smaller parties and effective competition. 
However, the two indicators that evaluate most closely the 
input and output side of political competition are 
‘opposition share’ and ‘effective competition’, 
consequently. The data for the variable ‘effective 
competition’31 is taken from Polity IV dataset (Marshall et 
al., 2012a). This index is a five-point ordinal scale (5 being 
the highest) that measures the extent to which alternative 
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the 
political arena. The data for the variable which portrays the 
electoral success of smaller parties is taken from Vanhanen 
(2011) dataset. Finally the data for the remaining four 
political competition variables used in this study is taken 
                                                 
31 The original name of the variable ‘effective competition’ is 
‘competitiveness of participation (Marshall et al., 2012a). However, the 
name was changed in order to avoid confusion and overlapping with 
the independent variable from the previous chapter (i.e. political 
participation). 
127 
from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 2012).32 
For the purpose of this study I use only the data that covers 
the period 1992-2009. There are two reasons for this. First, 
the ex-Yugoslav countries gained their independence only 
in 1991. Second, although the communist regime in the rest 
of Eastern Europe fell two years earlier (in 1989), several 
years were needed for constituting a multi-party system.33 I 
don’t take into consideration the last few years as there is 
also missing data for some of the variables. 
Table 7 lists the average levels of political competition in 
each of the 15 European post-communist states, along with 
the group averages, which allows comparison both 
between countries and groups. Close inspection of the 
results in the table reveals that with the exception of 
government fractionalization, the CEE EU member states 
score higher in all dimensions of political competition 
compared to the Western Balkans. Interestingly enough, 
this difference is most obvious in the two sub-dimensions 
that capture the input and output side of political 
competition: opposition share and effective competition. 
Namely, the share of the opposition parties in parliament in 
the Western Balkans in the period 1992-2009 was about 
                                                 
32 Please note that the variable ‘opposition share’ is calculated by the 
author as a ratio between the number of seats assigned to opposition 
and total seats in the legislature, and then converted in percentage. For 
more information on the variables definitions and data, see Appendix 
2.  
33 For that reason, most of the indicators show zero in the first few years 
of democratic transition in the CEE. 
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37%, while in the rest of CEE almost half of the seats 
belonged to the opposition parties. As for the effective 
competition dimension, Western Balkan countries had an 
average score of 3.5 for the same time period. That means 
that most of the time they had factional or transitional 
arrangement of competitiveness. CEE EU member states on 
the other hand, scored on average somewhere between 
transitional and competitive competition. Thus, it is clearly 
evident that the quality of political competition in the 
Western Balkan states is lower compared to the other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are several 
factors which I consider to be the most essential reason for 
this variation. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
First, the initial political competition in the new 
democracies in Europe was determined by the presence or 
absence of an opposition to the communists in the founding 
years of democratic governance (Vachudova, 2005a). More 
specifically, right after the fall of the communist regime in 
the Western Balkans, there was an absence of an organized 
opposition to the former political order, which allowed the 
old rulers to win the first elections and to conduct the 
transition. This has allowed the old-regime elites to 
concentrate even more political power in their hands. 
Consequently, their initial strategies were to block the entry 
of competing political groups, so they would be able to 
govern in a relatively noncompetitive political manner. The 
only exception was Croatia where an anti-communist right 
wing party (HDZ) under the rule of Franjo Tuđman won 
129 
the first multi-party elections. However, Croatia under 
Tuđman was far from being a functioning democracy. On 
the contrary, he enforced a noncompetitive political system 
which resulted in a decade of uninterrupted rule of his 
party. Thus, the communist regime change in these 
countries was followed either by illiberal democracy 
(Albania, Macedonia) or by authoritarianism (Serbia and 
Croatia). Thus, it becomes clear that the first critical 
ingredient for a vigorous political competition was absent 
in all Western Balkan states. This was not the case with the 
other countries of post-communist Europe where the old 
regime parties were dismantled and ousted from power in 
the first democratic elections, or where they ‘survived’, 
they transformed themselves into moderate left-wing 
parties. The new elites that took over the power were 
dedicated to dismantle the elements of the communism, to 
transform the economy and to create democracy. 
Another factor that shapes the political competition in the 
Western Balkans is the ethnic cleavage. This is mainly 
because the ethnic self-identification in these states is very 
salient, with people perceiving the actions of another ethnic 
group as threatening to their own interest and identity.  
Therefore, voters are very susceptible to appeals of ethnic 
nationalism. On the other hand, political elites take 
advantage of this fact and use therefore ethnic scapegoating 
to win votes. This practice is constantly harming the quality 
of democracy and increasing the chances of conflict along 
ethnic lines. The intense polarization along ethnic lines 
characterizes in particular the party systems in Macedonia 
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and Bosnia. This has ‚obstructed state cohesion in both 
cases during the 1990s and beyond, and also led to violence 
and to sharp political-ideological differentiation between 
the major parties [and eventually] undermined the basis for 
the emergence of moderate party pluralism functioning 
within broadly legitimated states‛ (Cohen and Lampe, 
2011, p. 231). On the other hand, most of the CEE EU 
members have no large ethnic minorities. Consequently, 
their parties could not make use of ethnic nationalistic 
rhetoric against minorities to win or maintain power. 
Party corruption is considered to be yet another factor that 
shapes the party competition in the region. Although all 
Western Balkan states have established laws on the 
financing of political parties, several recent surveys indicate 
that political parties are considered by the public as most 
corrupted of all political institutions (Cohen and Lampe, 
2011, p. 237). Many agree that in order to concentrate more 
political power in their hands, the political elites of the 
Western Balkan region engage in corrupt activities. At the 
same time, some of them have systematically used the 
following methods to constrain the political competition: 
placing media under their control, changing electoral laws 
to their advantage, diverting state funds from the 
opposition parties, blocking the registration of rival 
political parties etc. And the more control that the ruling 
party exerts over state institutions, media, private sector 
and society as a whole, the lower the level of party 
competition. Eventually, the perceived party corruption 
has seriously undermined public trust and led to voter 
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skepticism, thus threatening the viability of democracy in 
the region. Blechinger (2002, p. 3) has rightly observed that 
‚long term high-level corruption may also provide a 
powerful incentive for political parties to secure political 
power, thus producing authoritarian regimes, one-party 
monopoly states, and non-democratic governments.‛ In 
contrast with this practice, most of the states in CEE created 
a solid institutional basis for party competition since the 
early years of their democratic rule and have thus reduced 
opportunities for corruption. On the other hand, as a result 
of higher party competition, as well as functioning checks 
and balances, political actors in these states faced a high 
risk of exposure and consequently losing power if they 
engage in corrupt transactions. At the same time, the 
presence of an organized opposition to the ex-communist 
party officials has restricted them in using their political 
power to monopolize former state resources.  
I strongly believe that the above mentioned factors are the 
key variables that account for the still relatively 
uncompetitive democratic political system and the 
unconsolidated democracies in the countries of the Western 
Balkans. Subsequently, they will be analyzed in more 
details further in this chapter. 
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4.3. Political competition and transition to 
democracy 
 
When speaking about transition, O'Donnell (1988) makes a 
difference between two types of transition: a transition to 
democracy, and then transition to a consolidated 
democracy. The first one is basically the current 
momentum of breaking with the authoritarian rule and the 
second - the process of institutionalization and entrenching 
of the democratic rules and principles. As scholars began 
asking what factors make democracy emerge and 
consolidate, besides the structural factors, they too found 
that competition between relevant political actors and elite 
strategic choices to be crucial factors. This chapter gives an 
overview of some key comparative and theoretical issues in 
the literature on political competition and transition to 
democracy and democratic consolidation. 
Dahl (1971) argued that democracy is most likely to endure 
when the advent of political contestation precedes the 
extension of political participation. In other words, a 
competitive politics first develops among small group of 
elite and then includes more people. This scenario, 
according to Dahl laid the foundation for some of the 
world’s most successful democracies, such as England and 
Sweden. Later generation of transition scholars believed 
that restricting the political competition in the early years 
of a new democracy would make the democracy more 
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stable (see Gasiorowski, 1995; Karl, 1995; O'Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986; Valenzuela, 1992; Zakaria, 1997). Namely, 
they start from the premise that the new regimes would not 
be able to cope with the large variety of demands and 
interests of the competing political actors. Haggard and 
Kaufman (1995, p. 152) for instance, argued that: ‚new 
democratic governments face exceptionally strong 
distributive pressures, both from groups reentering the 
political arena after long periods of repression and from 
established interests demanding reassurance.‛ Others claim 
that unrestricted political competition in emerging 
democracies might allow the election of ‘illiberal’ 
democrats who will eventually subvert democracy 
(Zakaria, 1997). Nonetheless on the degree of competition 
they consider beneficial for democracy, all scholars agree 
that political parties and party competition play a 
particularly important role both during the transition and 
consolidation phases of the democratic development. 
The debate about parties, political competition and 
democracy took on renewed importance as new 
democracies emerged following the collapse of the 
communist regime in Europe. The competition in a post-
communist transitional setting was usually a contest 
between the old regime and those most opposed to it. What 
determined whether these states would develop a 
competitive or a noncompetitive democratic political 
system in the first years of transition, was the presence or 
absence of an organized opposition to the previous regime. 
Specifically, the most favorable conditions for developing a 
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competitive political system is when the electoral support 
following the transition was given to a faction opposed to 
the communist elites (see Bunce, 2000; Fish, 1998; Kitschelt, 
2003; Vachudova, 2005b; Vachudova and Snyder, 1997). 
Consequently, the post-communist countries which 
suppressed the initial political competition had relatively 
slower progress in building liberal democratic institutions 
and market economy. The debate on the quality of political 
competition determined by the presence or absence of an 
opposition to the previous regime has built on and 
contributed to the literature on elite recruitment. This 
literature distinguishes between two theories: the 
reproduction of elites theory and the circulation of elites 
theory (see Adam and Tomšič, 2002; Dobry, 2000; Hanley et 
al., 1998; Szelényi and Szelényi, 1995). According to the 
theory of elite reproduction, the old elite preserves its 
power (there is no elite change), while the theory of elite 
circulation suggests that new people are recruited for 
command positions (there is an elite turnover). 
Elite interactions in the ‘third wave’ democracies have also 
been in the focus of the research interest of the notable 
political analysts such as Huntington, O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, Whitehead, Przeworski, Kaufman etc. 
Huntington (1984, p. 212), for instance wrote that 
‚democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been 
instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, 
democracy has come as much from the top down as from 
the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy 
as of protest against oligarchy.‛ Mainwaring (1989, p. 10), 
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on the other hand argues that transition to democracy 
involves interaction between elites and masses. Namely, 
according to him ‚transitions usually begin with splits 
within authoritarian regimes, but over time more and more 
actors become involved< As liberalization proceeds, 
governments and oppositions alike attempt to win popular 
sympathies in efforts to bolster their bargaining power.‛ 
 
4.4. Political competition and transition to 
a consolidated democracy 
 
As previously said political parties and robust party 
competition play a very important role not only during the 
transition period of a country, but also during the process 
of democratic consolidation. According to Pasquino (1990, 
p. 52), while the democratic transition has not always been 
a party dominated process, all processes of democratic 
consolidation have indeed been party dominated. Morlino 
(2011) also asserts that there is a strong relationship 
between regime consolidation and the stabilization and 
structuring of parties and party systems. Specifically, he 
suggests that three conditions related to parties are 
required for consolidation of democracy: stabilization of 
electoral behavior, the emergence of recurring patterns of 
party competition, and the stabilization of the leadership. 
Namely, ‚they give an immediate picture of the 
stabilization of the relationship between parties and civil 
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society, i.e. some of the basic elements in the whole process 
of consolidation<‛ (Morlino, 2011, p. 111). Eventually, he 
concludes that competition and participation are the 
qualities that can affect all other dimensions of democracy. 
Similarly, Pridham (1990) argues that in order to capture 
the role of political parties in democratic consolidation we 
need to employ a three-dimensional approach that focuses 
on parties’ relationship with the state, inter-party 
relationships and the relationship between parties and 
society. Following this line of reasoning, it seems that it is 
the institutionalization of the party system that is most 
relevant for democratic consolidation. This process entails 
stability of interparty competition, embeddedness of the 
parties in society, acceptance of the parties as legitimate 
institutions, as well as party organizations with stable rules 
and structures (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). However, 
there is still a question mark regarding the link between 
party system institutionalization and democratic 
consolidation. Among more specific arguments which 
address this question Morlino (2011) suggests that parties 
constrain the behavior of individuals and groups in civil 
society by channeling that behavior into democratic 
institutionalized arenas which eventually contains conflict 
and prevent groups from resorting to anti-regime extremist 
alternatives. This enables continuation and deepening of 
the democratic process which is necessary for 
consolidation. 
Numerous studies depict the way in which political parties 
influence the process of democratic consolidation in post-
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communist countries in Europe (see Birch, 2001; Filho et al., 
2012; Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Innes, 2002; Kitschelt et al., 
1999; Vachudova, 2005a, 2011; Wright, 2008). This clearly 
demonstrates the significance in approaching parties and 
political competition in order to comprehend the quality of 
democracy in a specific context. Seeking to highlight the 
contribution of political parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe, (Vachudova, 2005a, p. 15) writes: ‚Competition 
among political parties is essential for efficient democratic 
politics – and its importance is greatly amplified when the 
rules of the democratic game are at stake< *This is 
particularly evident] during transition, when the 
institutions of the new polity and economy are being 
created, it is the political parties in power that have a great 
deal of discretion over how new rules are written on issues 
as fundamental as citizenship, elections, and property 
rights. These political parties will only write these new 
rules in an efficient way if their freedom to maneuver is 
limited by competing groups.‛ Having said that, the 
absence of stable party interactions among the competing 
party elites on one hand, and among these elites and the 
voters on the other represent a serious problem in some 
post-communist democracies.   
Mair (1997), on the other hand identifies four main factors 
which differentiate the post-communist party system from 
the one of the established democracies. First, the new party 
systems of post-communist Europe emerged in the wake of 
a very specific democratization process that occurred in an 
effective absence of a real civil society. Second, these party 
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systems confronted a quite different type of electorate, an 
electorate which was substantially more open and 
unpredictable than those of the established democracies.34 
The third difference involves the context of competition. 
More specifically, the new political class was less motivated 
by organizational loyalties and commitments which 
resulted in an increased number of party splitting and 
merging. Finally, Mair notes that the most important 
difference between the post-communist party systems and 
the ones of the established democracies is the pattern of 
competition. That is, the elites in the new democracies 
proved to be more conflictual, which resulted in 
majoritarian, rather than consensual competition. 
This last point opens up the discussion whether party 
fractionalization is conducive to democratization. (Lijphart, 
1999, p. 62) for instance, points out that the existence of 
multiple political parties provides the citizens with a 
variety of choices and offers meaningful representation of 
the minorities. Contrary to this, a single-party majority 
government creates sharp divisions between those who 
hold the power and those in opposition. Therefore, 
according to him, consensus democracy performs better 
than majoritarian democracy in many policy areas, 
                                                 
34 Mair (1997) notes that the electoral volatility in terms of voters’ 
changing from one party to another has been quite high in the 
European post-communist countries which is not the case with the 
established democracies. This, according to him, can be particularly 
problematic because the stakes are usually too high due to the depth of 
ongoing institutional changes. 
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particularly in countries with sharp cultural, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic cleavages. In contrast, Carey (1997, p. 
68) argues that ‚the greater the fragmentation of the party 
system that is associated with proportionality and 
multipartism is potentially problematic< [because] a party 
system that is too representative can contribute to policy 
deadlock.‛ However, Powell (1982, p. 108) holds that 
fractionalized party systems tend to have less stable 
governments, but mainly due to their association with 
extremism, and not fractionalization as such. 
To sum up, although there are some contrasting views on 
the level of political competition that is most propitious in 
promoting stable democracy, all scholars agree that parties 
and party competition are important vehicles for 
democratic development, for they shape the political 
system in a variety of ways. 
 
4.5. Methodology, variables and data 
 
4.5.1. Dependent variable 
 
Because the aim of this chapter is to test the influence of 
political competition on democracy in Central Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans, I use the level of 
democracy as a dependent variable for my second model. 
The term democracy has been used to capture many 
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concepts – from contested elections, political rights, 
freedom of expression etc. For that reason, once again the 
classic definition on democracy by Robert Dahl is my 
guiding concept which helped me decide which democracy 
indicator to use as a dependent variable. Namely, Dahl 
(1971) maintained that ‚democracy requires not only free, 
fair, and competitive elections, but also the freedoms that 
make them truly meaningful (such as freedom of 
organization and freedom of expression), alternative 
sources of information, and institutions to ensure that 
government policies depend on the votes and preferences 
of citizens.‛ 
A fairly large number of researchers and institutions have 
provided quantitative measures of democracy. However, as 
previously elaborated, Freedom House (Freedom House, 
2013) and Polity (Marshall et al., 2012a) are the two most 
acknowledged democracy indices within the 
democratization literature. The Freedom House provides 
two separate indexes for political rights and civil liberties. 
The concept of political rights is applied by using the 
following basic definition: ‚Political rights are rights to 
participate meaningfully in the political process. In a 
democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and 
compete for public office, and for elected representatives to 
have a decisive vote on public policies‛ (Gastil and 
Sussman, 1987, p. 7). On the other hand, the Freedom 
House concept of civil liberties uses the following basic 
definition: ‚Civil liberties are rights to free expression, to 
organize and demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of 
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autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, 
education, travel, and other personal rights‛ Gastil and 
Sussman (1987, p. 7). Freedom House assigns each country 
a numerical rating from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) for 
both political rights and civil liberties.35 These indices are 
then averaged in order to calculate the democracy index for 
a given country. 
An alternative measure of democracy that is frequently 
used by political scientists is the one compiled by Ted 
Robert Gurr (see Gurr, 1974; Gurr and Jaggers, 1990), i.e. 
so-called Polity democracy score. Namely, Gurr evaluates 
countries annually on the authority characteristics of their 
political regimes, rating them on a 21-point scale that runs 
from -10 (a ‘fully institutionalized autocracy’) to +10 (a 
‘fully institutionalized democracy’). Democracy is 
measured based on the evaluation of the following five 
components: competitiveness of participation, regulation of 
participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, 
openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
executive. 
As both of these indices provide an adequate 
operationalization of the dependent variable, it is my belief 
                                                 
35 As it is elaborated in Chapter 3 (Section 3), political rights ratings 
combine the average of the following three subcategories: electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of 
government; while civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of 
four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights. 
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that a combined index that includes both Freedom House 
and Polity2 democracy indices would be most appropriate 
for the purpose of this study. Teorell et al. (2011) combine 
Freedom House and Polity2 into one index that ranges 
from 0 to 10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most 
democratic. This is an index that according to Hadenius 
and Teorell (2005) outperforms all rival operationalizations 
of democracy. And what is important for this study, it has 
imputed values for countries where data on Polity is 
missing (the so-called ‘interruption’, ‘interregnum’ and 
‘transition’ periods). Nevertheless, I have to use this index 
carefully as one of my key independent variables (‘effective 
competition’ or as originally named by Polity IV - 
‘competitiveness of participation’) is one of the components 
in Polity2 democracy index. At the same time, although 
conceptually different, some of the other independent 
variables I employ in this chapter might overlap to a certain 
extent with this component. Hence, in order to conduct a 
robustness check I exclude the effect of the competitiveness 
of participation component from the Polity2 index, and 
therefore from the dependent variable. I have done this in 
several steps. First, I re-estimate Polity2 index by removing 
the effects of ‘competitiveness of participation’ component. 
Then, I adjust this new Polity index, as well as the Freedom 
House index into a scale 0-10. Finally, I combine these two 
newly created variables into one new combined Freedom 
House/Polity2 index that ranges from 0 to 10. Thus, in the 
end I have an adjusted democracy index to serve as a 
dependent variable for my robustness check models which 
differs from the Freedom House/Polity2 one only for not 
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having the 'competitiveness of participation' component in 
it.36 
 
4.5.2. Independent variable 
 
As the aim of this chapter is to examine the influence of 
political competition on the levels of democracy in the 
regions of Central Eastern Europe and Western Balkans, 
the key independent variable to test the above hypotheses 
is political competition. More specifically, six different 
dimensions of political competition will be considered as 
independent variables. These are: opposition share, 
effective competition, opposition fractionalization, 
government fractionalization, legislature fractionalization 
and electoral success of smaller parties. However, as 
previously said, my main focus will be on the first two 
dimensions because they evaluate most closely the input 
and output side of political competition (as defined by 
Morlino (2011)). The relationship between each dimension 
of political competition and the levels of democracy in 
Central Eastern Europe and Western Balkans will be tested 
in six separate independent models. At the same time a 
robustness check will be conducted by regressing the same 
                                                 
36 This adjusted index has imputed values for countries where data on 
Polity is missing (Bosnia for 1992-2009 and Croatia in 1999) which I 
generated by regressing it on the combined Freedom House/Polity2 
democracy index. 
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dimensions of political competition on the adjusted 
Freedom House/Polity2 democracy index.37 
According to Morlino (2011, p. 205), ‚on the input side, the 
relevant competition is among political actors, 
characterized by freedom for all political parties to compete 
with each other complemented by fairness of political 
competition.‛ In my opinion, the indicator that most closely 
operationalizes this concept is the share of the opposition in 
the parliament. Explicitly, the larger the legislative 
opposition is, it is more likely to have the ability to monitor 
the government work through checks and balances and to 
publicly report any missteps or deviations. This indicator is 
calculated by the author as a ratio between the total 
number of seats held by all opposition parties and the total 
number of seats held by all government parties. The data 
for these two sub-dimensions is taken from Database of 
Political Institutions (Keefer, 2012). Similarly, another 
variable that captures the quality of competition on the 
input side is the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, 
the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in 
parliamentary elections. The data for this variable is 
provided by Tatu Vanhanen (2011). 
On the output side of political process I concentrate on 
whether ‚there are alternative patterns in the formation of 
government and different potential choices among policy 
                                                 
37 See Section 4.5.1 for more information on the reasons for conducting 
the robustness check, as well as on the procedure for obtaining the 
adjusted Freedom House/Polity2 democracy index. 
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alternatives‛ (Morlino, 2011, p. 205). Therefore, I employ 
the Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2012a) measure of political 
competition: competitiveness of participation. However, in 
order to avoid conceptual confusion with the independent 
variable of the previous chapter (political participation), I 
have changed the name of this variable into ‘effective 
competition’, and as such will be used further in the text. 
This index is a five-point ordinal scale (5 is the highest) that 
measures the extent to which alternative preferences for 
policy and leadership can be pursued in the political 
arena.38 Although this measure of political competition may 
be a blunt measure, it actually captures a meaningful 
variation in how much freedom different groups have to 
pursue political power (Wright, 2008). As it was previously 
mentioned, using this index as one of my key independent 
variables might be problematic, mainly because the 
dependent variable (combined Freedom House/Polity2 
index) is partly based on it. For that reason, as a robustness 
check I re-estimate the model after excluding this 
component from the dependent variable. The second 
disadvantage by using this index in this study is that Polity 
doesn’t provide data for the cases of so-called 
‘interregnum’ (or anarchy) and foreign ‘interruption’, i.e. 
they are treated as system missing. This is the case with 
Bosnia (one out of five countries of the Western Balkans) 
which was in a state of civil war in the first years following 
                                                 
38 The five categories are: repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional 
and competitive. For more information on how these categories are 
defined, see Appendix 2. 
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the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and under NATO 
intervention and presence ever since. Therefore, Bosnia is 
not taken into consideration in the second model. 
The other three independent variables: opposition 
fractionalization, government fractionalization and 
legislature fractionalization also capture certain aspects of 
the political competition and as such influence the levels of 
democracy in a country. More specifically, a fragmented 
opposition usually lacks the consensus and skills to 
cooperate effectively against illiberal parties. Therefore it 
can become a powerful tool in the hands of the ruling elites 
who seek to suppress real political competition in the 
political system. On the other hand, there are contrasting 
views regarding the effects of the overall party system 
fractionalization on the level of democracy. Some analysts 
(such as Carey, 1997; Lijphart, 1996) believe that the 
existence of multiple political parties provides citizens with 
a variety of choices and enables minorities to attain 
meaningful representation by participating in governing 
coalitions. However, a very fragmented government is 
sometime perceived as a challenge to democracy because it 
can undermine governmental accountability and polarize 
the political landscape. On account of the above mentioned 
arguments, I considered it preferable to include these 
variables in the analysis. The data for these independent 
variables is taken from Database of Political Institutions 
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(Keefer, 2012).39 I would like to point out here that although 
conceptually different, my other five key independent 
variables (besides ‘effective competition’) might also 
overlap to a certain degree with the component 
‘competitiveness of participation’ on which the dependent 
variable is partly based on. Therefore, as previously 
mentioned, I estimate five different models with the new 
adjusted dependent variable as a robustness check for the 
other five key independent variables of this chapter, as 
well. 
Finally, as it was the case with the first statistical model (see 
Chapter 3, Section 4), I include several control variables 
that according to the democratization theory are commonly 
regarded as correlates to democracy. These are: lagged 
levels of democracy, GDP per capita based on Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), average years of schooling in the 
population aged 25 and above, trade openness, ethnic 
fractionalization, religious fractionalization, political 
stability and absence of violence.40 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 For more information about the data and the sources used for the 
independent variables, please see the Appendix 2 at the end of the 
thesis. 
40 For more information about the data and the sources used for the 
control variables, please see the Appendix 2 at the end of the thesis. 
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4.5.3. Methodology 
 
The main empirical and theoretical findings on the 
relationship between political competition and democracy 
suggest that democracy is more likely to consolidate when 
there is robust competition in the political system. That is, 
political competition enhances democratic quality. Taking 
into consideration the lower levels of almost all dimensions 
of political competition in the Western Balkan states 
compared to their CEE counterparts, it seems that this 
theoretical implication holds true for the post-communist 
region in Europe, as well. In other words, I expect a 
positive correlation between the levels of democracy and 
political competition in CEE, but also in the Western 
Balkans. The purpose of this chapter is to test this 
hypothesis by using panel data on 18 European post-
communist countries41 for a period of 18 years (1992-2009). 
Therefore, I use pooled-OLS with a constant term as a 
method of estimation. More specifically, to formally test my 
                                                 
41 The countries that I include in the regression analysis are the same as 
in the previous chapter. Accordingly, they can be divided in three 
groups. The first group includes the five Western Balkan states: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. The 
second group consists of the ten CEE EU member states: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. And the third group comprises the other three 
Eastern European countries: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, which I 
use as controls. 
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first hypothesis, I estimate six variants of the following 
time-series cross-section regression model (TSCS): 
                                           (              )
  ∑    (   )
 
   
       
The subscript         denotes a country;         
denotes a year;          denotes a specific control 
variable; while    is the regional dummy that takes a value 
of one for the Western Balkan countries and zero otherwise. 
Including the regional dummy for Western Balkans in the 
regression will allow controlling for the effects caused by 
the countries that belong to this group on the dependent 
variable.    ,      and    refer respectively to dependent, 
independent and control variables for unit   and time  ;      
is a random error and    and    refer, respectively, to the 
intercept and the slope parameters. I include interaction 
terms between the key explanatory variables and the 
Western Balkan dummy, to measure if political competition 
might have different influence depending on whether the 
country belongs to the Western Balkan region or not. 
Six separate statistical investigations will be conducted. The 
intention behind this is to capture the isolated effects of the 
six main explanatory variables: opposition share, effective 
competition, opposition fractionalization, government 
fractionalization, legislature fractionalization and electoral 
success of smaller parties, while controlling simultaneously 
for other explanatory factors. The regression results will 
eventually show whether there is indeed a positive and 
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statistically significant correlation between political 
competition and the levels of democracy in the Western 
Balkans. As a robustness check, I also estimate another six 
models with the adjusted Freedom House/Polity2 
democracy index as a dependent variable.42 Table 8 (Model 
2a-2f) and Table 9 (Model 3a-3f) report the estimation 
results of the twelve models. 
[Insert Table 8 and Table 9 about here] 
 
4.6. Results and analysis 
 
The results in Table 8 and Table 9 imply that the effects of 
political competition on the levels of democracy do not 
significantly differ on whether the country belongs to the 
Western Balkan region or not. The only important 
difference is in the government fractionalization. Namely, 
including the interaction term turns the coefficient from 
negative into positive and statistically significant at 0.01 
level, suggesting that more fractionalized government 
would lead to better democracy in the Western Balkans. 
These results confirm my hypothesis that political 
competition represents supportive component of 
democratic development in post-communist Europe, 
                                                 
42 This robustness check is particularly relevant for the second model 
(2b) as the independent variable ‘effective competition’ is contained 
within the dependent variable. 
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including the Western Balkan states. I elaborate this in 
more details further below. 
In the first two models (2a and 2b), the level of democracy 
is regressed on the two main independent variables 
(opposition share and effective competition), as well as on 
the control variables. On the input side of political 
competition, that is plurality in competition patterns, 
operationalized as share of the opposition in the 
parliament, the results confirm my assumption. As can be 
seen in Table 8, the opposition share is positively correlated 
with the levels of democracy in CEE and, moreover, it is 
statistically significant at 0.01 level. However, when the 
interaction term with the Western Balkans is added, 
although the same positive relationship continues, it loses 
its statistical significance. 
With regard to the output side of political competition, i.e. 
the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena, there is 
also a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
the levels of democracy, both in CEE and Western Balkans. 
Specifically, one of the key aspects of the democratic 
process is the lack of restrictions on formation of 
government and choosing among different policy 
alternatives. The robustness check, that was particularly 
important for this model, has confirmed these results. In 
other words, neither the substantive, nor the statistical 
significance were considerably altered. 
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The vote share of the smaller parties in CEE is also 
positively associated with the levels of democracy, which 
supports the idea that larger opposition is conducive to 
democracy. Nevertheless, when controlled for the Western 
Balkans the results are inconclusive. 
Next, the level of democracy is regressed on party 
fractionalization, operationalized through three separate 
variables: legislature fractionalization, government 
fractionalization and opposition fractionalization. The 
results on legislature and government fractionalization 
(Models 2d and 2e) confirm the theoretical implication that 
the existence of multiple political parties has a positive 
association with democracy, mainly because it promotes a 
consensus democracy and represents a broader array of 
interests. Both coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant when controlled for the Western Balkans. On the 
other hand, the results on the relationship between 
opposition fractionalization and levels of democracy are 
inconclusive, as they suggest a positive correlation between 
the two for the region of CEE, while a negative and 
statistically significant one when controlled for the Western 
Balkans. However, I would like to point out that the 
negative correlation fits in well, if we accept the viewpoint 
advocated by some scholars that the absence of unifying 
leadership among the opposition parties limits its 
effectiveness because it lacks the strength to undermine 
government’s commitment to comply with the rules of the 
democratic game.  
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Finally, Table 9 (Model 3a-3f) illustrates that the robustness 
check confirmed all results on the key independent 
variables of this chapter, except on opposition 
fractionalization in the Western Balkans, which lost its 
statistical significance. Further bellow I offer several 
explanations why the Western Balkan states failed to 
develop more robust political competition even after more 
than two decades following the collapse of the communist 
regime. 
First, the communist parties in CEE and their 
transformation have to a large extent affected patterns of 
party competition that developed in the post-1989 
democracies. Namely, the communist parties and their 
successors can be divided in three groups: (1) parties that 
exited from power after the collapse of the communist 
regime, transformed and returned to power after an 
interval out of office; (2) parties that exited from power and 
did not return; and (3) parties that did not exit and stayed 
in power throughout the first years of the transition 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2006). In all of the Western Balkan 
countries with the exception of Croatia, the old-regime 
parties retained their rule, i.e. neither transformed, nor 
exited from power. As a result, these parties had 
preferential access to the media and state resources which 
heavily disadvantaged the opposition forces and made the 
initial electoral alternatives less clear. Therefore, the initial 
political competition in these countries was rather weak. 
The same was the case in Bulgaria and Romania. On 
contrary, the other CEE countries (with the exception of 
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Lithuania) followed the other two strategies, that is, either 
the communist parties were forced to exit power, or they 
have transformed themselves radically into moderate 
Social Democratic parties. Consequently, they have 
developed robust political competition. This variation 
matters, not only because it shaped the initial levels of 
political competition that developed in the post-communist 
Europe, but also determined the progress in building 
liberal democratic political institutions and a market-based 
economy. This relationship has already been recognized by 
several scholars (see Bunce, 2000; Fish, 1998; Kitschelt, 2003; 
Vachudova, 2005a; Vachudova and Snyder, 1997). 
Vachudova (2005a, p. 11), for instance proposes that 
‚where the collapse of communism was quickly followed 
by the creation and strengthening of a competitive 
democratic political system, we should expect relatively 
rapid progress in building liberal democratic political 
institutions and a market-based economy. In countries 
where the collapse of communism was followed by the 
creation of a noncompetitive (albeit democratic) political 
system, we should expect the suppression of liberal 
democratic institutions, and relatively slow progress 
toward a market economy.‛ 
Another reason for the absence of strong, programmatic 
political competition between political parties in the 
Western Balkan is the strong ethnic cleavage. Namely, the 
electorate in almost all Western Balkan states is 
underpinned by a strong cleavage structure based on 
ethnicity. Although the electoral volatility has been quite 
155 
high, it has been largely limited to one of the existing ethnic 
groups. Consequently, political parties have the incentive 
to play on such divisions and organize themselves more 
readily around ethnic than other identities. This is 
particularly the case with Macedonia and Bosnia, where 
since the very beginning of their democratic transition, 
political competition developed along ethnic lines, causing 
instability and making democratic consolidation unlikely. 
In Bosnia, for instance, the main party voted for by the 
Croats is Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ); the Bosniaks 
cast their preferences for the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA); while the party that represents Serbian interests is 
the Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) which 
replaced the previously prominent Serbian Democratic 
Party (SDS) (Stojarová and Emerson, 2010). Similarly, the 
basic dividing line in Macedonian party politics is the 
ethnic cleavage between Macedonian and Albanian parties. 
Both the Macedonian and Albanian sides are divided into 
two large parties: the Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia (SDSM) and the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) – in the case 
of Macedonians; and the Democratic Union for Integration 
(DUI) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) – in 
the case of Albanians. Apart from these, there are dozens of 
minor, practically marginal parties. There are some recent 
developments into moving from totally mono-ethnic 
parties to multi-ethnic ones. However, the efforts to go 
beyond the existent ethnocentrism, very often takes form of 
elite bargains, which can potentially block further 
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democratization. A handful of scholars acknowledged that 
deeply ethnically divided societies are more prone to 
conflict which makes more difficult for them to implement 
democratic procedures. Donald L. Horowitz (1993, p. 19) 
has accurately observed that: ‚Democracy has progressed 
furthest in those East European countries that have the 
fewest serious ethnic cleavages (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland) and progressed more slowly or not 
at all in those that are deeply divided (Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and of course the former Yugoslavia). Adrian 
Karatnycky (2002, pp. 109-110) expressed a similar view: 
‚Democracy has been significantly more successful in 
monotonic societies than in ethnically divided and 
multiethnic societies.‛ 
Party corruption is considered to be yet another factor that 
shapes the party competition in the region. People in the 
region perceive political parties as some of the most corrupt 
institutions. Although, almost all Western Balkan states 
have established laws on the financing of political parties, 
they experience serious deficiencies in the implementation 
of such legislation (Cohen and Lampe, 2011, p. 237). A 
survey conducted by the UNODC (2011) observed that a 
very high percentage of the population in the Western 
Balkans considers that political parties engage in some kind 
of corrupt practices (the lowest is reported in Macedonia – 
21.6% and the highest in Bosnia - 68.8%). The result is the 
lack of public trust in the political system and distorted 
political competition, posing a threat to democracy in the 
region. It seems that the most problematic aspect of party 
157 
corruption in the Western Balkans is party campaign 
financing and a lack of actual transparency. Namely, in 
their struggle to win, party leaders are willing to spend as 
much money as possible for financing of their campaigns 
and are often temped to accept donations from 
questionable or undisclosed sources. At the same time, the 
citizens’ awareness on the subject of party funding is very 
limited and also the external pressure on political parties to 
abide by the law. Some of the other methods that some of 
the Western Balkans elites have systematically used to 
constrain the political competition are: placing media under 
their control, changing electoral laws to their advantage, 
diverting state funds from the opposition parties, blocking 
the registration of rival political parties etc. All of these 
seriously undermine the emergence of responsible and 
transparent pluralism and consequently the prospects for 
democratic consolidation. As Blechinger (2002, p. 15) 
emphasizes: ‚democratic reforms and economic 
development are likely to fail if captured by corrupt 
parties. Therefore, the structure of parties is critical for 
improving democracy in developing and transitional 
countries.‛ 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1. Summary and discussion 
 
Since the fall of the communist regime in the end of the 
1980s, all Eastern European countries have been striving to 
build democratic societies. As a part of this region, Western 
Balkan states moved also ahead along difficult and often 
troublesome path of reforms and democracy building. Yet, 
issues relating unresolved statehood, ethnic conflicts and 
economic crisis continue to dominate political life in the 
region. As a result, larger political interests are often 
prioritized over other considerations, including 
consolidation of democracy. And consolidation of 
democracy certainly demands a great deal. Above all, it 
demands an extraordinary commitment and continuous 
efforts, both from the political elites and the public. 
Therefore, raising doubt on whether mass public 
commitment and strategic choices of political leaders 
influence the advancement of democracy in the Western 
Balkans, I have taken the actor-based approach as 
theoretical perspective. Consequently, the aim of this thesis 
was to examine if mass political activism and robust 
political competition are important determinants for 
democratic consolidation in Central Eastern Europe, but 
particularly in the region of the Western Balkans. More 
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specifically, by employing a time-series cross-section 
statistical model on a dataset comprising 18 Central and 
Eastern European countries, I have statistically assessed the 
effects of citizens’ political participation and party 
competition on the democracy levels in these two regions. 
However, the focus of my research interest was primarily 
on the Western Balkan states, and the CEE EU member 
states served just as a term of comparison. 
Weak participation in politics by ordinary citizens in post-
communist Europe is considered to be one of the main 
reasons for the prolonged democratic transition in these 
countries and peculiar practices of illiberal democracy in 
some of them (particularly the Western Balkan states). A 
between-regions comparison, however, revealed that the 
levels of almost all dimensions of political participation are 
significantly higher in the Western Balkans compared to 
ten CEE EU member states. Therefore, my main hypothesis 
with regard to political participation was that while low 
levels of citizens’ participation leads to hollow or stagnant 
democracy in most democratic systems, higher levels of 
civic engagement is not necessarily an indication for better 
democracy in post-communist Europe. The empirical 
findings confirmed this line of reasoning. Namely, there is 
a strong negative and statistically significant correlation 
between all four types of political participation relevant for 
this study (voter turnout, party membership, signing 
petitions and attending demonstrations) and the levels of 
democracy when controlled for the Western Balkans. As 
these results contradict the conventional theories on 
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political participation and democracy, there is obviously an 
intermediate variable that accounts for this relationship. 
Hence, I argue that political participation in the countries of 
the Western Balkans is motivated primarily by the receipt 
of various political, social or economic benefits provided or 
promised by a certain political party or a political 
candidate. This clientelist linkage building between 
politicians and voters can take several forms, some among 
which are: direct vote-buying, employment in the public 
sector, illegitimate acquirement of tenders etc. 
Consequently, this clientelist-inspired political 
participation, rather than deepening and advancing the 
principles of representative democracy, undermines the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability. As Shefner (2012, 
p. 51) has noted: ‚Clientelism forces certain political 
behaviors that reinforce structured inequalities. It limits 
representation, excludes many and channels access to 
power. Clientelist participation fosters corruption because 
of its intrinsic ethos of exchange, and provides only limited 
social mobility. It deprioritizes values of equality in favor 
of satisfying material needs, and is generally correlated 
with lagging economic development.‛ The exact 
mechanisms of the clientelism argument was investigated 
through a small-N analysis (SNA), where I have compared 
Macedonia and Slovenia as two ex-Yugoslav countries that 
represent two most different cases in terms of popular 
movements, clientelism and democratization process. 
The literature suggests that advancement of economic and 
political development of a country can weaken political 
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clientelism. So far, many scholars confirmed the robust 
correlation between levels of economic development and 
political clientelism (see Hicken, 2011; Keefer, 2005; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Remmer, 2007; Wantchekon, 
2003). Namely, as the socio-economic status of the 
individual increases, the demand for clientelism decreases. 
At the same time, the cost for providing clientelistic goods 
might exceed the electoral benefit (Hicken, 2011). On the 
other hand, as democracy becomes more mature and 
democratic principles more entrenched into the society, the 
possibilities for clientelism diminish (see Keefer, 2005; 
Keefer and Vlaicu, 2007). Therefore, I strongly believe that 
political and economic reforms in the Western Balkan 
countries would eradicate corrupt political practices and 
promote democratic political participation. This is certainly 
an interesting area of study and hopefully these 
observations would catalyze further research in this 
direction. 
The progress towards full democratic consolidation 
depends also from the development of competitive party 
system. Hence, the relationship between political 
competition and the levels of democracy occupied the 
second part of my thesis. Compared to the CEE EU 
member states, party systems of the Western Balkan states 
seem to be less institutionalized, more volatile, less 
distinguishable along ideological stances, as well as 
fragmented and ethnically polarized. Competition in these 
two regions was analyzed with regard to several empirical 
sub-dimensions. However, the focus was on the input and 
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output side of political competition (Morlino, 2011, p. 205). 
That is, freedom for all political parties to compete with 
each other; and freedom in formation of government and 
choosing among different policy alternatives, respectively. 
As it was expected, the empirical data indicated that with 
the exception of government fractionalization, Western 
Balkan states score lower in all quantitative dimensions of 
political competition43 compared to the rest of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Apparently, robust political competition 
represents supportive component of democratic 
development in post-communist Europe. The statistical test 
has basically confirmed this hypothesis. Namely, there is 
positive and statistically significant correlation between the 
levels of democracy in Central Eastern Europe and the 
indicators that operationalize the input and output side of 
political participation. The same positive relationship 
continues when controlled for the Western Balkan region. I 
have identified several possible reasons why the Western 
Balkan states were unsuccessful in developing more robust 
political competition even after more than two decades 
following the collapse of the communist regime. First, 
Western Balkan states failed to develop higher initial levels 
of political contestation. Namely, the collapse of the 
                                                 
43 Six different dimensions of political competition were taken into 
consideration in this study. These are: opposition share, 
competitiveness of participation, opposition fractionalization, 
government fractionalization, legislature fractionalization and electoral 
success of smaller parties. However, as it was elaborated in Chapter 4, 
the main focus was on the first two dimensions because they evaluate 
most closely the input and output side of political competition. 
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communism in these countries (with the exception of 
Croatia) did not result in a replacement of the ruling elite. 
That is, the old communist elite survived and continued to 
play a central role in conducting the democratic transition. 
On the other hand, in the other post-communist countries 
in Europe (with the exception of Lithuania), the communist 
parties were either forced to exit power, or they have 
transformed themselves radically into moderate Social 
Democratic parties. Second, the electorate in almost all 
Western Balkan states is underpinned by a strong ethnic 
cleavage. Consequently, political parties make use of this 
division and organize themselves more readily around 
ethnic than other identities. Third, political parties in the 
Western Balkans are perceived as some of the most corrupt 
institutions. The result is the lack of public trust in the 
political system and distorted political competition. 
Although a certain progress has been made in the political 
party development in the Western Balkans in the last few 
years, there are still many deficiencies in most of the party 
systems throughout region. It is therefore necessary to 
create strategies and implement additional measures in 
order to reinforce the competitive party system. Such 
strategies include moving beyond totally mono-ethnic 
parties, improving the legislation on the financing of 
political parties, strengthening transparency in political 
finance, clearly defining the scope of activities and 
authority of political parties, as well as party restructuring 
that will improve internal party democracy. 
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To sum up, democratization in the Western Balkan 
countries seems to be mainly elite-driven, as they still 
haven’t developed sufficient levels of genuinely democratic 
mass participation capable to induce political institutions to 
be responsive and accountable to societal interests. Cohen 
and Lampe (2011, p. 494) come to similar conclusion by 
suggesting that: ‚One of the most important lessons of the 
Western Balkan case is that the pace of democratic 
consolidation is mainly attributable to the willingness of 
postconflict elites to work together in tackling the 
entrenched sources of authoritarian resilience.‛ Thus, a 
more firm and concrete commitment is needed to stimulate 
participatory attitudes among the citizens of the region, as 
it represents one of the most critical dimensions of 
democratic consolidation. Alternatively, these countries 
face the danger of gradually regressing into forms of ‚soft 
dictatorship‛ or ‚liberalized authoritarian rule‛. 
 
5.2. Ideas for future research: the interplay 
between political competition and 
citizens’ participation 
 
As it was previously elaborated, the countries that once 
made up the post-communist bloc in Europe varied 
considerably from each other with respect to their 
democratization path. While the CEE countries that have 
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already joined the European Union have established stable 
and durable democratic institutions and well-functioning 
market economies, the Western Balkan countries have 
failed to genuinely transform their economies and to 
institutionalize democratic pluralism. At the same time, 
these two blocs of countries differ with regard to the levels 
of distrust towards the major political institutions and 
consequently to the levels of political participation. The 
goal of this final section is to briefly explore the 
relationship between political competition and citizens’ 
participation in post-communist Europe - an interesting 
area which hopefully will generate ideas for future 
research. 
It has been argued that vibrant political competition in CEE 
has depressed the trust in political parties and stifled 
political participation by citizens. Ceka (2012, p. 2), for 
instance has demonstrated that: ‚Intense political 
competition and, in particular, vocal and critical opposition 
parties that criticize and expose government scandals do 
much to convince the average Eastern European that 
political parties are deeply corrupt institutions run by self-
interested and power-hungry politicians.‛ That, on the 
other hand, discourages citizens to be politically active. 
This causal link is analyzed in more details further bellow. 
Several empirical studies contend that citizens in post-
communist democracies are very distrustful towards 
political institutions in their countries and particularly 
toward political parties (see Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; 
Klingemann et al., 2006; Mishler and Rose, 1997, 2001). The 
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extent of political trust in new democracies is a sum of 
several different factors. The most salient one is the 
economic development and prosperity of the country (see 
Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Kitschelt, 1992; Mishler and 
Rose, 1997). However, Ceka (2012, p. 6) points out that 
vigorous political competition tends to depress trust in 
political parties because ‚vocal and critical opposition 
parties that expose government misdoings do much to 
convince the average Eastern European that political 
parties are fundamentally corrupt institutions.‛ It is indeed 
true that the economic transformation that occurred in 
post-communist Europe created many opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior and corrupted practices among the 
politicians. And in the countries with robust political 
competition, the vigilant and critical opposition parties 
used the opportunity to expose the government abuse of 
state resources and corruption scandals. Consequently, this 
has lowered the levels of trust in political institutions 
among the ordinary citizens. On the other hand, countries 
that lacked powerful opposition forces with skills and 
resources to expose corrupted practices had more trustful 
citizens. 
The second link of the causal mechanism is the relationship 
between trust in political parties and political participation. 
That is, if citizens believe that political parties are corrupt 
and politicians are involved in the business of rent-seeking 
and state capture, then they will be discouraged to 
politically participate, i.e. to vote or become party 
members. However, there is also evidence that the post-
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communist voters switch from one party to another and 
even vote for extremist, i.e. unorthodox parties, only to 
punish incompetent and/or corrupt incumbents. Pop-
Eleches (2010) calls this ‘protest voting’. Ceka’s (2012) 
findings support this argument to a certain extent. He 
empirically demonstrates that ‚distrustful voters are less 
likely to vote than those who trust parties, but some of 
them present an electoral opportunity for different parties.‛ 
Yet, when controlling for all relevant factors, his findings 
suggest that the same distrustful voters are very unlikely to 
go to work for a party. Nonetheless, this holds only for 
those who are not intense partisans. For individuals who 
have strong party identification, vigorous political 
competition has no effect on their trust in political parties 
and consequently on their political activism. 
Similarly to this, I would argue that in countries where 
many segments of the society are politicized and large 
percent of the population has strong party identification, 
political participation tends to be higher. However, this is 
not a genuine political participation, but rather a 
clientelistic-inspired one. As it was previously elaborated, a 
clientelistic behavior between parties and voters is a feature 
that characterizes the Western Balkan states. Therefore, in 
these countries, increased political competition would most 
likely depress political participation, but not so much as a 
result of the decreased trust in political parties, but rather 
due to the presence of a strong opposition capable to 
pressure the incumbents to abandon these practices.  
Subsequently, once the clientelist networks that compel 
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citizens to participate cease to exist, they might be less 
motivated to do so. 
Further exploration is needed in order to provide support 
for the hypotheses outlined above. However, being a whole 
new area of study, this topic falls out of the scope of this 
thesis and no further exploration will be pursued here. The 
main goal of this final section was to present some new 
concepts and catalyze ideas for future research. 
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Table 1: Coding of parties by elections (1990-1999) 
 
Country Year Incumbent government Old/new regime 
    
10 New EU Members    
Bulgaria 1990 
1991 
1994 
1997 
BSP 
SDS 
BSP 
ODS 
Old 
New 
Old 
New 
Czech Republic 1990 
1992 
1996 
1998 
OF 
ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA 
ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA 
CSSD 
New 
New 
New 
- 
Estonia 1992 
1995 
1999 
I + M + ERSP 
KMU + EK 
I + ER + RM 
New 
New 
New 
Hungary 1990 
1994 
1998 
MDF + FKGP + KDNP 
MSZP + SZDSZ 
Fidesz + FKGP + MDF 
New 
Old 
New 
Latvia 1990 
1993 
1995 
1998 
LTF 
LC + TPA 
TB/LNNK + LC + LZS/KDS/LDP 
TP + LC + LNNK + JP 
New 
New 
New 
New 
Lithuania 1992 
1996 
LDDP 
TS + LKD + LCS 
Old 
New 
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Note: Abbreviations are the party’s initials in its native language. Full names of parties can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Poland 1991 
1993 
1997 
UD + WAK + KLD + PPG 
SLD + PSL 
AWS 
New 
Old 
New 
Romania 1992 
1996 
FDSN/PDSR 
CDR + USD + UDMR 
Old 
New 
Slovakia 1992 
1994 
1998 
HZDS + SNS 
HZDS + ZRS + SNS 
SDK + SDL + SMK + SOP 
- 
- 
New 
Slovenia 1992 
1996 
LDS + SKD 
LDS + SLS 
Old 
Old 
Western Balkans    
Albania 1991 
1992 
1996 
1997 
PPSh 
PDS 
PDS 
PSS 
Old 
New 
New 
Old 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1996 
1998 
SDA + SDS + HDZ 
KCDBiH + KS + HDZBiH 
Old 
Old 
Croatia 1992 
1995 
HDZ 
HDZ 
New 
New 
Macedonia 1994 
1998 
SDSM + LP + PDP 
VMRO-DPMNE + DA + DPA 
Old 
New 
Serbia 1992 
1993 
1997 
SPS 
SPS 
SPS + YUL + ND 
Old 
Old 
Old 
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Table 2: State of democracy and market economy, by country (2012) 
Country State of democracy State of market 
economy 
Status index Rank 
     
10 New EU Members 9.08 8.63 8.86 8.50 
Bulgaria 8.65 7.93 8.29 14 
Czech Republic 9.65 9.57 9.61 1 
Estonia 9.55 9.00 9.28 5 
Hungary 8.35 8.61 8.48 12 
Latvia 8.80 7.82 8.31 13 
Lithuania 9.35 8.71 9.03 7 
Poland 9.20 8.89 9.05 6 
Romania 8.55 7.79 8.17 16 
Slovakia 9.00 8.75 8.88 8 
Slovenia 9.65 9.25 9.45 3 
Western Balkans 7.54 7.08 7.31 26.20 
Albania 7.25 6.79 7.02 31 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.40 6.43 6.41 39 
Croatia 8.40 8.11 8.25 15 
Macedonia 7.60 7.11 7.35 25 
Serbia 8.05 6.96 7.51 21 
Note: The Status Index ranks the countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy. Best score = 10, 
worst score = 1. 
Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Donner et al., 2012) 
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Table 3: State of democracy dimensions, by country (2012) 
Country Stateness Political  
participation 
Rule of law Institutional 
stability 
Political and 
social integration 
      
10 New EU Members 9.7 9.5 8.9 9.3 8.1 
Bulgaria 10.0 9.0 8.5 8.5 7.3 
Czech Republic 10.0 10.0 9.3 10.0 9.0 
Estonia 9.5 9.8 9.8 10.0 8.8 
Hungary 9.8 9.0 7.8 7.5 7.8 
Latvia 9.5 9.5 8.5 9.5 7.0 
Lithuania 9.4 9.8 9.0 10.0 8.0 
Poland 9.5 9.8 9.3 9.5 8.0 
Romania 9.5 9.0 8.3 8.5 7.5 
Slovakia 9.8 9.5 8.5 9.0 8.3 
Slovenia 9.8 9.8 9.5 10.0 9.3 
Western Balkans 8.6 8.0 6.9 7.5 6.8 
Albania 8.8 7.5 6.0 7.5 6.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.8 7.5 6.8 5.5 5.5 
Croatia 9.3 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.8 
Macedonia 8.8 7.8 6.8 8.0 6.8 
Serbia 9.3 8.5 7.0 8.0 7.5 
Note: Best score = 10, worst score = 1. 
Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Donner et al., 2012) 
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Table 4: NGO Sustainability Index Scores, by country (1997-2011) 
Note: NGO – non-governmental organization; N/A – not available. Best score=1, worst score=7 
Source: USAID (2012) 
 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
                
10 New EU 
Members 
3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Bulgaria 4.0 3.6 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Czech 
Republic 
N/A N/A N/A 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Estonia N/A N/A N/A 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Hungary 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 N/A 
Latvia 3.6 4.2 N/A 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Lithuania 4.0 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Poland 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Romania 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Slovakia 2.8 2.8 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
Western 
Balkans 
4.6 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 
Albania 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Bosnia N/A 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Croatia 4.6 4.4 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 
Macedonia 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 
Serbia 4.8 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 
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Table 5: Average political participation (1994-2009), by country (in percent) 
 Institutional political 
participation 
Non-institutional political 
participation 
Illegal political participation 
Country Voter (VAP) 
Turnout 
Party  
members. 
Signing a 
petition 
Joining in 
boycotts 
Attending 
peaceful 
demonst. 
Joining  
unofficial 
 strikes 
Occupy.  
buildings or 
factories 
        
10 New EU Members 58 3 24 5 12 3 1 
Bulgaria 71 5 10 3 12 4 3 
Czech Republic 70 5 39 8 17 7 1 
Estonia 49 2 19 3 13 2 0 
Hungary 53 2 19 3 6 1 0 
Latvia 52 2 22 5 21 2 0 
Lithuania 41 3 23 4 13 2 1 
Poland 48 1 21 5 10 4 2 
Romania 61 5 12 2 12 3 1 
Slovakia 71 5 44 6 11 3 1 
Slovenia 69 4 30 7 11 4 1 
Western Balkans 64 14 28 10 14 4 1 
Albania 70 20 24 9 19 2 1 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
49 16 23 7 8 4 1 
Croatia 74 7 42 7 8 5 1 
Macedonia 63 15 27 15 17 6 3 
Serbia 64 11 23 13 17 5 1 
Note: The percentages are rounded to whole numbers. 
Source: EVS (2011) and WVS (2009) 
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Table 6: Pooled time-series cross-national regression analysis on the impact of political 
participation on levels of democracy 
Dependent variable: 
Level of Democracy (fh_ipolity2) 
Voter (VAP) Turnout 
(Model 1a) 
Political Party 
Membership 
(Model 1b) 
Signing Petitions 
(Model 1c) 
Attending Peaceful 
Demonstr. 
(Model 1d) 
Voter (VAP) Turnout 0.006 
(0.01) 
- - - 
Voter (VAP) Turnout – WB -0.093*** 
(0.02) 
- - - 
Political Party Membership - 0.043* 
(0.02) 
- - 
Political Party Membership – WB - -0.081*** 
(0.03) 
- - 
Signing Petitions 
 
- - 0.006 
(0.00) 
- 
Signing Petitions – WB - - -0.037*** 
(0.01) 
- 
Attending Peaceful 
Demonstrations 
- - - 0.014* 
(0.01) 
Attending Peaceful 
Demonstrations – WB 
- - - -0.042*** 
(0.01) 
GDP p.c., PPP (thousands of 
USD) 
-0.026 
(0.02) 
0.020* 
(0.01) 
0.016 
(0.01) 
0.024** 
(0.01) 
Education 
 
-0.079 
(0.08) 
-0.054 
(0.04) 
-0.064 
(0.04) 
-0.071* 
(0.04) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.061 
(0.23) 
-0.003 
(0.12) 
-0.032 
(0.12) 
-0.060 
(0.12) 
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Ethnic fractionalization 0.252 
(0.93) 
0.075 
(0.42) 
0.068 
(0.42) 
-0.181 
(0.43) 
 
Religious fractionalization -0.637 
(1.01) 
-0.175 
(0.47) 
-0.152 
(0.47) 
-0.034 
(0.46) 
Political stability & 
absence of violence 
0.680** 
(0.29) 
0.106 
(0.13) 
-0.140 
(0.14) 
-0.094 
(0.13) 
Western Balkan dummy 1.182*** 
(0.38) 
0.457** 
(0.22) 
0.219 
(0.21) 
0.357* 
(0.20) 
Constant 
 
1.830 
(1.38) 
0.991** 
(0.46) 
1.144** 
(0.45) 
1.070** 
(0.45) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9369 0.9473 0.9468 0.9473 
Number of observations 51 172 172 172 
Note: The sample includes 18 Eastern European countries for the period 1994-2009. These are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The dependent variable is the level of democracy. The method of 
estimation is pooled-OLS with a constant term. The table reports the b-values on the coefficients and the standard errors (in 
parentheses). Appendix 2 gives detailed variable definitions and sources. (*Statistically significant at p<.1; ** Statistically 
significant at p<.05; *** Statistically significant at p<.01). 
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Table 7: Average political competition (1992-2009), by country 
Country Opposition share (%) Effective 
competition 
(ordinal) 
Electoral 
success of 
smaller 
parties (%) 
Legislature 
fractional. (P) 
Government 
fractional. (P) 
Opposition 
fractional. (P) 
       
10 New EU Members 44.52 4.3 60.27 0.75 0.42 0.59 
Bulgaria 40.35 3.5 53.15 0.66 0.25 0.52 
Czech Republic 49.93 4.4 64.14 0.72 0.32 0.53 
Estonia 49.56 3.6 69.51 0.80 0.47 0.66 
Hungary 41.42 5 58.47 0.63 0.30 0.37 
Latvia 45.89 4 68.22 0.79 0.55 0.60 
Lithuania 39.46 5 66.46 0.74 0.42 0.67 
Poland 46.21 4.4 55.60 0.73 0.39 0.59 
Romania 50.82 3.8 53.78 0.76 0.34 0.68 
Slovakia 43.18 3.9 58.06 0.79 0.57 0.60 
Slovenia 38.36 5 55.26 0.82 0.58 0.71 
Western Balkans 36.78 3.5 47.24 0.71 0.46 0.54 
Albania 31.22 3.7 44.66 0.57 0.26 0.35 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 24.29 / 53.12 0.88 0.76 0.78 
Croatia 43.97 3.4 44.93 0.68 0.22 0.58 
Macedonia 26.03 4 46.26 0.70 0.53 0.44 
Serbia 58.38 2.9 52.02 0.70 0.55 0.56 
Note: P denotes probability 
Source: Opposition share, Legislature fractionalization, Government fractionalization, Opposition fractionalization – 
Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 2012); Effective competition – (Marshall et al., 2012a); Electoral success of smaller 
parties – Vanhanen (2011) 
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Table 8: Pooled time-series cross-national regression analysis on the impact of political 
competition on levels of democracy 
Dependent variable: 
Level of Democracy 
(fh_ipolity2) 
Opposition 
share 
(Model 2a) 
Effective 
competition 
(Model 2b) 
Electoral 
success of 
smaller parties 
(Model 2c) 
Legislature 
fractional. 
(Model 2d) 
Government 
fractional. 
(Model 2e) 
Opposition 
fractional. 
(Model 2f) 
Opposition share 0.797** 
(0.38) 
- - - - - 
Opposition share – WB 0.990 
(0.88) 
- - - - - 
Effective competition - 0.369*** 
(0.08) 
- - - - 
Effective competition – 
WB 
- 0.438*** 
(0.13) 
- - - - 
Electoral success of 
smaller parties 
- - 0.015*** 
(0.00) 
- - - 
Electoral success of 
smaller parties – WB 
- - -0.002 
(0.01) 
- - - 
Legislature 
fractionalization 
- - - 0.087 
(0.47) 
- - 
Legislature 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - 2.421** 
(1.12) 
- - 
Government 
fractionalization 
- - - - -0.075 
(0.18) 
- 
Government 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - - 1.363*** 
(0.44) 
- 
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Note: The sample includes 18 Eastern European countries for the period 1992-2009. These are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Bosnia is not taken into consideration in the second model as there is 
missing data for the key independent variable (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2 for more information). The dependent variable is 
the level of democracy. The method of estimation is pooled-OLS with a constant term. The table reports the b-values on the 
coefficients and the standard errors (in parentheses). The Appendix 2 gives detailed variable definitions and sources. 
(*Statistically significant at p<.1; ** Statistically significant at p<.05; *** Statistically significant at p<.01). 
Opposition 
fractionalization 
- - - - - 0.117 
(0.24) 
Opposition 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - - - -1.31* 
(0.64) 
GDP p.c., PPP (thousands 
of USD) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.025** 
(0.01) 
0.027** 
(0.01) 
0.020* 
(0.01) 
0.022* 
(0.01) 
0.026** 
(0.01) 
Education 
 
-0.030 
(0.04) 
-0.096** 
(0.04) 
-0.096** 
(0.04) 
-0.082** 
(0.04) 
-0.090** 
(0.04) 
0.016 
(0.05) 
Trade openness 
 
0.004 
(0.12) 
-0.194* 
(0.10) 
-0.132 
(0.11) 
-0.148 
(0.12) 
-0.169 
(0.12) 
-0.060 
(0.12) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.088 
(0.42) 
0.775* 
(0.40) 
-0.458 
(0.45) 
-0.296 
(0.46) 
-0.183 
(0.44) 
0.144 
(0.44) 
Religious fractionalization -0.215 
(0.46) 
0.313 
(0.42) 
0.166 
(0.46) 
0.262 
(0.49) 
0.219 
(0.47) 
-0.401 
(0.48) 
Political stability & 
absence of violence 
0.099 
(0.14) 
-0.073 
(0.12) 
-0.084 
(0.13) 
-0.052 
(0.15) 
0.050 
(0.15) 
0.158 
(0.16) 
Western Balkan dummy 0.457 
(0.39) 
-1.780*** 
(0.52) 
-0.019 
(0.49) 
-1.818** 
(0.80) 
-0.560*** 
(0.21) 
0.400 
(0.35) 
Constant 
 
0.860* 
(0.48) 
0.604 
(0.51) 
1.213** 
(0.48) 
1.417** 
(0.61) 
1.564*** 
(0.48) 
1.643*** 
(0.55) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9236 0.9565 0.9500 0.9275 0.9250 0.8905 
Number of observations 171 174 176 160 162 159 
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Table 9: Robustness check with adjusted Freedom House/Polity2 democracy index as a 
dependent variable (pooled time-series cross-national regression analysis on the impact of 
political competition on levels of democracy) 
Dependent variable: 
Level of Democracy 
(fh_ipolity2_adjusted) 
Opposition 
share 
(Model 3a) 
Effective 
competition 
(Model 3b) 
Electoral 
success of 
smaller parties 
(Model 3c) 
Legislature 
fractional. 
(Model 3d) 
Government 
fractional. 
(Model 3e) 
Opposition 
fractional. 
(Model 3f) 
Opposition share 0.721* 
(0.37) 
- - - - - 
Opposition share – WB 1.136 
(0.87) 
- - - - - 
Effective competition - 0.274*** 
(0.07) 
- - - - 
Effective competition – 
WB 
- 0.513*** 
(0.13) 
- - - - 
Electoral success of 
smaller parties 
- - 0.015*** 
(0.00) 
- - - 
Electoral success of 
smaller parties – WB 
- - -0.002 
(0.01) 
- - - 
Legislature 
fractionalization 
- - - 0.060 
(0.46) 
- - 
Legislature 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - 3.062*** 
(1.09) 
- - 
Government 
fractionalization 
- - - - -0.108 
(0.18) 
- 
Government 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - - 1.449*** 
(0.43) 
- 
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Note: the sample includes 18 Eastern European countries for the period 1992-2009. These are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Bosnia is not taken into consideration in the second model as there is 
missing data for the key independent variable (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2 for more information). The dependent variable is 
the level of democracy. The method of estimation is pooled-OLS with a constant term. The table reports the b-values on the 
coefficients and the standard errors (in parentheses). The Appendix 2 gives detailed variable definitions and sources. 
(*Statistically significant at p<.1; ** Statistically significant at p<.05; *** Statistically significant at p<.01). 
Opposition 
fractionalization 
- - - - - 0.033 
(0.24) 
Opposition 
fractionalization – WB 
- - - - - -0.736 
(0.63) 
GDP p.c., PPP (thousands 
of USD) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.024** 
(0.01) 
0.023** 
(0.01) 
0.017 
(0.01) 
0.020* 
(0.01) 
0.021* 
(0.01) 
Education 
 
-0.036 
(0.04) 
-0.105*** 
(0.04) 
-0.101** 
(0.04) 
-0.089** 
(0.04) 
-0.097** 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.033 
(0.11) 
-0.221** 
(0.10) 
-0.168 
(0.11) 
-0.162 
(0.12) 
-0.208* 
(0.11) 
-0.111 
(0.11) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.093 
(0.41) 
0.483 
(0.39) 
-0.614 
(0.44) 
-0.472 
(0.45) 
-0.340 
(0.43) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
Religious fractionalization -0.017 
(0.45) 
0.481 
(0.42) 
0.364 
(0.45) 
0.417 
(0.48) 
0.416 
(0.46) 
-0.146 
(0.48) 
Political stability & 
absence of violence 
0.012 
(0.14) 
-0.188 
(0.12) 
-0.175 
(0.13) 
-0.137 
(0.14) 
-0.046 
(0.14) 
-0.042 
(0.15) 
Western Balkan dummy -0.573 
(0.39) 
-2.109*** 
(0.52) 
-0.064 
(0.48) 
-2.295*** 
(0.78) 
-0.632*** 
(0.20) 
0.156 
(0.34) 
Constant 
 
0.900* 
(0.46) 
0.845* 
(0.51) 
1.209** 
(0.47) 
1.475** 
(0.60) 
1.590*** 
(0.47) 
1.682*** 
(0.55) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9254 0.9580 0.9498 0.9252 0.9276 0.8862 
Number of observations 171 174 176 160 162 159 
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Figure 1: Average political participation (1994-2009) 
Source: EVS (2011); IIDEA (2011); WVS (2009) 
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Figure 2: Voter (VAP) turnout in parliamentary elections (1990-2009) 
 
Note: Election number 6 was held only in limited number of countries. Thus, the apparent 
reversal of the decreasing trend in the new EU member states is to some extent misleading. 
Source: IIDEA (2011) 
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Figure 3: Percentage distribution of adult population who applied for a job in the public 
sector in the three years prior to the survey and were not hired according to the perceived 
reason for not being recruited, Macedonia (2010) 
Note: Data refer to adult population (aged 18-64) who applied for a job in the public service in 
the 3 years prior to the survey and who were not recruited. 
Source: UNODC (2011) 
7% 
70% 
5% 
18% 
Somebody fitted job
requirements better
Somebody got the job
because of nepotism
Somebody got the job
because he/she paid
money
Don't know
186 
Figure 4: Percentage distribution of adult population who applied for a job in the public 
sector in the three years prior to the survey and were not hired according to the perceived 
reason for not being recruited, Western Balkan region (2010) 
Note: Data refers to adult population (aged 18-64) who applied for a job in the public service in the 
three years prior to the survey and who were not recruited. 
Source: UNODC (2011) 
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Figure 5: Corruption Perception Index, Western Balkan region (2003-2012) 
Note: A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale 
of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country 
is perceived as very clean. 
Source: Transparency International (2013) 
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Figure 6: Percentage of adult population asked to vote for a candidate at last national and 
local elections in exchange for money, goods or a local favor, by country/area (2010) 
Note: Data do not include Albania since the topic was not covered in the Albania survey. 
Source: UNODC (2011) 
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Figure 7: Electoral process ratings, Western Balkan region (2003-2012) 
Note: Best score = 1, worst score = 7. 
Source: Freedom House (2013), Nations in Transit Ratings 
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Figure 8: Average political competition (1992-2009) 
Note: While the variable Electoral success of smaller parties is given in percentages, variables 
Legislature fractionalization, Government fractionalization and Opposition fractionalization are 
calculated as probabilities. However, in order to ensure better comparability, these probabilities are 
converted into percentages. The variable Opposition share is calculated by the author as a ratio and 
converted into percentage (see Appendix 2 for more details). 
Source: Database of political institutions (Keefer, 2012) 
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Figure 9: Average effective competition (1992-2009) 
Note: The average effective competition in the Western Balkans is calculated as an average of only 
four Western Balkan states: Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. That is because Polity doesn’t 
provide a score for the cases of so-called foreign ‘interruption’, which is the case with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Source: Marshall et al. (2012a) 
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Appendix 2 
Variables definitions and sources 
 
- Attending peaceful demonstrations: percentage of 
respondents who have engaged in a political action 
by attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations. 
Source: EVS (2011); WVS (2009) 
- CSO Sustainability Index: The Sustainability Index 
reports on the strength and overall viability of CSO 
sectors. It analyzes and assigns scores to seven 
interrelated dimensions: legal environment, 
organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, 
service provision, infrastructure, and public image. 
These scores are averaged to produce an overall 
sustainability score. The Index ranges from 1 (best) 
to 7 (worst). Source: USAID (2012) 
- Education: Average years of total schooling in the 
population aged 25 and above. Source: Barro and 
Lee (2010) 
- Effective competition (originally named by Polity IV 
‘competitiveness of participation): ‚extent to which 
alternative preferences for policy and leadership can 
be pursued in the political arena. [It] is coded on a 
five category scale: repressed: no significant 
oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks 
of the regime and ruling party; suppressed: some 
organized, political competition occurs outside 
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government, without serious factionalism; but the 
regime systematically and sharply limits its form, 
extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial 
groups from participation; factional: polities with 
parochial or ethnic-based political factions that 
regularly compete for political influence in order to 
promote particularist agendas and favor group 
members to the detriment of common, secular, or 
cross-cutting agendas; transitional: transitional 
arrangements are accommodative of competing, 
parochial interests but have not fully linked 
parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian 
and secular interest groups coexist; competitive: 
there are relatively stable and enduring, secular 
political groups which regularly compete for 
political influence at the national level; ruling groups 
and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central 
power to competing groups.‛ Source: (Marshall et 
al., 2012a) 
- Electoral success of smaller parties: percentage of 
votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary 
elections. ‚The variable is calculated by subtracting 
from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest 
party (the party which wins most votes) in 
parliamentary elections. The variable thus 
theoretically ranges from 0 (only one party received 
100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a 
distinct party).‛ Source: Vanhanen (2011) 
- Ethnic/religious fractionalization: Index of 
ethnic/linguistic heterogeneity. It measures ‚the 
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probability that two randomly selected individuals 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnic/religious group.‛ Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
- GDP p.c., PPP: Real GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). Source: The World 
Bank (2010) 
- Government fractionalization: ‚probability that two 
deputies picked at random from the government 
parties will be of different parties.‛ Source: Database 
of Political Institutions (Keefer, 2012) 
- Legislature fractionalization: ‚probability that two 
deputies picked at random from the legislature will 
be of different parties.‛ Source: Database of Political 
Institutions (Keefer, 2012) 
- Level of democracy: Freedom House/Imputed Polity 
is a measure of democracy composed by two 
existing measures of democracy: Freedom House 
and Polity. Both measures are first transformed to a 
scale 0-10 and then averaged into a new measure. 
The imputed values for countries where data on 
Polity is missing are obtained by regressing Polity 
on the average Freedom House measure. Source: 
Teorell et al. (2011) 
- Opposition fractionalization: ‚probability that two 
deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties.‛ 
Source: Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 
2012) 
- Opposition share: ratio between the total number of 
seats held by all opposition parties and the total 
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number of seats held by all government parties. 
Source: Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 
2012) 
- Political party membership: percentage of the 
respondents who are members of a political party. 
Source: EVS (2011); WVS (2009) 
- Political stability & absence of violence: Index which 
measures the ‚perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism.‛ The index ranges 
from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to more political stability. Source: The 
World Bank (2010) 
- Signing petitions: percentage of respondents who 
have engaged in a political action by signing a 
petition. Source: EVS (2011); WVS (2009) 
- Trade openness: Dummy variable indicating trade 
openness based on five different indicators for 
specific trade-related policies. A country was 
classified as closed if it displayed at least one of the 
following characteristics: (1) Average tariff rates of 
40% or more; (2) Non-tariff barriers covering 40% or 
more of trade; (3) A black market exchange rate that 
is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official 
exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s; 
(4) A state monopoly on major export; (5) A socialist 
economic system. Source: Wacziarg and Welch 
(2008) 
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- Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Status Index 
which ranks the countries according to the state of 
their democracy and market economy, i.e. political 
and economic transformation, respectively. State of 
democracy is constructed upon evaluation of five 
criteria: Stateness, Political Participation, Rule of 
Law, Stability of Democratic Institutions and 
Political and Social Integration. State of market 
economy is constructed upon evaluation of seven 
criteria: Level of Socioeconomic Development, 
Organization of the Market and Competition, 
Currency and Price Stability, Private Property, 
Welfare Regime, Economic Performance and 
Sustainability. The Index ranges from 10 (best) to 1 
(worst) Source: Donner et al. (2012) 
- Voter (VAP) turnout: percentage of the voting age 
population that actually voted. Source: IIDEA (2011) 
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Political parties’ abbreviations 
 
Albania 
- Party of Labour of Albania (Partia e Punës e 
Shqipërisë, PPSh) 
- Democratic Party of Albania (Partia Demokratike e 
Shqipërisë, PDS) 
- Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e 
Shqipërisë, PSS) 
 
Bosnia 
- Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske 
Akcije, SDA) 
- Serbian Democratic Party (Serbian: Српска 
демократска Странка/Srpska Demokratska Stranka, 
СДС/SDS) 
- Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica, HDZ) 
- Coalition for a Single and Democratic Bosnia 
(Koalicija za cjelovitu I demokratsku BiH, KCDBiH) 
- Sloga Coalition (Koalicija Sloga, KS) 
- Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (Hrvatska 
demokratska zajednica BIH, HDZBiH) 
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Bulgaria 
- Bulgarian Socialist Party (Българска 
социалистическа партия/Bulgarska 
sotsialisticheska partiya, БСП/BSP) 
- Union of Democratic Forces (Съюз на 
демократичните сили/Sayuz na demokratichnite 
sili, СДС/SDS) 
- United Democratic Forces (Обединени 
демократични сили/Obedineni demokratichni sili, 
ОДС/ODS) 
 
Croatia 
- Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica, HDZ) 
 
Czech Republic 
- Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF) 
- Civic Democratic Party (Občansk{ demokratick{ 
strana, ODS) 
- Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak 
People's Party (Křesťansk{ a demokratick{ unie – 
Československ{ strana lidov{, KDU–CSL) 
- Civic Democratic Alliance (Občansk{ demokratick{ 
aliance, ODA) 
- Czech Social Democratic Party (Česk{ strana 
soci{lně demokratick{, CSSD) 
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Estonia 
- Bloc "Fatherland"(Valimisliit "Isamaa", I) 
- Bloc "Moderates" (Valimisliit "Mõõdukad", M) 
- Estonian National Independence Party (Eesti 
Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei, ERSP) 
- Bloc "Coalition Party and Country People's Union" 
(Valimisliit "Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus", 
KMU) 
- Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond, EK) 
- Pro Patria Union (Estonian: Isamaaliit, I) 
- Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond, ER) 
- People's Party Moderates (Rahvaerakond 
Mõõdukad, RM) 
 
Hungary 
- Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata 
Fórum, MDF) 
- Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and 
Civic Party (Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és 
Polgári Párt, FKGP) 
- Christian Democratic People's Party (Hungarian: 
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) 
- Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar 
Szocialista Párt, MSZP) 
- Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal 
Party (Hungarian: Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – 
a Magyar Liberális Párt, SZDSZ) 
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- Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz – Magyar 
Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz) 
 
Latvia 
- Popular Front of Latvia (Latvijas Tautas Fronte, LTF) 
- Latvian Way (Latvijas Ceļš, LC) 
- Political Union of Economists (Tautsaimnieku 
politiskā apvienība, TPA) 
- For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (Tēvzemei un 
Brīvībai/LNNK, TB/LNNK) 
- Latvian Farmers' Union (Latvijas Zemnieku 
savienība, LZS) 
- Christian Democratic Union (Kristīgi demokrātiskā 
savienība, KDS) 
- Latgalian Labour Party (LDP) 
- People's Party (Tautas partija, TP) 
- New Party (Jaunā Partija, JP) 
 
Lithuania 
- Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (Lietuvos 
demokratinė darbo partija, LDDP) 
- Homeland Union (Tėvynės sąjunga, TS) 
- Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Lietuvos 
krikščionys demokratai, LKD) 
- Centre Union of Lithuania (Lietuvos centro sąjunga, 
LCS) 
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Macedonia 
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia 
(Социјалдемократскиот сојуз на Македонија/ 
Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija, 
СДСМ/SDSM) 
- Liberal Party (Либерална партија, ЛП/LP) 
- Socialist Party of Macedonia (Социјалистичка 
партија на Македонија/ Socijalistička Partija na 
Makedonija, СПМ/SPM) 
- Party for Democratic Prosperity (Партија за 
демократски просперитет, Partija za demokratski 
prosperitet, ПДП/PDP) 
- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – 
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(Внатрешна македонска револуционерна 
организација – Демократска партија за 
македонско национално единство/Vnatrešna 
makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – 
Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno 
edinstvo, ВМРО-ДПМНЕ/VMRO–DPMNE) 
- Democratic Alternative (Демократска 
алтернатива/Demokratska Alternativa, ДА/DA) 
- Democratic Party of Albanians (Демократска 
партија на Албанците, Demokratska Partija na 
Albancite, ДПА/DPA) 
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Poland 
- Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD) 
- Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja 
Katolicka, WAK) 
- Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-
Demokratyczny, KLD) 
- Polish Economic Program (Polski Program 
Gospodarczy, PPG) 
- Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej, SLD) 
- Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 
PSL) 
- Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza 
Solidarność, AWS) 
 
Romania 
- Democratic National Salvation Front (Frontul 
Democrat al Salvării Nationale, FDSN) 
- Party of Social Democracy in Romania (Partidul 
Democraţiei Sociale in România, PDSR) 
- Romanian Democratic Convention (Convenţia 
Democrată Română, CDR) 
- Social Democratic Union (Uniunea Social 
Democrats, USD) 
- Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, 
(Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, 
UDMR) 
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Serbia 
- Socialist Party of Serbia (Социјалистичка партија 
Србије / Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS) 
- Yugoslav Left (Југословенска Левица, 
ЈУЛ/Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL) 
- New Democracy (Нова демоцратија/Nova 
demokratija, ND) 
 
Slovakia 
- Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za 
demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) 
- Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, 
SNS) 
- Union of the Workers of Slovakia (Slovak: Združenie 
robotníkov Slovenska, ZRS) 
- Slovak Democratic Coalition (Slovak: Slovenská 
demokratická koalícia, SDK) 
- Party of the Democratic Left (Slovak: Strana 
demokratickej ľavice, SDL) 
- Party of the Hungarian Coalition (Strana maďarskej 
koalície, SMK) 
- Party of Civic Understanding (Strana občianskeho 
porozumenia, SOP) 
Slovenia 
- Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Liberalna 
demokracija Slovenije, LDS) 
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- Slovene Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski 
demokrati, SKD) 
- Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, 
SLS) 
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